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Abstract 
 
The IPO market is characterised by a high level of information asymmetry; thus, 
self-interested managers have strong incentives to overstate earnings during the IPO to 
inflate stock prices. Prior literature has provided evidence of earnings manipulation by 
managers around IPOs. If managers opportunitically manipulate earnings in the IPO year, 
the reported earnings will not be sustainable, and the IPO firms will exhibit negative 
abnormal stock returns in subsequent periods due to investors’ downward adjustment of 
their evaluation of the firm value. Another common phenomenon of the IPO markets is 
the underperformance of IPO firms in the post-issue periods, with nearly a third of issuers 
either failing or being acquired within five years of going public. Therefore, in this thesis, 
I aim to examine potential factors contributing to restraining the level of earnings 
management undertaken by IPO firms and improving the post-issue long-term 
performance. Specifically, I investigate the impact of credit ratings and CEOs’ work 
experience on earnings management and post-issue performance of newly listed firms.  
I uncover strong evidence that newly listed firms going public with a credit rating 
are less likely to engage in income-enhancing earnings management through both 
accruals and real operating activities manipulation. Moreover, while unrated IPO firms 
manipulate earnings to mislead investors, rated issuers tend to employ accounting 
discretion for informative purposes. I also study the association between CEOs’ financial 
experience and earnings management around IPOs and find that IPO firms with financial 
expert CEOs are less likely to manage earnings through accruals. Furthermore, financial 
expert CEOs tend to be informative in financial reporting to allow investors to properly 
gauge the fair value of the firm. In addition, I investigate the influence of CEOs’ specialist 
managerial experience on the probability of failure and survivability of IPO firms. My 
findings suggest that specialist CEOs enhance the ability of IPO firms to remain viable 
for a longer period of time. 
My research not only contributes to a wide range of literature on IPOs, credit 
ratings, earnings management and managerial attributes but also provides several 
practical implications for regulators in monitoring IPO firms’ financial reporting, for 
investors in making investment decisions, and  for firms in considering relevant  work 
experience for CEO appointment. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Initial public offering (IPO) is an important period in which a firm transforms its 
status from a privately held to a public company. The IPO provides previously private 
firms an opportunity to gain a number of advantages such as expanding capital, becoming 
publicly traded, and enhancing public image (Ritter and Welch 2002; Brau and Fawcett 
2006). However, it involves various disadvantages such as complex procedures of going 
public, stringent requirement of information disclosure, and increased litigation risks 
(Jain and Kini 2000; Jain and Kini 2008). As part of the going public process, IPO firms 
are required to file a prospectus, which discloses useful information for investors to make 
informed investment decisions such as a description of the business, biographies of top 
executives and their compensation, risk factors, and especially financial statements up to 
previous three years (Teoh et al. 1998b). The prospectus is the main source of public 
information regarding the IPO firm. Due to the scarcity of public information available 
to investors, the IPO market is characterised by a high level of information asymmetry 
(Ritter and Welch 2002). Much information about the firm is held by managers, leaving 
outside investors with a great deal of information uncertainty (Cheung and Krinsky 1994; 
Barzel et al. 2006; Balatbat 2006).  
The information disparity induces two opposing incentives of managers. 
Managers of high quality firms may want to convey useful private information to less 
informed investors to signal the firm’s future prospects. However, self-interested 
managers may want to exploit this opaque information environment to act against the 
interests of shareholders. These different incentives can be fulfilled through a channel – 
financial reporting. Managers can exercise their accounting discretion to communicate 
the timing, risks, and magnitude of future cash flows to less informed investors so that 
investors will be able to properly evaluate the firm’s value. In contrast, self-interested 
managers can take advantage of the flexibility in accounting policies to manipulate 
earnings to mislead investors and influence short-term stock prices (Fields et al. 2001). 
Prior literature (for example, Alhadab et al. (2014), Marquardt and Wiedman (2004), 
DuCharme et al. (2004), Roosenboom et al. (2003), DuCharme ( 2001), Teoh et al. 
(1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), Friedlan (1994), and Aharony et al. (1993)) provides 
evidence that managers of IPO firms tend to engage in opportunistic earnings 
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management (EM) to increase stock prices around the offering. Prior studies document 
several determinants of EM around IPOs such as the participation of large auditing firms 
(Gul et al. 2009; Krishnan 2003; Becker et al. 1998), reputable underwriters (Lee and 
Masulis 2011; Jo et al. 2007), and venture capitalists (Wongsunwai 2013; Hochberg 2012; 
Lee and Masulis 2011; Morsfield and Tan 2006). In my thesis, I examine additional 
factors explaining EM of IPO firms which have been scarcely explored in the literature. 
Specifically, I analyse the association between credit ratings and CEOs’ financial 
experience and EM around IPOs. Moreover, I further investigate whether firms that have 
a credit rating before going public and those whose CEOs have past financial experience 
provide more informative financial reporting. 
Another important phenomenon witnessed in the IPO market that has been widely 
examined in the IPO literature is the long-term underperformance. The IPO involves 
substantial organisational transformations and fundamental changes in operational 
structures that considerably influence the competitive position of the firm (Jain and Kini 
2008). Moreover, IPO firms are exposed to more stringent scrutiny from regulators and 
capital market participants (Ball and Shivakumar 2008). These shifts threaten the survival 
of IPOs. Prior empirical evidence suggests that IPO firms show substantial initial returns, 
but demonstrate poor long-run performance, with one third of firms either failing or being 
acquired within five years following the offering (Ritter 2003; Ritter and Welch 2002; 
Loughran et al. 1994; Ritter 1991). Being intrigued by the impact of CEOs’ work 
experience on firms’ decisions and outcomes, I question whether the career experience of 
CEOs contributes to the long-term IPO surviablity. 
The next three sections of this chapter provide a brief summary of the motivation, 
methodology, findings, and contributions of the three previously discussed research areas 
of this thesis. 
 
1.2. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are an important information intermediary and 
gatekeeper of the capital markets. They provide investors with their independent assertion 
of the creditworthiness of a borrowing entity or a debt issue. Since CRAs are excluded 
from the Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD), they can have access to private information 
relevant to their assessment of the issuer (Jorion et al. 2005). Therefore, credit ratings 
convey both private and public information and CRAs have been appreciated by their 
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contribution to reducing the information asymmetry in the IPO market (An and Chan 
2008; Chan and Lo 2011). Besides their informational function, CRAs also exert their 
monitoring impacts in both the initial rating and post-issue surveillance procedures 
(Arnoud et al. 2006; Bannier and Hirsch 2010; Bonsall et al. 2015). Due to the 
significance of CRAs in the capital markets, I am motivated to fill the gap in the literature 
and explore EM by rated IPO firms. I argue that the monitoring of CRAs and the reduced 
information asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating may weaken the incentives 
of rated IPO firms to opportunistically manipulate earnings since their financial reporting 
misbehaviours are more likely to be detected. Moreover, the lower information 
asymmetries may encourage high quality rated IPO firms to signal their future prospects 
by employing accounting discretion to convey private information to less informed 
investors because investors are more likely to accurately interpret that information.  
In order to investigate the impact of credit ratings on EM around IPOs, I aim to 
address two main research questions: (1) Whether rated IPO firms are less likely to 
engage in EM in the offering year, and (2) Whether managers of rated IPO firms exercise 
their accounting discretion for informative purposes. I analyse both accrual-based and 
real EM to have a complete view of EM undertaken by IPO firms. Moreover, I 
acknowledge the potential issue of self-selection bias, which occurs when the firm can 
choose to have a credit rating, and endogeneity, which exists when there is a correlation 
between EM determinants and factors influencing the firm’s decision to have a credit 
rating. I address this endogenous selection problem by employing several econometric 
methods commonly used in the literature including the instrumental variable model, 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step treatment effect model, and the maximum likelihood 
treatment effect model.  
I document that IPO firms with a credit rating are associated with a lower level of 
income-increasing accrual-based and real EM. I also find that the level of income-
increasing EM in the offering year of rated IPO firms is positively linked with subsequent 
accounting performance, but insignificantly related to long-term post-issue abnormal 
stock returns. The results suggest that managers of IPO firms going public with a credit 
rating are less likely to engage in EM in the offering year to overstate earnings. Moreover, 
they tend to use their accounting discretion to better inform the market about the firm’s 
future prospects.   
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. I provide new 
empirical evidence on the role of CRAs in reducing EM around IPOs, thereby extending 
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the literature on determinants of EM. My study also compliments the research on the 
significance of information environment around IPOs in determining managers’ intent to 
undertake EM. Moreover, my findings have important implications for capital market 
participants and regulators in assessing financial reports of rated IPO firms. 
 
1.3. Financial expert CEOs and earnings management around IPOs 
Studies on EM mainly focus on examining the significance of firm characteristics 
in explaining the variation in EM across firms. Researchers have recently paid increasing 
attention to the effects of managerial characteristics.  Studies on managerial influence on 
corporate decisions are primarily based on predictions of the well-known upper echelons 
theory developed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). The theory predicts that managerial 
personalities, backgrounds, and past experiences can affect how managers interpret 
business circumstances and deal with problems, thereby influencing organisational 
outcomes. Voluminous empirical evidence across a wide array of managerial attributes 
confirms the validity of the theory. Functional track is an important background 
characteristic suggested by the upper echelons theory as having a considerable impact on 
managers’ strategic perspectives, knowledge, and skills. I expect that CEOs with financial 
experience will have superior finance and accounting understanding, which may 
positively enhance the financial reporting process. Thus, I am motivated to examine the 
linkage between CEOs’ financial experience and EM among IPO firms. The empirical 
evidence on this topic is scarce. There is a study by Jiang et al. (2013) which examines 
the association between CEOs’ financial experience and EM among Chinese listed firms. 
My study is conducted in the IPO market which is a more favourable setting to examine 
not only the magnitude of EM but also the incentives of managers behind undertaking 
this financial reporting misbehaviour because managerial opportunism is more strongly 
driven by information asymmetries (Dye 1988; Trueman and Titman 1988). 
The research questions that I aim to answer in order to understand whether the 
financial experience of CEOs influences the magnitude of EM around IPOs are: (1) 
Whether financial expert CEOs are associated with lower EM in the offering year, and 
(2) Whether financial expert CEOs use their accounting discretion to better inform 
investors. I analyse detailed biographical information of CEOs and extract data from their 
past financial experience prior to becoming the CEO of the current IPO firm. I address 
the potential selection bias due to the endogenous matching between CEOs and firms by 
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employing various econometric techniques including the propensity score matching, the 
instrumental variable approach, Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effect model, and 
the maximum likelihood treatment effect model.  
I find that financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in EM in the IPO year. 
I also document a positive association between at-issue managed earnings and subsequent 
accounting performance and an insignificant linkage between aggressive EM in the issue 
year and long-run post-issue stock performance for IPO firms managed by financial 
expert CEOs. The results suggest that financial expert CEOs not only contribute to 
curtailing EM of IPO firms but also enhance the informativeness of reported earnings.  
To the best of my knowledge, this research provides the first empirical evidence 
on the influence of financial expert CEOs on EM around IPOs. My findings also add to 
the growing literature on the impact of managerial characteristics on EM. Moreover, my 
results confirm the upper echelons theory’s prediction about the influence of managerial 
functional experience on corporate decisions. Last but not least, my study offers practical 
implications for investors in assessing financial reporting outcomes of IPO firms 
managed by financial expert CEOs, and for firms in deciding to hire CEOs having prior 
financial experience.   
 
1.4. Specialist CEOs and IPO survival 
The work experience of CEOs has been documented to influence corporate 
strategic choices such as corporate investment (Hu and Liu 2015), divesture (Huang 
2014), strategic and social novelty (Crossland et al. 2014), cost of equity (Mishra 2014), 
financial policies (Custódio and Metzger 2014), and acquisitions (Custódio and Metzger 
2013). Nevertheless, little has been done regarding the effect of CEOs’ work experience 
on organisational performance. Since I am interested in examining the overall future 
survival profiles of IPO firms rather than any particular strategic decisions, I focus on a 
more general metric of work experience instead of the functional experience of CEOs. 
Specifically, I investigate the extent to which CEOs’ general managerial ability influences 
IPO survival. 
I examine the association between CEOs’ specialist managerial ability and the 
survival profiles of IPO firms. I extract the details of CEOs’ lifetime work histories prior 
to rising to the current CEO position and construct a general managerial ability index 
following the method by Custódio et al. (2013). The general managerial ability index is 
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the first factor of the principal component analysis on the five aspects of CEOs’ prior 
work experience: the number of roles, the number of firms, the number of industries, CEO 
experience in another firm, and experience in a conglomerate firm. A CEO is categorised 
as a generalist if the index is equal to or above the sample median, and a CEO is classified 
as a specialist if the index is below the sample median.  
I conduct the survival analysis to examine the differences in the survival and 
hazard curves of IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs, and to 
analyse the association between specialist CEOs and the probability of failure and 
survival rates in the periods following the issue. I find that IPO firms with specialist CEOs 
have a lower probability of failure and higher survival rates. Particularly, the failure risk 
of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is 35% that of firms with generalist CEOs.  
My findings contribute to the large body of literature on the influence of 
managerial characteristics on corporate choices by offering novel empirical evidence of 
the relationship between CEOs’ specialist managerial experience and the probability of 
failure and time to survive in periods subsequent to the stock issuance. My study also 
provides useful insights into the determinants of IPO survival. Particularly, it suggests 
that hiring more costly generalist CEOs may not be desirable for longer survivability of 
IPO firms, and firms may want to consider specialist managerial skills in making CEO 
recruitment decisions.  
The rest of my thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 present my studies 
on the previously discussed research topics in the format of three papers. Specifically, 
Chapter 2 investigates the influence of credit ratings on EM around IPOs. Chapter 3 
explores the association between financial expert CEOs and EM among IPO firms. 
Chapter 4 examines the role of CEOs with specialist managerial experience in enhancing 
the IPO survival. Finally, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks.  
7 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 – Credit ratings and earnings management around 
IPOs 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In November 2010, General Motors Co. (GM) made one of the largest IPOs in the 
US history, raising a record US$20.1 billion. This highlighted GM’s remarkable 
comeback after its government-backed reorganisation and Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection filing in June 2009. GM showed a notable turnaround and reported earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) of US$2.0 billion, an EBIT margin of 6.1%, and US$3.8 
billion in cash from its operating activities. One month before its planned IPO on the New 
York Stock Exchange, and for the first time since being under bankruptcy protection, GM 
received ratings from all three of the largest credit rating agencies (CRAs)1. GM’s 
reported profitability and credit ratings may have favourably influenced its IPO. 
However, it is questionable whether we can regard the firm’s reported earnings as a 
credible measure of its future prospects as its earnings may have been manipulated to 
appear attractive to investors, and whether the existence of credit ratings provided the 
investors with certainty about the quality of GM’s reported earnings. 
Earnings are an important indicator of firm performance, and investors commonly 
rely on them to value stocks; thus, managers have strong incentives to manipulate 
earnings to influence short-term stock prices. The incentives of managers are stronger 
around an initial stock issuance due to the high level of information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors. Various studies investigating earnings management 
(EM) in the IPO market find evidence of opportunistic income-increasing EM around 
IPOs and a negative association between EM and post-issue long-run stock performance 
that suggests the incapability of market participants to adequately adjust for EM in their 
firm valuation (Aharony et al. 1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b; 
Roosenbloom and Van De Goot 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004; Gramlich and Sorensen 
2004). The accounting research also demonstrates that certain parties, such as the audit 
committee, the board of directors, external auditors, venture capitalists, and underwriters 
                                                          
1 Standard & Poor’s assigned GM a corporate credit rating of BB- with a stable outlook because of the company’s 
improved balance sheet and prospects for profitability and positive free operating cash flow. This rating is one level 
higher than that of GM’s rival, Ford Motor Co. Fitch gave the same rating, and Moody’s gave a rating of one level 
higher (Ba2). 
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can restrain managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings (Becker et al. 1998; Klein 2002; 
Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and Masulis 2011). However, to my knowledge, few studies 
have examined the role of CRAs in influencing IPO issuers’ EM activities.  
I hypothesise that CRAs disincentivise IPO firms from engaging in EM through 
their two main economic functions as an information intermediary and a monitor. By 
acting as an information intermediary, CRAs provide an independent assessment of the 
creditworthiness of a borrowing entity or a debt issue. In evaluating the firm, credit 
analysts thoroughly review both public sources of information and relevant private 
information provided by managers. Particularly, after the enactment of the Regulation 
Fair Disclosure (FD), credit analysts can have access to confidential information which 
is not made available to other investment professionals such as equity analysts (Jorion et 
al. 2005). Therefore, CRAs provide the market with information beyond publicly 
available sources, contributing to alleviating information asymmetries in the IPO markets 
(An and Chan 2008; Chan and Lo 2011). Besides their informational role, CRAs also play 
an important function as a monitor (Arnoud et al. 2006; Bannier and Hirsch 2010; Bonsall 
et al. 2015). CRAs conduct due diligence on the issuer in the initial rating and 
subsequently keep track of the developments that may affect its risk profiles to adjust the 
rating accordingly. Moreover, CRAs’ incentives to thoroughly monitor are strengthened 
due to their reputational concerns and heightened regulatory oversight (Cheng and 
Neamtiu 2009). The monitoring of CRAs and the reduced information asymmetry due to 
the provision of a credit rating may weaken the incentives of rated IPO firms to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings since their financial reporting misbehaviours are 
more likely to be detected. Moreover, the lower information asymmetries may encourage 
high quality rated IPO firms to signal their future prospects by employing accounting 
discretion to convey private information to less informed investors because investors are 
more likely to accurately interpret that information. 
Due to the distinct roles of CRAs in the capital markets and the gap in the literature 
on the influence of CRAs on EM around IPOs, I seek to answer these research questions: 
(1) whether rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in EM in the offering year, and (2) 
whether rated IPO firms use accounting discretion to better inform the market. To address 
these questions, I analyse a sample of common share US IPOs over the period 1991–
2011. In order to establish a complete view of EM, I investigate two EM methods: (1) 
accrual-based EM, which involves exploiting the accounting discretion over the 
recognition of accruals, and (2) real EM, which concerns altering the timing or structuring 
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of real economic activities. Moreover, I account for the self-selection bias, which occurs 
due to the firm’s choice to obtain a credit rating, and the endogeneity problem, which 
happens due to the potential correlation between EM determinants and factors influencing 
the firm’s decision to solicit a credit rating. To account for the endogenous selection issue, 
I employ alternative econometric techniques including Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
treatment effect model, the maximum likelihood treatment effect model, and the 
instrumental variable model. 
My primary finding is that IPO firms with a credit rating are less likely to 
manipulate accruals and real operating activities to achieve higher reported earnings. 
Credit rating levels, however, do not appear to explain the variation in EM around IPOs. 
This suggests that the monitoring of CRAs and the reduced information asymmetry due 
principally to the provision of a credit rating are significant in preventing rated firms from 
engaging in EM. The impact of CRAs on constraining EM around IPOs is less 
pronounced when controlling for the interaction effects of CRAs and venture capitalists, 
investment banks, and auditing firms, whose roles in inhibiting EM have been 
documented in prior literature. For firms without a venture capitalist, CRAs still 
significantly reduce both accrual-based and real EM. For IPOs not being underwritten by 
a top-tier investment bank, CRAs only significantly reduce accrual-based EM, but not 
real EM. Particularly, for issuers not having their financial reports audited by a high 
quality auditor, I do not find a significant association between CRAs and either accrual-
based or real EM. The findings suggest that the coordination between CRAs and the other 
financial intermediaries is important in inhibiting EM around IPOs; especially, the 
presence of experienced auditors is crucial for the restraining impact of CRAs on EM to 
work.  
Furthermore, rating existence not only influences income-increasing EM in the 
offering year but also affects managers’ intention of using their discretion to report higher 
earnings. I document that at-issue income-increasing EM of rated firms is positively 
related to subsequent accounting performance. The relationship is insignificant for firms 
without a credit rating. Analysing post-issue stock performance, I document that while 
at-issue income-increasing EM is negatively linked to post-issue long-run stock 
performance for unrated issuers, the long-run stock returns of rated firms are not 
associated with the extent of EM in the issue year. The evidence indicates that while 
unrated firms tend to manage earnings upward to mislead investors, managers of rated 
companies are more likely to exercise their discretion in accounting and operating 
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decisions to signal the firm’s future prospects. It also supports the role of a credit rating 
in reducing the information asymmetry around IPOs. Lower information asymmetry 
reduces information uncertainty and allows investors to more immediately recognise EM 
and adjust for it in their stock valuation; therefore, the post-issue long-term stock returns 
are insignificantly related to at-issue EM.  
My study makes several contributions to the IPO, EM, and credit rating literature. 
Prior studies document opportunistic accrual-based EM around IPOs (Aharony et al. 
1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b; Roosenbloom and Van De 
Goot 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004) and highlight the roles of financial intermediaries 
including auditors, venture capitalists and investment banks in restraining IPO firms’ EM 
(Morsfield and Tan 2006; Venkataraman et al. 2008; Lee and Masulis 2011; Hochberg 
2012; Wongsunwai 2013). My findings provide new empirical evidence to support the 
impact of another important intermediary in the capital markets – CRAs on EM around 
IPOs. I also examine both the accrual-based and real EM in order to have more complete 
insights into the EM activities. In addition, Chen et al. (2013) argue that the extent of 
information uncertainty surrounding IPO firms affects managers’ intent to involve in EM. 
Specifically, high-information-uncertainty issuers opportunistically manipulate earnings, 
meanwhile low-information-uncertainty firms manage earnings for informative purposes. 
Prior research on CRAs in the IPO markets (for example, An and Chan (2008), Chan and 
Lo (2011)) suggests that credit ratings convey useful information that can reduce the 
information asymmetry around IPOs. I present further empirical evidence of the 
importance of information environment around IPOs in influencing managerial incentives 
in engaging in EM. I show that the provision of a credit rating reduces information 
uncertainty, allowing investors more accurately interpret managers’ messages, thereby 
motivating managers of rated firms to signal their value through informative EM. 
Moreover, several studies (e.g., Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), and Morsfield 
and Tan (2006)) show that abnormal accruals in the offering year predict the 
underperformance of IPO firms. I provide additional evidence that the relationship 
between at-issue EM and post-issue underperformance is significant among unrated IPO 
firms only. For rated issuers, since the accounting discretion is employed for informative 
purposes instead of misleading the market, at-issue EM does not explain the post-IPO 
underperformance. The research also provides important implications for practitioners 
and regulators in evaluating the quality of the financial reporting of firms going public 
with a credit rating. For sophisticated investors, my results suggest that the presence of a 
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credit rating can signal higher quality financial reporting in terms of lower opportunistic 
EM around IPOs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses related 
literature. Section 2.3 explains hypothesis development. Section 2.4 describes the sample 
and methodology in details. Section 2.5 presents the empirical models of the impact of 
credit ratings on EM around IPOs and the association between at-issue EM and post-issue 
accounting and stock performance. Section 2.6 presents the empirical results. Section 2.7 
provides additional tests and robustness checks for my findings. Finally, Section 2.8 
concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Literature review 
2.2.1. Theoretical framework 
 The theoretical underpinning of the study is agency theory. An important feature 
of this theory is that it views the firm as a nexus of contracting relationships such as those 
between executives and stakeholders. It is largely concerned with the principal-agent 
problem due to the conflict of interests between the principal (e.g., shareholders) and the 
agent (e.g., company executives) that arise when information asymmetry exists between 
the two parties  (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The information asymmetry mainly involves 
the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. An adverse selection problem occurs 
when managers have access to private information relevant to decision making. On the 
other hand, a moral hazard problem happens when managers make decisions which are 
inappropriate from the view of shareholders or not aligned with shareholders’ interests, 
yet shareholders are unable to observe these actions.  
 The IPO market is characterised by high information asymmetries. When 
information asymmetries are present, accounting choices can serve as a channel through 
which better informed insiders can effectively convey information about the magnitude, 
timing, and risk of future cash flows to less informed outsiders; however, compensation, 
reputation or other self-interested incentives may induce managers to take advantage of 
the information disparity to inflate earnings to influence stock prices (Fields et al. 2001). 
When a firm goes public, it discloses its financial information for the first time in the 
prospectus, which includes financial statements for up to the most recent three years. 
Public sources of information about private firms are limited; therefore, much private and 
valuable information about the IPO issuer prior to the offering is in possession of its 
managers, preventing outside investors from thoroughly understanding the firm (Cheung 
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and Krinsky 1994; Barzel et al. 2006; Balatbat 2006). This information disparity between 
investors and issuers and the lack of reliable independent information sources make it 
difficult for investors to evaluate the appropriateness of reported accounting figures in 
reflecting the firm’s future performance. Thus, self-interested managers have strong 
incentives to opportunistically manipulate reported earnings at the time of the IPO to 
inflate stock prices. In the immediate post-IPO period, the lock-up restriction for the 
managerial sale of shares, earnings projections, and risks of future lawsuits due to an 
abnormal drop in stock prices are argued to induce managers to continue to manage 
earnings upward to maintain high stock prices at the end of the IPO year (Teoh et al. 
1998b).  
 
2.2.2. Accrual-based earnings management around IPOs 
Research on EM around IPOs mainly analyses managers’ use of accruals in the 
period of taking their firms public and documents accrual manipulation by IPO issuers. 
Initial studies by Aharony et al. (1993) and Friedlan (1994) suggest income-increasing 
accrual-based EM by managers before the offering. Teoh et al. (1998b) further provide 
evidence of high positive abnormal accruals in the IPO year. Moreover, Teoh et al. 
(1998a) report that issue-year abnormal accruals are negatively correlated with post-issue 
long-run stock returns. This is consistent with the notion that managers opportunistically 
manipulate earnings to achieve higher offer prices while investors are unable to 
immediately recognise this behaviour. Subsequent studies also confirm the aggressive use 
of accruals by managers around IPOs (DuCharme 2001; Roosenboom et al. 2003; 
DuCharme et al. 2004; Marquardt and Wiedman 2004; Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and 
Masulis 2011; Alhadab et al. 2014). However, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) provide a 
contrary finding. They argue that IPOs attract the attention of regulators and various 
parties such as auditors, analysts, investors, and the press; therefore, IPO firms are more 
pressured to provide higher quality financial reports. Examining a sample of UK firms 
whose financial statements filed as private firms are comparable to those restated and 
presented in the IPO prospectuses, they document that IPO firms tend to report more 
conservatively in response to increasing demand for higher quality financial reporting by 
capital market participants. Nevertheless, Lo (2008) argues that sophisticated managers 
are more likely to provide non-comparable reports to make their earnings manipulation 
less detectable; therefore, the restrictive sample selection by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
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may exclude IPO firms that engage in EM and the conclusion of no income-enhancing 
EM by IPO firms may not hold. 
 
2.2.3. Real earnings management around IPOs 
Besides accrual-based EM, increasing interest has been placed on real EM as 
another method to manipulate earnings. Contrary to accrual-based EM, which involves 
making within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounting choices to 
bias reported earnings, real EM occurs when managers deliberately alter the timing or 
structure of actual operating, investment or financing transactions to achieve desirable 
financial reporting results. While accrual-based EM does not affect cash flows because it 
is undertaken solely through the choice of accounting methods used to recognise business 
transactions, real EM affects operating activities and ultimately cash flows. There are 
several reasons for managers’ greater preference to undertake real EM than accrual-based 
EM. First, managing earnings through real activities is less likely to draw scrutiny from 
auditors and regulators than through accruals (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; 
Cohen et al. 2008). Moreover, relying solely on accrual manipulation to meet earnings 
targets is risky. Since accrual-based EM occurs at the end of the fiscal period, if reported 
earnings being manipulated by accrual-based EM fall short of the desired threshold, 
managers will be unable to adjust real activities at the end of the fiscal year (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010). Zang (2012) reports that managers adjust the degree of 
accrual-based EM used at the end of the fiscal year based on the amount of real activities 
manipulation realised during the year. In addition, managers’ flexibility to 
opportunistically manipulate earnings through accrual-based EM in the current year 
decreases with the extent of manipulated accruals in previous years as the balance sheet 
accumulates all the effects of previous accounting choices (Barton and Simko 2002). 
Hence, firms that extensively engage in accrual-based EM in earlier periods tend to 
undertake real EM in the current period (Gunny 2010).  
Despite the extensive research on accrual-based EM around IPOs, evidence of real 
EM by IPO issuers is less documented. The survey of 400 executives conducted by 
Graham et al. (2005) reports that managers are reluctant to make within-GAAP 
accounting choices to manage earnings. Instead, they manage real activities to maintain 
financial reporting outcomes. In order to meet an earnings target, 80% of respondents 
would choose to decrease discretionary expenses on research and development (R&D), 
advertising, and maintenance, while 55% would postpone a new project even if such delay 
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could cause a minor loss in firm value. Darrough and Rangan (2005) provide evidence 
that IPO firms upwardly manage earnings in the IPO year by reducing R&D expenses. 
Roychowdhury (2006) indicates that firms avoid reporting annual losses by utilising 
multiple real EM tools. Specifically, managers may offer price discounts and lenient 
credit terms to boost sales. They may also increase production to allocate overheads to 
larger inventory, thereby lowering cost of goods sold and improving operating margins. 
In addition, managers may reduce discretionary expenses such as advertising, R&D, and 
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses to increase earnings. Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010) find evidence of real EM around seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and 
document a greater decrease in operating performance due to real EM than due to accrual-
based EM in the post-SEO period. Alhadab et al. (2014) report that UK IPO firms engage 
in both accrual-based and real EM during the offering year to overstate earnings. They 
document that issuers with a higher magnitude of EM in the issue year subsequently have 
a higher probability of IPO failure and lower survival rates. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis development 
2.3.1. Credit rating agencies and earnings management around IPOs 
I hypothesize that CRAs can influence EM around IPOs by alleviating the agency 
problem via two mechanisms: information dissemination and monitoring. 
Informational role of credit rating agencies 
CRAs provide the market with their independent assessment of the firm’s 
creditworthiness based on publicly disclosed information in securities filings and relevant 
private information gathered in the due diligence process. They assess the likelihood that 
an issuer will default on its financial obligations by reviewing both financial and non-
financial factors such as macroeconomics environment, market conditions, competitive 
trends, corporate governance, growth prospects, operations and risk management, 
business plan, and financial position statements. Credit analysts also conduct in-depth 
interviews and discussions with company managers to obtain additional information and 
clarification about management policies, current positions, and future plans that may 
influence the rating. Research on the informational content of rating announcements (e.g., 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hand et al. (1992), Dichev and Piotroski (2001)) shows 
that rating changes significantly influence stock prices, suggesting that CRAs provide 
valuable information to market participants. Particularly, in 2000, the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Regulation FD which prohibits publicly traded 
companies from selectively disclosing private material information to their preferred 
investment professionals. Since CRAs are excluded from the Regulation FD, managers 
can provide credit analysts with relevant private information of the firm. Therefore, credit 
ratings convey additional information to the market beyond what is publicly disclosed, 
contributing to bridging the information gap between issuers and investors. Jorion et al. 
(2005) show that the informational impact of credit ratings is significantly strengthened 
after the implementation of the Regulation FD. Prior studies also document the role of 
credit ratings in reducing information asymmetry problem in the IPO markets (e.g., An 
and Chan (2008), Chan and Lo (2011)).  
Monitoring role of credit rating agencies 
The economic role of CRAs goes beyond mitigating information asymmetries. 
CRAs are widely considered as important gatekeepers of the capital markets. Employing 
their expertise, established methodologies, and access to a wide pool of both public and 
private information, they provide the market with their assessment of the issuer’s 
creditworthiness. Through the initial investigation, CRAs exert monitoring impacts on 
the issuer (Bonsall et al. 2015). CRAs’ monitoring function is also apparent in their 
surveillance procedure. After the initial rating, credit analysts maintain periodic contact 
with the issuer’s management to track developments that may affect the issuer’s credit 
risk profiles. As a result of the surveillance analysis, CRAs may adjust the credit rating 
to timely reflect changes in their opinion of the issuer’s creditworthiness. Bannier and 
Hirsch (2010) argue that CRAs appear to have fulfilled an active monitoring role through 
their rating review procedures. Moreover, CRAs’ incentives to monitor are strengthened 
by their reputational concerns. Since credit rating market is concentrated with a limited 
number of competitors, the survival and future profitability of CRAs are largely 
dependent on their reputation. The reputation of CRAs is directly affected by the 
performance of the issuer after the rating. Therefore, to maintain and improve their 
established reputation, it is important for CRAs to closely follow the issuer to assign 
timely and accurate ratings. 
There is a prevalent concern that CRAs’ monitoring may be weakened by the 
conflict of interests inherent in the issuer-pay model (i.e., the issuer pays the CRA for the 
rating). CRAs’ independence may also be compromised when the agency engages in other 
ancillary business services with the issuer besides the rating. In addition, CRAs have 
faced widespread criticism for the lack of rating timeliness in predicting prominent 
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bankruptcies in the past decade such as Enron in 2001, World.com in 2002, Parmalat in 
2003, and the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-2008. In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, CRAs have come under increased scrutiny. Several regulatory reforms have been 
implemented to enhance the regulation of CRAs such as the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 in the U.S. and European Union directives such as the Capital Requirements 
Directive of 2006. Failing to properly monitor the issuer and timely adjust ratings to 
predict a decline in credit quality is costly to CRAs, especially in terms of potential loss 
of reputation, additional regulatory burdens, and deterioration in future profitability. 
Cheng and Neamtiu (2009) show that CRAs improve their credit analysis when their 
market power is threatened by increased regulatory oversight and reputational concerns.  
Another relevant issue regards the monitoring of CRAs over the financial 
reporting process. Rating agencies largely rely on public and private information 
voluntarily provided by management; hence, the accuracy of their assessment depends 
considerably on the complete and honest information disclosure. In evaluating the issuer, 
credit analysts use a substantial amount of information from financial statements; 
therefore, a crucial part of the rating analysis entails the assessment of the quality of 
reported accounting numbers (Jorion et al. 2009). Although CRAs count on the 
verification service of auditors and do not repeat their auditing work, following the 
aftermath of the internet bubble period, CRAs recruit trained accountants to perform 
forensic accounting analysis and assist credit analysts in interpreting financial statements 
(Coffee 2006). Jorion et al. (2009) document that CRAs rationally employ stricter rating 
criteria to firms that engage in aggressive EM and adjust their ratings downward to 
appropriately reflect the firms’ true underlying economics.  
Overall, the reduced information asymmetry due to the provision of credit ratings 
and the monitoring of CRAs will make it more likely for financial reporting 
misbehaviours to be discovered. IPO firms will face severe consequences such as 
reputation loss, high costs of capital, and litigation risks if they are found to engage in 
accounting manipulation.  Therefore, I expect that managers of rated IPO firms will have 
weaker incentives to manipulate earnings to influence stock prices. Based upon existing 
empirical evidence, I examine both accrual-based and real EM by IPO issuers during the 
offering year and predict that rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in both accrual-
based and real EM to overstate earnings. My first hypothesis is:  
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H1: Rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in income-increasing EM (accrual-
based EM and real EM) than unrated IPO firms in the offering year. 
 
2.3.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance of rated 
IPO firms 
 Two opposing streams of literature have emerged regarding the managerial intent 
in managing earnings around IPOs. One stream supports the view that IPO is an 
opportunity for initial investors to cash their stock. Therefore, opportunistic managers 
have a motive to overstate earnings to maximize stock prices. Various studies support this 
view of managerial opportunism around IPOs (e.g., Aharony et al. (1993), Friedlan 
(1994), Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), DuCharme et al. (2004), Morsfield and 
Tan (2006), Lee and Masulis (2011)). The other stream views IPO as an external 
financing occasion; therefore, opportunistic EM is undesirable as managed accruals will 
be reversed in subsequent periods and consequently hurt post-IPO stock performance. In 
order to improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital, managers will seek to 
signal firm value to external investors. EM, in this view, is a means by which managers 
communicate private information about the firm’s future prospects to the market (Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978; Healy and Palepu 1993; Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996; 
Fields et al. 2001; Kallunki and Martikainen 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005; Herbohn 
et al. 2010).  
 The extent of information uncertainty may influence managerial intent in 
managing earnings. In the presence of high information uncertainty, self-interested 
managers have stronger incentives to opportunistically manipulate earnings because their 
financial reporting misbehavours are less likely to be detected (Dye 1988; Trueman and 
Titman 1988; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Lo 2008). Meanwhile, managers whose incentives 
are to enhance price efficiency and lower the cost of capital may hesitate to voluntarily 
disclose private information since investors are less likely to correctly interpret that 
information (Dutta and Trueman 2002; Fishman and Hagerty 2003; Suijs 2007; Chen et 
al. 2013). However, in less uncertain environment, stronger detection risks may refrain 
self-interested managers from manipulating earnings. In addition, managers of high 
quality firms can more effectively exercise their accounting discretion to convey inside 
information to the market because investors can more accurately realise and incorporate 
the information into their valuation. Chen et al. (2013) examine EM around IPOs 
operating in the environments of different levels of information uncertainty and find that 
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while high-information-uncertainty firms manipulate earnings opportunistically, low-
information-uncertainty firms manage earnings for informative purposes. Along these 
lines, I expect that lower information uncertainty around IPOs due to the provision of a 
credit rating before the offering will also influence managerial incentives in undertaking 
EM. Managers of rated firms will utilise their accounting choices to mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem and signal the firm’s future prospects instead of 
opportunistically manipulate earnings for short-term self-interests. If managers of rated 
firms draw on their inside information and exercise their accounting discretion to better 
inform the market about the firm’s future earnings, the extent of income-increasing EM 
in the offering year will be positively related to subsequent accounting performance. My 
second hypothesis is: 
 
 H2: At-issue income-increasing EM is positively related to post-issue accounting 
performance for rated IPO firms.  
 
 Extant literature (e.g., Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. (1998b), and Morsfield and 
Tan (2006)) documents a negative association between at-issue EM and post-issue long-
run stock returns, suggesting that managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve 
higher offer prices while investors are unable to immediately recognise this behaviour. If 
managers manipulate earnings upward to inflate stock prices, in subsequent years, the 
reversal of accruals will drive down future earnings. High stock prices reflect investors’ 
optimistic expectations of the firm’s future profitability. Yet, if future earnings do not 
meet investors’ earlier expectations, they will adjust their evaluation of the firm 
downwards. Therefore, IPO firms that opportunistically manage earnings upward in the 
offering year exhibit poorer long-run stock performance in the post-issue periods. 
However, Fields (2001) suggest that accounting discretion can be employed to convey 
inside information to external investors so that the stock price can be fairly evaluated. Fan 
(2007) argues that high-quality IPO firms can manage earnings upward to a certain level 
as a signalling device to separate themselves from low-quality firms. The author also 
documents that investors can accurately interpret the effect of EM when estimating the 
firm’s fundamental value. Chan and Lo (2011) find that rated IPO firms experience more 
immediate price correction and do not exhibit abnormal long-term stock performance. 
Their findings indicate that the provision of a credit rating before the new issue lowers 
information asymmetries and enables investors to correctly estimate the firm’s fair market 
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value. Since rated IPO firms tend to employ accounting choices to communicate private 
information to the market, I predict that the lower information uncertainty around rated 
IPO firms will allow the market to infer EM and correctly adjust for it in valuing the firm. 
Therefore, the post-issue long-run abnormal stock returns is expected to have no 
association with the at-issue income-increasing EM. This leads us to my third hypothesis: 
 
 H3: At-issue income-increasing EM is not related to post-issue long-run stock 
performance for rated IPO firms. 
 
2.4. Sample and methodology 
2.4.1. Sample selection 
I construct a sample of common share US IPOs over the period January 1, 1991 
to December 31, 2011 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database2. 
Following the literature, I exclude IPOs with an offer price below $5 per share, unit 
offerings, limited partnerships, leveraged buyouts (LBOs), rights issues, American 
depositary receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), 
financial institutions, spin-offs, and privatizations. I then match this sample with 
Compustat database where I obtain accounting information, and with the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) where I collect stock returns. After imposing the 
aforementioned restrictions, I arrive at the final sample of 2,602 IPO firms. Credit ratings 
are collected from Compustat and represent Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic 
issuer credit ratings. In my sample of 2,602 IPO firms, 153 firms have S&P credit ratings 
one month prior to the issue.  
 
2.4.2. Earnings management methodology 
2.4.2.1. Accrual-based earnings management 
In measuring the estimates of abnormal accruals, I employ the modified Jones 
(1991) model described in Dechow et al. (1995). Since its development, the model has 
been widely used in the EM literature. Various recent EM research continues to employ 
the model to measure abnormal accruals (Ye 2014; Doukakis 2014; Franz et al. 2014). 
                                                          
2 Compustat covers credit rating data from 1985. However, statement of cash flows data are available for all firms in 
Compustat from 1988 and I require past year data to measure earnings management proxies. Moreover, the post-issue 
long-run performance analysis examines the three-year period after the stock issuance. Therefore, the sample period 
starts from 1991 until 2011. 
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Jones (1991) assumes that the changes in sales and gross property, plant and equipment 
(PPE) are two main determinants of the firm’s accruals. Thus, total accruals are modelled 
as a function of sales growth and PPE. The total accruals are disaggregated into two 
components: expected accruals and abnormal accruals. The expected accruals reflect the 
firm’s economic conditions and are predicted by the change in sales and PPE. The 
abnormal accruals reflect managerial discretion and are determined by the residuals. 
However, sales revenues are susceptible to managerial manipulation since managers can 
influence credit policies to induce sales. Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) enhance the 
power of the Jones model by deducting the accounts receivable growth from revenue 
growth to account for the possibility of management manipulation in credit sales.  
In applying the modified Jones model, I first estimate for each year the following 
Jones model cross-sectionally for all firms in the same two-digit SIC industry as the IPO 
firm yet excluding firms going public in three years’ time: 
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where TACCi,t is total accruals computed as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations less cash flow from operations; TAi.t-1 is lagged total assets; 
∆SALESi,t is the change in total sales from the fiscal year before the offering to the fiscal 
year of the IPO; and PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant and equipment. I use the 
cash flow method instead of the balance sheet approach to measure total accruals since 
Hribar and Collins (2002) show that measuring accruals directly from the statement of 
cash flows is a superior method to avoid the non-articulation problem of the balance sheet 
approach. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
influence of outliers. I require at least ten firms in an industry in a year to run the 
regressions. This cross-sectional approach, which is introduced by DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), helps control for changes in economic conditions for specific years and industries 
that might influence total accruals independent of any managerial manipulation. The 
coefficient estimates from Equation (2.1) are then used to estimate the expected 
component of total accruals (NACCi.t) for the IPO sample as follows:  
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where ∆RECi.t is the change in receivables from the fiscal year before the offering to the 
fiscal year of the IPO. The abnormal accruals (DACCi.t) are computed as the difference 
between total accruals and expected accruals:  
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Several studies in the literature raise concerns that the abnormal accruals 
measured using the Jones model are correlated with firms’ performance; therefore, the 
Jones model is misspecified when being applied to firms experiencing extreme 
performance (Dechow et al. 1995). To mitigate this problem, I apply the procedure 
suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) to match the abnormal accruals of the IPO firm to those 
of a non-IPO firm in the same two-digit SIC industry and year with the closest prior-year 
ROA. I exclude firms whose matched non-IPO firm has ROA outside the range of +/- 
10% of the IPO firm’s ROA. The matched firms’ abnormal accruals are deducted from 
the IPO firms’ abnormal accruals to yield the performance-matched abnormal accruals 
for the IPO firms. 
I also acknowledge that accruals models may not adequately isolate between 
abnormal and normal accruals; consequently, estimated abnormal accruals may capture 
normal components of accruals. However, it should be noted that I use abnormal accruals 
as a dependent variable. The effect of measurement error in the dependent variable is less 
severe than measurement error in the independent variable. If the measure of abnormal 
accruals suffers from measurement error, the consequences will be lower explanatory 
power (R2) of the model, but unbiased estimated coefficients, larger estimated standard 
errors, and hence wider confidence intervals. 
For robustness check, I employ another commonly used model by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) to measure abnormal accruals. Dechow and Dichev (2002) map short-term 
working capital accruals to present, past, and future cash flows based on the notion that 
accruals predict future cash receipt or payment. Their model does not address distortions 
caused by long-term accruals; therefore, I follow McNichols (2002) and Francis et al. 
(2005) to modify the model by adding growth in revenue and PPE to reflect performance 
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and depreciation. I estimate the following regression cross-sectionally for each year and 
all non-IPO firms in each two-digit SIC industry with at least ten firms:  
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TCAi,t  is total current working capital accruals, CFOi,t is cash flows from operations, TAi,t-
1 is lagged total assets, ∆SALESi,t is the change in sales, PPEi,t is the gross value of plant, 
property and equipment, ∆CAi,t is the change in current assets, ∆Cashi,t is the change in 
cash, ∆CLi,t is the change in current liabilities, ∆STDi,t is the change in short-term debt, 
NIBEi,t is net income before extraordinary items, DEPNi,t is depreciation and amortization 
expenses. All changes are between the fiscal year before the offering to the fiscal year of 
the IPO. I winsorize all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to moderate the effect of 
outliers. The estimated coefficients of Equation (2.4) are used to estimate the normal level 
of current accruals of IPO firms. The IPO firms’ abnormal current accruals are then 
computed as the difference between the firms’ actual total current accruals and their 
normal level of current accruals. 
 
2.4.2.2. Real earnings management 
I measure real EM proxies based on the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998), 
implemented by Roychowdhury (2006), and later used by various real EM research  
(Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012; Alissa et al. 2013). 
Roychowdhury (2006) documents that managers avoid reporting annual earnings losses 
by manipulating real activities including temporarily increasing sales through price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms, overproducing to decrease the cost of goods sold, 
and reducing discretionary expenditures. Therefore, if managers exercise their discretion 
in operating decisions related to sales, production, and discretionary expenses to boost 
earnings, firms will exhibit an unusually low level of cash flow from operations and 
discretionary expenses, and unusually high production costs. I use three metrics as proxies 
for real EM: abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. 
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The normal level of cash flow from operations is expressed as a linear function of 
sales and change in sales in the current period: 
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(2.5) 
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations, TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets, SALESi,t is total 
sales, ∆SALESi,t is the change in sales from the fiscal year before the issue to the fiscal 
year of the IPO. 
The model for normal production costs is estimated as a function of current sales, 
change in current sales, and change in past sales: 
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(2.6) 
where PRODi,t  is the production costs computed as the sum of the cost of goods sold and 
the change in inventory from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the IPO. 
∆SALESi,t-1 is the change in sales from the fiscal year two years before the issue to the 
fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
The normal discretionary expenses are expressed as a linear function of lagged 
sales: 
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(2.7) 
 
where DISEXPi,t is the discretionary expenses computed as the sum of SG&A, R&D, and 
advertising expenses. SALESi,t-1 is total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO.  
All the three equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) are estimated cross-sectionally for each 
industry-year with at least ten observations. I winsorize all variables at 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the issue of outliers. The abnormal level of each real EM proxy is 
calculated as the actual level minus the normal level estimated using the coefficients from 
the regressions (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7). Moreover, I match real EM measures of IPO firms 
to those of non-IPO peers based on year, industry, and ROA to generate performance-
matched real EM measures. I also multiply the estimated abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses by (-1) so that higher values reflect 
higher real EM. Besides analysing the individual effect of each real EM activity, I also 
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measure the aggregate effect of all three metrics by calculating two combined measures 
REM1 and REM2. Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I compute REM1 as the sum of 
abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses and REM2 as the sum 
of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. Abnormal 
production costs and abnormal cash flows from operations are not combined because the 
same activities that create high abnormal production costs also create low abnormal cash 
flow from operations, so adding the two measures would result in double counting 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). The higher REM1, the more likely that 
firms increase production and cut discretionary expenses to manipulate earnings upward. 
Similarly, the higher REM2, the more likely that firms manipulate sales and reduce 
discretionary expenses to report higher earnings.  
 
2.4.3. Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the distribution of the sample by year, industry, and credit 
rating level. I observe a larger flow of IPOs in the 1990s, which is consistent with the 
recovery and expansion period of the US economy after the 1990 recession. The early 
2000s recession caused a downturn in the stock market. Subsequently, the overall IPO 
activity showed some improvement before declining again due to the financial crisis of 
2007-2008. The sample covers 57 industries identified by the two-digit SIC code. Nearly 
half of the firms are concentrated in computer and high-technology industries (SIC codes 
35, 36, 38, and 73). Rated issuers, however, are more strongly presented in 
manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, and wholesale and retail trade 
industries. There are 153 IPOs with credit ratings one month prior to the stock issuance. 
The highest rating level is AAA and the lowest is CCC+. Approximately 2% of the issuers 
are in the A rating category and 4% receive investment grade credit ratings. Nearly half 
of the firms obtain the rating of B+. The credit ratings of IPO firms are clustered in the 
rating categories of BB-, B+, and B. The ratings distribution is consistent with recent 
research on credit ratings of IPO firms (for example, An and Chan (2008)). 
Panel A of Table 2.3 illustrates descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and 
EM proxies for the overall sample and the sub-samples of IPOs with and without a credit 
rating. Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the correlation matrix, and no multicollinearity is 
detected among the variables. Regarding firm characteristics, IPO firms are in operation 
for an average of 16 years. They have the mean market value at the time of listing of 446 
million dollars, the mean leverage ratio of 0.73, and the mean industry-adjusted ROA of 
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-0.17. The average proportion of firms reporting a loss in the fiscal year prior to the 
offering is 37%. The mean ratio of capital expenditures to total assets is 0.41. On average, 
36% of IPOs are underwritten by reputable investment banks, 92% are audited by big six 
accounting firms, and 51% are venture-backed.  
Firm-specific characteristics also appear to differ between rated and unrated IPOs. 
The mean differences are strongly statistically significant for all firm characteristics 
except for capital expenditures. Rated IPOs (average age of 37 years) are older than 
unrated ones (average age of 15 years). Rated issuers have the mean market value at the 
time of listing of 1,252 million dollars, which is considerably larger than unrated issuers 
(market value of 396 million dollars). Rated firms have higher leverage than unrated ones 
with the mean ratio of total liabilities to total assets of 96% for the rated and 71% for the 
unrated. While 39% of unrated issuers report losses in the previous fiscal year prior to the 
IPO, this figure is only 8% for rated issuers. Rated IPOs are more profitable than unrated 
ones, which is suggested by the mean industry-adjusted ROA of -0.01 for the rated and -
0.18 for the unrated. The mean proportion of rated IPOs underwritten by top-tier 
investment banks (68%) doubles that of unrated IPOs. Slightly more firms with a credit 
rating (96%) are audited by big six auditors than firms without a credit rating (92%). 
While more than half (53%) of unrated IPOs are venture-backed, only 18% of rated IPOs 
are supported by venture capitalists. My results are consistent with prior literature. Denis 
and Mihov (2003) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006) also report that large, mature, 
profitable and highly leveraged companies are more likely to issue public debts and obtain 
credit ratings. 
With respect to EM proxies, I rely on the median for statistical inference since the 
median is less likely than the mean to be affected by extreme observations. For the whole 
sample of IPO firms, the median value of abnormal accruals (0.02) is significantly larger 
than zero; thus, consistent with prior studies, I find evidence of the manipulation of 
accruals to report higher earnings around IPOs. The median abnormal cash flow from 
operations (0.03) is also significantly positive, implying that managers of IPO firms tend 
to manipulate sales to bias earnings upward. Meanwhile, the median values of abnormal 
production costs (-0.08), abnormal discretionary expenses (-0.25), REM1 (-0.30), and 
REM2 (-0.21) are all negative and strongly significant. The finding that IPO firms engage 
in income-increasing real EM through sales manipulation but not through overproduction 
and discretionary expenses is intuitive. First, sales manipulation is less likely to be 
discovered given that newly listed firms are expected to have growth in sales. Moreover, 
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increasing sales while at the same time reducing discretionary expenses such as 
advertising and SG&A expenses is not only difficult to accomplish but also likely to 
attract attention and scrutiny from auditors, regulators, and investors. In addition, 
production cost manipulation can only be fully employed by manufacturing firms 
(Roychowdhury 2006). My IPO sample consists of a small proportion of manufacturing 
firms; thus, the inability to fully exploit production-based real EM may deter IPO firms 
from undertaking this method to manage earnings upward.  
Similar to the overall sample, unrated IPO firms have significantly positive 
median abnormal accruals (0.03) and abnormal cash flow from operations (0.03), yet 
significantly negative median abnormal production costs (-0.09), abnormal discretionary 
expenses (-0.29), REM1 (-0.40), and REM2 (-0.24). This indicates that unrated IPO firms 
tend to engage in income-increasing EM through accruals and sales manipulation, yet 
make conservative operating decisions related to production and discretionary expenses. 
On the other hand, for rated IPO firms, all EM measures apart from REM1 are not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that rated IPO issuers appear not to engage 
in EM through manipulation of accruals, sales, production, or discretionary expenses. 
Tests of the differences in EM between the two samples of rated and unrated IPOs show 
significant results and suggest that rated IPO issuers are less likely to manage earnings 
through accruals and real operating activities in the issue year than unrated IPO issuers.  
The results so far show an initial insight into the relation between credit ratings 
and EM. Overall, IPO firms exhibit income-increasing EM through accruals and sales 
manipulation, yet are conservative in decisions related to production and discretionary 
expenses. Rated IPO firms, on the other hand, do not engage in either accrual-based or 
real EM in the issue year. Comparing a sample of rated and unrated IPO firms, the results 
reveal that rated IPOs exhibit less EM through both accruals and real activities than 
unrated IPOs. In order to establish more concrete evidence, I provide multivariate analysis 
controlling for several determinants of EM in the next section.  
 
2.5. Empirical models 
2.5.1. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
 I estimate the following regression model to examine the association between 
credit ratings and EM around IPOs: 
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𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 +
∑ 𝛽20111991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (2.8) 
 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the positive value of an EM measure including abnormal accruals, 
abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, REM1, or REM2 in the fiscal year of the offering. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the 
main variable of interest that equals to one if the IPO firm has a credit rating, and zero 
otherwise. I include control variables in Equation (2.8) as suggested by prior EM 
literature. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 2.1.  
 I account for several firm characteristics that may determine the level of EM 
undertaken in the issue year. First of all, I include log(1+ firm age) to control for firm 
age. Firms that have been in operation for a longer period develop more solid management 
and accounting systems. On the other hand, starter companies often show poor financial 
performance and less stable earnings; thus, they have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings. I control for firm size by including ln(market value). Larger firms normally have 
more complex financial structures, which creates incentives for managers to exercise 
discretion over accounting policies to manage earnings; however, they face closer 
scrutiny from regulators and capital market players, which may discourage managers 
from engaging in dishonest activities (Lee and Masulis 2011). 
 Moreover, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) suggest that firms with high leverage 
are more likely to manipulate accruals to avoid debt covenant violations. Franz et al. 
(2014) also find that firms close to debt covenant violations tend to engage more in EM 
than firms far from the violation. Hence, I include leverage to control for the possibility 
that firms with high leverage tend to upwardly manage earnings. Further, Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) posit that firms manage earnings to avoid losses. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
also argue that executives engage in EM to exceed the positive profit threshold. Thus, I 
include loss to account for the probability of higher income-increasing EM among firms 
operating at a loss. 
 Prior literature documents that financial intermediaries participating in the IPO 
process can contribute to curtailing EM. Jo et al. (2007) suggest that EM around SEOs is 
significantly lower in the presence of reputable investment banks. Lee and Masulis (2011) 
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report a negative association between underwriter reputation and EM by IPO issuers. 
Therefore, I include highly ranked underwriter to control for this effect of top-tier 
underwriters. Furthermore, I include big6 auditor to capture the capability of experienced 
auditing firms in detecting misrepresentations in accounting reports as suggested by 
Becker et al. (1998), Krishnan (2003), and Gul et al. (2009). I also include venture 
capitalist as a determinant of EM since venture capitalists can play a monitoring role and 
restrain EM around IPOs (Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and Masulis 2011; Hochberg 
2012; Wongsunwai 2013). 
 In addition, investors face higher uncertainty in evaluating high-growth firms 
since their value is substantially derived from future uncertain growth opportunities; 
therefore, managers of these firms have better chances to mislead investors through 
earnings manipulation (Fan 2007). To control for growth opportunities, I use the average 
capital expenditures in the offering year and one year after scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the offering year, CAPEX, as a proxy for growth. I also account for a firm’s 
financial performance using industry-adjusted ROA. 
 The variable of interest is rating existence which indicates whether the IPO firm 
has a credit rating before the offering. The provision of a credit rating may not be random 
across firms as they can partially choose to have a credit rating. A firm’s decision to have 
a credit rating may depend on various firm-specific characteristics which make the 
existence of a credit rating beneficial to the firm. For instance, Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006) claim that firms with longer time in operation, larger size, greater profitability, 
higher leverage, and more tangible assets tend to issue public debts and have a credit 
rating. Firm characteristics which induce firms to issue debts and obtain a credit rating 
may also determine firms’ choice to undertake EM. Thus, there exists the potential issue 
of selection bias and endogeneity which would result in a biased coefficient estimate of 
rating existence.  
 To address this issue, I follow related literature (Faulkender and Petersen 2006; 
An and Chan 2008; Karampatsas et al. 2014) to account for the endogenous selection 
issue by employing several econometric models including Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
treatment-effect model, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment-effect 
model, and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable (IV) model. These 
econometric approaches require the estimation of a selection model that accounts for 
factors influencing firms’ choice to obtain a credit rating. It is important to select variables 
which are correlated with the probability of having a rating in the selection model but not 
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directly explain EM in the outcome model. Therefore, instead of including firm 
characteristics in the selection model, I account for industry-specific characteristics and 
exclude industry-fixed effects in the regressions to avoid weak instrument biases and 
invalid inferences. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argue that firms operating in an 
industry with a large proportion of public debt issuers tend to have lower information 
costs because the bond market is already familiar with the industry and competitors. 
Lower information costs also mean that it is more likely for the bank to underwrite a bond 
issue. Therefore, a firm is more likely to issue public debts and obtain a credit rating if it 
operates in an industry with more rated firms. To account for this effect, I create the 
variable industry fraction, which is calculated as the logarithm of one plus the percentage 
of firms that have credit ratings in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm in 
the fiscal year end prior to the offering. Johnson (1997) and Cantillo and Wright (2000) 
demonstrate that firms in more profitable and less risky industries are more likely to gain 
access to public debt markets due to their low default probability. Hence, I control for the 
significance of industry profitability and risks in determining the probability of a firm 
holding a credit rating. I measure industry profitability as the median ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of the IPO 
firm’s three -digit SIC industry in the fiscal year prior to the offering. Industry risk is 
computed as the standard deviation of the industry’s profitability.  
 The Heckman (1979) correction for self-selection bias involves two-step 
estimation. In the first step, I estimate the selection equation using a probit regression of 
rating existence on industry fraction, industry profitability, and industry risk. The self-
selection correction term, i.e. the inverse Mills ratio, is estimated and added to the 
outcome Equation (2.8) and the linear regression is estimated as normal. For MLE 
treatment effect model, the selection and outcome equations are estimated simultaneously 
by maximum likelihood estimation. This method is more efficient than the two-step 
treatment effect model if the error terms in the selection and outcome equations have a 
bivariate normal distribution (An and Chan 2008). Using 2SLS IV involves two-stage 
estimation. In the first stage, I estimate the regression of rating existence on all exogenous 
variables in the main Equation (2.8) and the instruments, namely, industry fraction, 
industry profitability, and industry risk to get the fitted probabilities of having a credit 
rating. In the second stage, the main regression is estimated with the endogenous variable 
rating existence being replaced with the predicted value from the first stage.  
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2.5.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue accounting performance 
 I examine the relation between the magnitude of income-increasing EM in the 
offering year and subsequent accounting performance in order to evaluate whether 
managers of IPO firms exercise their accounting discretion to mislead investors or to 
better inform the market. Subramanyam (1996) documents that the positive association 
between accounting discretion and subsequent operating cash flows indicates the 
informative role of EM in signaling future performance. Using cash flow from operations 
(CFO) as a measure of future performance can avoid the correlation between current 
accruals and future earnings due to accrual reversals; however, CFO lacks timeliness as 
a performance measure (Dechow 1994; Bowen et al. 2008). Another widely used 
performance measure is return on assets (ROA), which is a direct measure of future 
profitability. ROA is less likely to have the timeliness issue; yet ROA tends to be 
influenced by accrual reversals since the extent of accruals employed in the past may be 
correlated with the magnitude of accruals used in the future and ultimately with ROA 
(Bowen et al. 2008). Each performance measure has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
In order to provide more robust findings, I employ both measures of accounting 
performance in the analysis. I also analyse future accounting performance using CFO and 
ROA being adjusted for the median measures of the firm’s two-digit SIC code industry. 
 I estimate the following regression to examine the relation between at-issue 
income increasing EM and accounting performance in the subsequent year: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 +
𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (2.9) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + ∑ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2.10) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 is cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal 
year following the IPO; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 is net income scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal 
year following the IPO; 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 is the positive value of abnormal accruals, abnormal 
cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
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REM1, and REM2 in the offering year; 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡=0 is an interaction 
term between EM and Rating existence. I include current performance measures 
(𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=0) to control for potential mean-reversion in the measures of 
accounting performance (Barber and Lyon 1996; Bowen et al. 2008). I also include 
CAPEX to account for the effect of the investment of proceeds on the post-issue 
performance (Teoh et al. 1998b).  
 If managers manipulate either accruals or operating activities to overstate 
earnings for opportunistic purposes to mislead investors, the earnings will not be 
sustainable and the magnitude of income-increasing EM employed in the offering year 
will not reflect the firm’s future prospects. On the other hand, if managers engage in EM 
with the aim of communicating private information to the market and to signal firm value, 
firms will show positive earnings in subsequent periods and at-issue EM will explain the 
firm’s future performance. I expect that managers of rated IPO firms tend to engage in 
income-enhancing EM to signal their value; therefore, the sum of the estimated 
coefficients (𝛽1+𝛽2) will be significantly positive.  
 
2.5.3. At-issue earnings management and post-issue long-run stock 
performance 
To examine the impact of at-issue income-increasing EM on post-issue long-run 
stock performance, I regress the IPO post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
on EM in the offering year. The regression model is estimated as follows: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑀𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽7𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽10𝐵𝑖𝑔6 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽
2011
1991 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖  (2.11) 
 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the IPO firm’s three-year post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal return 
calculated starting from the day after the annual financial report date in the offering year 
to the earlier of the three year anniversary date and the delisting date; 𝐸𝑀𝑖 is the positive 
value of abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production 
costs, abnormal discretionary expenses, REM1, and REM2 in the offering year; 𝐸𝑀𝑖 ∗
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 is an interaction term between EM and Rating existence. I include 
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control variables in Equation (2.11) as suggested by prior studies (Ritter 1991; Teoh et 
al. 1998a; Chen et al. 2013). Definitions of these variables are presented in Table 2.1. The 
existence of a credit rating reduces the information uncertainty, creating incentives for 
managers of rated firms to release private information through accounting discretion to 
signal their quality, and also allowing investors to better interpret this information and 
incorporate it into their firm valuation. Price adjustment will occur in the short-run, 
leaving insignificant long-run abnormal stock returns. Therefore, I expect at-issue EM of 
rated firms will be unrelated to long-run stock performance, and the sum of the estimated 
coefficients (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) will be insignificantly different from zero. 
As an additional check, I examine the long-run stock performance using the 
calendar-time portfolio approach3: the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The regression model estimated based on Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.12) 
 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 is the return from taking a long position in a portfolio of 
IPO firms that manage earnings upward and a short position in a portfolio of IPO firms 
that manage earnings downward for each calendar month in the sample period. 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is 
the excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index for each calendar month in 
the sample period. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
small and large stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the 
difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market and low 
book-to-market stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. 
IPO firm returns are included in the portfolio returns for the period of three years 
after the IPO fiscal year end. The Carhart four-factor model adds to the Fama and French 
three-factor model an additional factor to account for one-year momentum price return. 
The factors for those models are retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website4. The 
                                                          
3 Buy-and-hold returns are representative of investors’ investment experience, therefore, they are commonly used to 
examine long-run stock performance. However, Fama (1998) points out several concerns regarding the use of buy-and-
hold returns in long-run performance studies including the exaggeration of short-term estimation errors through 
compounding, the skewness in the distribution of buy-and-hold returns, and the cross-correlation problems caused by 
time-period overlap. Fama (1998) also advocates the use of calendar-time approach to examine the long-run 
performance since the approach can account for the clustering of events and cross-correlation problems, and better 
approximate the normal distribution, therefore, can produce more reliable statistical inferences.  
4 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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regression is estimated for separate samples of unrated and rated IPO firms. The intercept 
of the factor models represents the average monthly abnormal return. Following Chen 
(2013), I use an intercept test to examine the difference in the post-IPO stock performance 
between issuers with aggressive EM and those with conservative EM. In the case that the 
provision of a credit rating reduces information asymmetry and allows investors to better 
gauge the managerial intention in EM and adjust accordingly, the future stock returns will 
be unrelated to EM in the offering year. Therefore, I expect the intercept is insignificantly 
different from zero. 
 
2.6. Empirical results 
2.6.1. Credit ratings and earnings management around IPOs 
Table 2.4 reports my regression analyses of the association between accrual-based 
EM and rating existence using the three estimation methods: Heckman’s two-step 
treatment effect model, MLE treatment effect model, and 2SLS IV model. The regression 
results using the performance-matching modified Jones (1991) model and Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model to measure abnormal accruals are reported in Panels A and B 
respectively. My results are consistent across all econometric models and for both 
methodologies used to estimate abnormal accruals. 
Evidence from the three estimation approaches confirms the presence of 
endogenous selection problem. The inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman two-step 
treatment effect model is significant at the 5% level, suggesting the issue of selection bias. 
The likelihood ratio test of the correlation between the two error terms of the selection 
and outcome equations from the MLE treatment effect model provides a strongly 
significant result. This indicates that unobservable firm characteristics determining the 
decision to obtain a credit rating also influence EM activities. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test of endogeneity from the 2SLS IV model also verifies the endogeneity problem.  
The coefficients on rating existence are negative and statistically significant at 
either 1% or 5% levels, suggesting that rated IPO firms are less likely to engage in 
income-increasing EM. The signs of the coefficients on control variables are generally in 
line with prior literature. I document that IPOs with longer operating history, lower 
leverage, less growth, and venture-backing are less likely to manage earnings. Among the 
three industry specific variables in the selection equation, industry fraction is positively 
associated with rating existence across all specifications. This is similar to the findings 
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of earlier studies that the probability of having a credit rating increases for firms in 
industries with more rated debt issuers.  
Table 2.5 presents multiple regression analyses of different measures of real 
activities manipulation on rating existence.  The results of the inverse Mills ratio test, the 
likelihood ratio test, and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirm the endogenous selection 
problem. Panels A, B, and C report the results of the regressions estimated using the three 
econometric techniques: Heckman two-step treatment effect model, MLE treatment effect 
model, and 2SLS IV model.  
The results consistently hold for the alternative econometric models and different 
measures of real EM. The coefficients on all individual metrics of real EM — abnormal 
cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary 
expenses and the combined real EM measures - REM1 and REM2 are significantly 
negative. This supports the conjecture that rated IPOs are less likely to manage earnings 
through real activities manipulation. The control variables have the expected signs. I 
document significantly lower real EM for IPO firms that are older, larger, less leveraged, 
less growth, more profitable, underwritten by reputable investment banks, and venture-
backed. With regard to variables in the selection equation, industry fraction is consistently 
highly significant across all specifications. Overall, the results support the first hypothesis 
that rated IPO firms demonstrate less income-enhancing accrual-based and real EM in the 
issue year than unrated IPO firms.  
 
2.6.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue accounting performance 
I present the results of the regressions of post-issue accounting performance on at-
issue income-increasing EM in Table 2.6. In Panel A, I determine future accounting 
performance using CFO in the fiscal year following the offering. The results are 
consistent for regressions using raw CFO and industry-adjusted CFO as dependent 
variables. The coefficients on EM is insignificant for all EM measures, except for 
abnormal discretionary expenses. This suggests that managers of unrated IPO firms tend 
to engage in income-increasing EM in the offering year without the aim of signalling to 
the market about the firm’s future performance. The coefficients on the interaction term 
EM*Rating existence are significantly positive at either 1% or 5% level for all EM 
measures. Moreover, the sums of the estimated coefficients of EM and EM*Rating 
existence are significantly positive. The results indicate that managers of rated IPO firms 
tend to employ EM in the issue year for informative purposes; therefore, the level of 
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income-enhancing EM in the offering year is positively related to post-IPO operating cash 
flows.  
In Panel B, I employ ROA as a measure of accounting performance. I analyse both 
raw ROA and industry-adjusted ROA. For regressions using raw ROA, the coefficients 
on EM is significantly negative at either 5% or 10% level for abnormal accruals, 
abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal discretionary expenses. The 
coefficients on the interaction term EM*Rating existence are positive and strongly 
significant for all EM measures. Except for abnormal discretionary expenses, the sums 
of the estimated coefficients of EM and EM*Rating existence are positively significant 
for all other EM measures. For regressions using industry-adjusted ROA, the coefficients 
on EM are also significantly negative at the 10% level for abnormal cash flow from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. The coefficients on the interaction term 
and the p-value of the F-test of (EM + EM*Rating existence) are similar to regressions 
using raw ROA described above apart from a minor difference that the coefficient on 
EM*Rating existence for abnormal discretionary expenses is still positive but 
insignificant. In general, the results of the analysis of post-issue ROA indicate that for 
unrated issuers, future earnings are more likely to worsen with the extent of income-
increasing EM in the issue year; while for rated issuers the extent of income-increasing 
EM during the IPO year is positively linked to subsequent future earnings. This is 
consistent with the results in Panel A. As a robustness check, besides CFO and ROA in 
the fiscal year following the IPO, I analyse the average CFO and ROA over the three 
years after the IPO. I also estimate the equations (2.9) and (2.10) again including both the 
main effects of EM and Rating existence in the regressions. In untabulated results, I obtain 
consistent results which indicate the informative purposes of rated IPO firms’ managers 
in employing EM in the offering year. Overall, the findings support the second hypothesis 
that at-issue income-increasing EM is positively associated with subsequent accounting 
performance for rated IPO firms. This is consistent with the notion that managers of rated 
IPO firms exercise their accounting and operating discretion with the aim of better 
informing the market.  
 
2.6.3. At-issue earnings management and post-issue long-run stock 
performance 
I report the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses of post-issue long-
run stock performance in Table 2.7. Panel A presents the results for the regressions of 
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post-issue three-year BHARs on at-issue income-increasing EM. The coefficients on EM 
are significantly negative for regressions using abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow 
from operations, and abnormal production costs as EM measures. This suggests that 
managers of unrated IPO firms generally manipulate earnings in the issue year for 
opportunistic purposes to mislead investors; therefore, the post-issue long-run stock 
performance deteriorates with the extent of upward EM through accruals and operating 
activities related to sales, and production. In a high information asymmetry environment, 
investors are less likely to recognise managers’ manipulation activities; hence, when 
actual earnings in the future do not meet their expectation, they revise downward their 
valuation, leading to negative abnormal stock returns in the post-issue period. The 
coefficients on EM*Rating existence is significantly positive for specifications using 
abnormal accruals as an EM measure, implying that in comparison with unrated issuers, 
the long-run stock performance of rated IPO firms improves with the extent of accrual-
based EM. The insignificance of the F-tests of [EM + EM*Rating existence = 0] across 
all regressions with different EM measures indicates that for rated IPO firms, post-issue 
long-run stock performance is generally unrelated to the extent of income-increasing EM 
in the offering year. Panel C presents the intercept estimates of Fama and French three-
factor model and Carhart four-factor model. The results are consistent for both factors 
models. The intercept estimate of the regression using abnormal accruals to measure EM 
is negative and significant at the 1% level for the sample of IPOs without credit ratings. 
The finding holds for abnormal cash flow from operations, but the significance level is 
lower at the 10%. This indicates that unrated IPO issuers aggressively employ accrual-
based EM and real EM through sales manipulation underperform those conservatively 
undertaking these EM tools. However, for the sample of rated IPO firms, the intercept 
estimates are insignificantly different from zero across all specifications of EM measures 
apart from abnormal production costs which is marginally significantly negative. This 
suggests that for rated issuers, the difference in post-issue long-run abnormal stock 
returns is not significant between aggressive and conservative issuers. 
Taking together the results from the analysis of long-term stock performance 
using BHARs and factors models, I find that issue-year income-increasing accrual-based 
EM predicts the post-issue deterioration in stock performance for IPO firms without credit 
ratings. This is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Teoh et al. (1998a), Teoh et al. 
(1998b), and Morsfield and Tan (2006)). However, the finding of the association between 
at-issue abnormal accruals and post-issue underperformance is not applicable to rated IPO 
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firms. For rated issuers, the at-issue EM does not explain post-issue IPO 
underperformance. The results support the third hypothesis that the post-issue long-run 
stock performance is unrelated to the extent of at-issue income-increasing EM for rated 
IPO issuers. The managers of rated firms tend to exercise their discretion in the offering 
year to better inform the market of the firm’s future prospects. Plus, lower information 
asymmetry due to the provision of a credit rating allows investors to more accurately 
interpret the information conveyed by managers through EM and incorporate it into their 
firm valuation, resulting in insignificant long-run stock performance.  
 
2.7. Additional tests and robustness checks 
In the main analysis, I document that IPO firms with credit ratings have a 
significantly lower level of both accrual-based and real EM than those without credit 
ratings. In this section, I provide additional auxiliary tests to check the validity of the 
findings.  
2.7.1. Credit rating levels and earnings management around IPOs 
The results so far indicate that the presence of a credit rating prior to the stock 
issue is associated with the lower level of income-increasing EM in the offering year. 
Specifically, managers of rated IPOs are less likely to manipulate either accruals or real 
activities to distort reported earnings. In this section, I further examine whether credit 
rating levels can signal the extent of EM in the IPO year. I create the variable rating level 
which takes the value from 1 to 22, equivalent to the lowest rating D to the highest rating 
AAA. A higher rating corresponds to a higher value. I regress different EM proxies on 
rating level and other controls for determinants of EM as previously discussed in Section 
2.5.1.  
I continue to employ the instrumental variable method to correct for the potential 
endogeneity of credit rating levels. I also include industry profitability and industry risk 
in the first-stage regression. In addition, to control for the average credit rating level of 
rated firms in an industry, I substitute industry fraction with industry level, which is 
computed as the median credit rating level of all rated firms in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as the IPO firm in the fiscal year end prior to the offering. I report the results of 
the regressions of income-increasing EM on credit rating levels in Table 2.8. The 
estimated coefficients on rating level across all specifications are insignificant at 
conventional levels. The result suggests that credit rating levels do not predict the 
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magnitude of EM in the offering year. What matters in influencing EM undertaken by 
IPO issuers are the presence of CRAs and the existence of credit ratings. Managers have 
fewer incentives to manipulate earnings under additional scrutiny of CRAs and in lower 
information asymmetry environment due to the provision of credit ratings. As an 
additional check, I create an indicator variable equal to one if the credit rating is 
investment grade and test whether EM is different among firms with investment grade 
credit ratings. In untabulated results, the coefficients on the indicator variable of 
investment grade are insignificant across regressions using different EM measures, 
indicating that credit rating investment grades do not explain the variation in EM by IPO 
issuers. Moreover, since the majority (96%) of IPO firms in the sample have non-
investment grade credit ratings (BB+ and above) and the rating levels cluster in the range 
of 7 to 12 (equivalent to B- to BB+), I also check the results on the sample of IPO firms 
whose rating levels range from 7 to 12 and obtain similar results. 
 
2.7.2. Interaction effects of credit rating agencies and other financial 
intermediaries  
Auditors, venture capitalists, and investment banks are financial intermediaries 
that are closely involved in the IPO process. Several studies indicate the constraining 
effects of these intermediaries on EM by IPO firms. Venkataraman et al. (2008) report 
that auditors are more conservative in auditing IPO firms’ financial reports due to greater 
litigation exposure in the IPO market. Morsfield and Tan (2006), Hochberg (2012), and 
Wongsunwai (2013) suggest that the monitoring of venture capitalists can restrain EM by 
IPO firms. Jo et al. (2007) argue that due to reputational concerns and litigation risks, 
prestigious underwriters make an effort to constrain firms’ EM. Lee and Masulis (2011) 
document a negative association between EM and more reputable venture capitalists and 
investment banks. In the main analysis, I find evidence that the presence of CRAs reduces 
EM by IPO issuers. In this section, I examine whether CRAs exert influence on EM 
decisions by IPO firms which are venture backed, underwritten by reputational 
investment banks, or audited by big six accounting firms. I create an interaction term 
between rating existence and each of the variables venture capitalist, highly ranked 
underwriter, and big6 auditor. I then run regressions separately for each interaction effect. 
The results are presented in Table 2.9.  
Panel A reports the results of the regressions of EM on rating existence controlling 
for the interaction effect between CRAs and venture capitalists. The coefficients on rating 
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existence remain significantly negative, indicating that for IPOs without venture backing, 
having a credit rating is still associated with less EM. The F-tests of [Rating existence + 
Rating existence*Venture capitalist] give significant negative results in regressions 
employing abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, and REM2 as 
dependent variables. This suggests that for venture-backed IPOs, issuers with credit 
ratings have a lower level of accrual-based EM, sales-based real EM, and the combination 
of sales and discretionary expense manipulation than those without credit ratings.  
The results presented in Panel B account for the interaction effect between CRAs 
and top-tier underwriters. The coefficient on rating existence is significantly negative 
only for the regression with the dependent variable of abnormal accruals. For IPO firms 
not being underwritten by top-tier investment banks, having a credit rating is associated 
with lower accrual-based EM, but not with lower real EM. The findings suggest that the 
presence of a reputable underwriter is important in contributing to the reduction effect of 
credit ratings on real EM. Moreover, I obtain significant negative results for the F-tests 
of [Rating existence + Rating existence*Highly ranked underwriter] for specifications 
using abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and REM2 as EM measures. This indicates that among IPO firms being 
underwritten by reputable investment banks, firms with credit ratings have significantly 
less EM through accruals, sales and discretionary expenses than those without credit 
ratings. 
Panel C shows the results of the regressions controlling for the interaction effect 
between CRAs and big six auditing firms. For IPOs not being audited by big six auditors, 
the presence of a CRA is not significantly related to lower levels of either accrual-based 
or real EM. This implies that the certification of financial statements by an experienced 
auditing firm is important for a CRA to effectively exert its influence on EM by an IPO 
firm. For IPOs being audited by the big six, rated firms are less likely to engage in accrual-
based EM and real EM through sales and discretionary expenses manipulation. 
To summarize, without a venture capitalist, rating existence remains negatively 
related to the level of EM in the offering year. However, without a top-tier underwriter, 
the negative association between credit rating and EM holds for accrual-based EM, but 
not real EM. Going public without a big six auditor indicates that the restraining effect of 
CRAs on EM no longer holds. In the presence of a venture capitalist, a reputable 
investment bank, or a big six auditor, rated issuers are less likely to undertake accrual-
based EM and some real EM methods than unrated ones. 
40 
 
 
 
 
2.7.3. Other robustness tests 
First of all, I conduct a robustness control for the existence of multicollinearity. In 
the main analysis, I provide a correlation matrix and show that there is no 
multicollinearity among the variables. Besides the bivariate method to examine whether 
there is a relationship between one variable and one of the other variables, I also check 
the severity of multicollinearity in the regression analysis using variance inflation factor 
(VIF). VIF measures the extent to which the variance of the estimated coefficients is 
inflated due to collinearity among independent variables in the regression. Panel A of 
Table 2.10 presents the VIFs of the estimated coefficients in each of the regressions of 
EM proxies (i.e., abnormal accruals, abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal 
production costs, REM1, and REM2) on rating existence. The VIFs of the estimated 
coefficients across all regressions range from just above 1 to less than 2.5, indicating low 
multicollinearity among independent variables in the regressions. 
The credit rating sector is highly concentrated with the three largest CRAs (i.e. 
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch) covering approximately 95% of the rating business. For 
robustness, I expand the sample of rated IPOs to include firms obtaining ratings from 
either of the three CRAs. The data for long-term corporate credit ratings from Moody’s 
and Fitch are extracted from Bloomberg. This increases the sample of rated IPOs to 174 
firms. There are 47 firms having credit ratings from more than one rating agency. I re-
estimate the main regressions and report the results in Panel B of Table 2.10. I continue 
to report that rated firms are less likely to engage in accrual-based and real EM. 
In addition, concerns have been raised regarding the ability of CRAs to give 
advance warning of financial crises. For example, during the internet bubble period, S&P 
and Moody’s assigned investment grade ratings to Enron, World.com, and Parmalat just 
a short period before they went bankrupt5. In July 2007, the US market witnessed a mass 
significant downgrade by CRAs for thousands of residential mortgage-backed securities 
that were issued a year earlier. To control for these turbulent periods, I include in the main 
model an indicator variable dotcom that equals to one if the IPO took place during the 
                                                          
5 In the Internet bubble period, S&P and Moody’s assigned investment grade ratings to Enron until November 27, 2001 
- six days before its bankruptcy; Moody’s and S&P gave Worldcom investment grade ratings about two months before 
its bankruptcy; Parmalat also received an investment grade rating from S&P until 18 days before its bankruptcy on 
December 27, 2003 (Coffee 2006). 
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dot-com bubble period 1999–2000 and zero otherwise, and an indicator variable crisis 
that equal to one if the IPO occurred during the financial crisis 2007–2008 and zero 
otherwise. Another important event that may affect the results is the passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). SOX was passed by the US Congress and enacted in 2002 as a reaction 
to a series of corporate scandals including those affecting Enron and World.com. The bill 
aims to restore investor confidence in financial reporting and assure the integrity of capital 
markets. It entails a number of strict regulations to strengthen financial disclosures and 
protect investors from potential fraudulent accounting practices. Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
report that SOX’s requirement for the certification of financial statements by CEOs and 
CFOs influences managerial accounting discretion towards higher conservatism in 
financial reporting. Cohen et al. (2008) also document changes in managerial choice of 
EM methods towards more real EM after the passage of SOX. To capture the effect of 
SOX, I create an indicator variable SOX that equals to one for IPOs occurring after the 
passage of SOX and zero otherwise. I re-run the main regressions with three additional 
indicator variables dotcom, crisis, and SOX. To avoid multicollinearity, I do not include 
year fixed effects in the regressions. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 2.10. I 
still obtain similar results with the main findings. Specifically, there is strong evidence 
that rated IPO firms are less likely to undertake accrual-based and real EM than unrated 
IPO firms. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This study provides new empirical evidence regarding the effect of credit ratings 
on EM around IPOs. Particularly, firms with credit ratings are associated with lower EM 
in the offering year. CRAs are highly capable of identifying managers’ misbehaviours 
due to their profound expertise, experience, and access to a large pool of both private and 
public information. Moreover, reputational concerns and litigation risks strengthen the 
incentives of CRAs to thoroughly monitor and detect reporting misrepresentations of the 
issuer. The additional monitoring from CRAs and reduced information asymmetry due to 
the provision of a credit rating weaken the incentives of rated IPO firms to bias reported 
earnings through accrual and real activities manipulation because their misbehaviours are 
more likely to be detected. Additionally, I find no evidence that rating levels explain the 
variation in EM around IPOs. Particularly, I document that the impact of CRAs in 
restraining EM is less pronounced when controlling for the interaction effects between 
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CRAs and other financial intermediaries including venture capitalists, investment banks, 
and big six auditors. For IPOs without a venture capitalist, CRAs still restrain both 
accrual-based and real EM. For issuers without a top-tier underwriter, the negative 
association between credit ratings and EM holds for accrual-based EM, but not real EM. 
For firms going public without a high quality auditor, the restraining effect of CRAs on 
EM no longer holds. Thus, the involvement of experienced auditors in certifying 
accounting information is essential for CRAs to impose their impacts on reducing EM 
around IPOs. 
In my analysis, I examine both accrual-based and real EM and employ various 
measures of EM. I also control for the endogenous selection problem in the firm’s choice 
to obtain a credit rating by employing different econometric approaches including 
Heckman’s (1979) two-step treatment effect model, MLE treatment effect model, and 
2SLS IV model. Furthermore, the results remain robust when I use ratings from S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch to determine the existence of a credit rating. The findings still remain 
consistent when controlling for critical periods that may affect the influence of CRAs on 
EM including the Internet bubble (1999–2000), the financial crisis (2007–2008), and the 
post-Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002).  
Additionally, I examine the influence of having a credit rating on managerial 
intent to exercise accounting and operating discretion to inflate earnings in the IPO year. 
I find that income-increasing EM in the offering year of rated IPOs is positively linked to 
subsequent accounting performance, which is consistent with the notion that managers of 
rated IPO firms tend to exercise their accounting discretion to communicate to the market 
about the firm’s future prospects. The insignificant association between at-issue income-
increasing EM and future earnings for unrated firms suggest that they are more likely to 
opportunistically manage earnings. Analysing post-issue long-run stock performance, I 
reveal that while abnormal accruals in the offering year explain the variation in post-issue 
IPO underperformance for unrated firms, they are not related to post-IPO long-run stock 
performance of rated issuers. This indicates that investors are unable to see through the 
opportunistic EM by unrated IPO issuers; however, for rated IPO issuers, investors are 
more likely to accurately interpret the information conveyed by managers through at-
issue EM and derive the fair market value of the stock, resulting in insignificant post-
issue long-run abnormal stock returns. The overall evidence suggests the importance of 
CRAs in explaining the extent of income-increasing EM around IPOs and managers’ 
purposes in exercising their discretion to report higher financial outcomes.   
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Table 2. 1 Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Measures of earnings management 
Abnormal accruals  Abnormal accruals computed using the modified Jones model and 
adjusted for abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-IPO 
firm. The methodology to estimate abnormal accruals is explained 
in Section 2.4.2.1. 
Abnormal cash flow from 
operations 
Abnormal cash flow from operations multiplied by minus one. The 
methodology to estimate abnormal cash flow from operations is 
explained in Section 2.4.2.2. 
Abnormal production costs Abnormal production costs, where production costs are the sum of 
cost of goods sold and change in inventories. The methodology to 
estimate abnormal production costs is explained in Section 2.4.2.2. 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
Abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by minus one, where 
discretionary expenses are the sum of advertising expenses, R&D 
expenses, and SG&A expenses. The methodology to estimate 
abnormal discretionary expenses is explained in Section 2.4.2.2. 
REM1 First measure of overall level of real earnings management 
computed as the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal 
discretionary expenses.  
 
REM2 Second measure of overall level of real earnings management 
computed as the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Credit rating variables 
Rating existence Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm has a credit rating 
one month prior to the offering, and zero otherwise (Compustat).  
Rating level Credit rating level that ranges from 1 (D rating) to 22 (AAA rating) 
(Compustat).  
Firm and offering characteristics 
Firm age Age of the firm in years. Firm age is the difference between the 
firm’s offering year and its founding year. Company founding 
years are collected from the Field-Ritter dataset.6 
Market value Market value of the firm in the year of the offering (Compustat 
PRCC_F*CSHO). 
                                                          
6 The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm. 
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Leverage Ratio of total debts to total assets (Compustat (DLC + DLTT)/AT). 
Loss Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm has negative 
earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat EBIT) in the fiscal 
year prior to the offering, and zero otherwise.  
CAPEX Average capital expenditures (Compustat CAPX) in the offering 
year and one year after scaled by total assets (Compustat AT) in the 
beginning of the offering year. 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets (Compustat NI/AT). 
CFO Cash flow from operations to total assets (Compustat OANCF/AT). 
Industry-adjusted ROA Industry-adjusted ROA that is calculated by subtracting the median 
ROA (Compustat NI/AT) of the two-digit SIC industry group from 
the firm’s ROA.  
Industry-adjusted CFO Industry-adjusted CFO that is calculated by subtracting the median 
CFO (Compustat OANCF/AT) of the two-digit SIC industry group 
from the firm’s CFO.  
Big6 auditor Indicator variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is audited by a 
big six audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big six audit firms include 
Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & 
Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Compustat AU).7 
Venture capitalist Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is venture-backed, 
and zero otherwise (SDC). 
Highly ranked underwriter Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is underwritten by 
most reputable underwriters, and zero otherwise (SDC). Most 
reputable underwriters are those with a ranking score of 9.0 or 
above based on Jay Ritter’s underwriter rankings.8 
Book-to-market Ratio of book value to market value at the end of the fiscal year of 
the offering (Compustat CEQ/PRCC_F*CSHO). 
                                                          
7 Coopers & Lybrand merged with Pricewaterhouse on July 1, 1998. Arthur Andersen ceased to operate after Enron 
scandal in 2002.  
8 IPO underwriter reputation rankings are available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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High-tech industry Indicator variable that equals to one if the firm is in the high-tech 
industry, and zero otherwise. High-tech industries are those with a 
SIC code of 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 
3675, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 
3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 
3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone 
equipment), 4899 (communications services), 7371-7375, 7378, 
7379 (software) (SDC). 
Stock returns variables  
BHAR Three-year post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated 
as the difference between the three-year buy-and-hold return of the 
firm and the three-year buy-and-hold return of the benchmark.  The 
three-year period starts from the day after the annual financial 
report in the offering year to the earlier of the three year 
anniversary date and the delisting date. Stock returns are collected 
from CRSP, the benchmark used is the CRSP market index.  
Market BHR Three-year buy-and-hold value weighted market index return 
(CRSP). 
Underpricing Stock return of the firm on the first day of trading (CRSP). 
POSEM  Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake 
income-increasing EM in the offering year. 
NEGEM Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake 
income-decreasing EM in the offering year. 
MKT Excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index. The 
factor is retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website9. 
SMB Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
small and large stocks. The factor is retrieved from Professor 
Kenneth French’s website. 
HML Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The 
factor is retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website. 
Instrumental variables 
Industry fraction Logarithm of one plus the percentage of firms having credit ratings 
in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm (Compustat). 
Industry level Median credit rating level of firms having credit ratings in the same 
three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. Credit rating level ranges 
from 1 (D rating) to 22 (AAA rating) (Compustat). 
                                                          
9 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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Industry profitability Median ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total assets (Compustat EBITDA/AT) 
of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry as the IPO firm. 
Industry risk Standard deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets 
(Compustat EBITDA/AT) of firms in the same three-digit SIC 
industry as the IPO firm. 
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Table 2. 2 IPO characteristics and distribution 
The table presents the characteristics and distribution of US IPOs from 1991 to 2011. N denotes the number 
of observations. IPO characteristics are measured for the fiscal year of the offering. Credit rating level is 
categorised from 1 to 22, and a higher rating level takes a higher value. 
 
Panel A: IPO characteristics 
 
All IPOs 
(N = 2,602) 
Rated IPOs 
(N = 153) 
Unrated IPOs 
(N = 2,449) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Firm age 16.08 9.00 36.86 24.00 14.78 8.00 
Initial return 0.22 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.23 0.11 
Offer price (in US$) 12.94 12.50 16.23 16.00 12.73 12.00 
Proceeds (in US$ million) 85.25 42.90 347.96 140.40 68.83 40.80 
Total assets (in US$ million) 317.72 75.94 2,202.45 686.50 201.58 70.03 
Total sales (in US$ million) 296.02 56.26 2,104.96 546.25 184.55 51.11 
Market value (in US$ million) 545.59 182.87 2,023.18 604.68 456.66 166.12 
ROA -0.49 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.52 0.05 
BHAR -0.07 -0.43 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.45 
Book-to-market 0.34 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.28 
 
 
 
Panel B: Time distribution  
Year 
 
All IPOs 
(N = 2,602) 
Rated IPOs 
(N = 153) 
Unrated IPOs 
(N = 2,449) 
 N % N % N % 
1991  111 4.01 7 4.38 104 3.98 
1992  185 6.68 9 5.63 176 6.74 
1993  226 8.16 14 8.75 212 8.12 
1994  186 6.71 4 2.50 182 6.97 
1995  214 7.72 9 5.63 205 7.85 
1996  301 10.86 11 6.88 290 11.11 
1997  213 7.69 9 5.63 204 7.81 
1998  140 5.05 6 3.75 134 5.13 
1999  243 8.77 11 6.88 232 8.89 
2000  167 6.03 7 4.38 160 6.13 
2001  35 1.26 2 1.25 33 1.26 
2002  40 1.44 3 1.88 37 1.42 
2003  37 1.34 7 4.38 30 1.15 
2004  95 3.43 10 6.25 85 3.26 
2005  80 2.89 8 5.00 72 2.76 
2006  91 3.28 14 8.75 77 2.95 
2007  99 3.57 5 3.13 94 3.60 
2008  12 0.43 1 0.63 11 0.42 
2009  31 1.12 5 3.13 26 1.00 
2010  52 1.88 10 6.25 42 1.61 
2011  44 1.59 1 0.63 43 1.65 
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Panel C: Industry distribution  
Industry name SIC codes 
All IPOs 
 
Rated IPOs 
 
Unrated IPOs 
 N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  13 48 1.84 6 3.92 42 1.71 
Food products 20 38 1.46 7 4.58 31 1.27 
Chemical products 28 218 8.38 9 5.88 209 8.53 
Manufacturing 30-34 91 3.49 16 10.45 75 3.07 
Computer equipment & services 35, 73 809 31.09 13 8.5 796 32.51 
Electronic equipment 36 242 9.30 8 5.23 234 9.55 
Scientific instruments 38 193 7.42 8 5.23 185 7.55 
Transportation and public utilities 40-49 204 7.83 28 18.29 176 7.18 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-59 312 11.99 25 16.34 287 11.72 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 51 1.96 3 1.96 48 1.95 
Health services 80 90 3.46 5 3.27 85 3.47 
All others 
10, 12, 14-17, 
21-27, 29, 37, 
39, 72, 75, 76, 
82, 83, 87 
306 11.78 25 16.34 281 11.46 
Total 57 2,602 100 153 100 2,449 100 
  
Panel D: Credit rating level distribution  
Credit rating 
level 
Rating level   
All rated 
IPOs  
(N = 153)  
%   
AAA 22   1 0.65   
AA+ 21   0 0.00   
AA 20   0 0.00   
AA- 19   0 0.00   
A+ 18   0 0.00   
A 17   1 0.65   
A- 16   1 0.65   
BBB+ 15   0 0.00   
BBB 14   2 1.31   
BBB- 13   1 0.65   
BB+ 12   2 1.31   
BB 11   9 5.88   
BB- 10   27 17.65   
B+ 9   66 43.14   
B 8   27 17.65   
B- 7   12 7.84   
CCC+ 6   4 2.61   
CCC 5   0 0.00   
CCC- 4   0 0.00   
CC 3   0 0.00   
C 2   0 0.00   
D 1   0 0.00   
 A rating category 3 1.95   
 B rating category 146 95.43   
 C and D rating category 4 2.61   
 Investment grade (BBB- and above) 6 3.91   
 
Non-investment grade (BB+ and 
below) 
147 96.08   
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Table 2. 3 Descriptive statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and earnings management proxies for the sample of US IPOs over the period from 1991 to 2011. Panel 
A illustrates the descriptive statistics for the overall sample and sub-samples of unrated and rated IPO firms. Panel B shows the correlation matrix. T-tests and Wilcoxon 
sign rank tests are used to examine the difference of means and medians from zero. Tests of difference in means and medians between the two samples of unrated and 
rated IPOs are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for overall sample and sub-samples of unrated and rated IPO firms 
 All IPO firms 
 
Unrated IPO firms 
 
Rated IPO firms 
 
Difference 
in mean  
(p-value) 
Difference 
in median  
(p-value)  N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Firm characteristics            
Firm age 2,602 16.08 9.00 2,449 14.78 8.00 153 36.86 24.00 0.000 0.000 
Market value 2,602 445.54 184.23 2,449 395.94 171.38 153 1,252.28 497.43 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 2,602 0.73 0.73 2,449 0.71 0.66 153 0.96 0.89 0.000 0.000 
Loss 2,602 0.37 0.37 2,449 0.39 0.00 153 0.08 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Highly ranked underwriter 2,602 0.36 0.36 2,449 0.34 0.00 153 0.68 1.00 0.000 0.000 
Big6 auditor 2,602 0.92 0.92 2,449 0.92 1.00 153 0.96 1.00 0.032 0.063 
Venture capitalist 2,602 0.51 0.51 2,449 0.53 1.00 153 0.18 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Industry-adjusted ROA 2,602 -0.17 -0.17 2,449 -0.18 -0.00 153 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 0.534 
CAPEX 2,602 0.41 0.41 2,449 0.43 0.14 153 0.12 0.07 0.112 0.000 
Earnings management proxies            
Abnormal accruals 2,324 -0.03** 0.02*** 2,188 -0.03** 0.03*** 136 -0.04 -0.01 0.480 0.060 
Abnormal cash flow from 
operations 
2,354 
0.10*** 0.03*** 
2,217 
0.10*** 0.03*** 
137 
-0.00 0.02 0.052 0.165 
Abnormal production costs 1,038 -0.11*** -0.08*** 938 -0.12*** -0.09*** 100 -0.01 -0.01 0.107 0.008 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
2,211 
-0.65*** -0.25*** 
2,088 
-0.69*** -0.29*** 
123 
0.02 0.02 0.000 0.000 
REM1 968 -0.80*** -0.30*** 879 -0.88*** -0.40*** 89 0.06 0.08** 0.000 0.000 
REM2 2,179 -0.56*** -0.21*** 2,059 -0.59*** -0.24*** 120 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix  
  
Rating 
existence 
Log(1+firm 
age) 
Ln(market 
value) 
Leverage Loss Highly 
ranked 
underwriter 
Big6 
auditor 
Venture 
capitalist 
Industry-
adjusted 
ROA 
CAPEX 
Rating existence 1.000          
Log(1 + firm age) 0.216 1.000         
Ln(market value) 0.217 0.069 1.000        
Leverage 0.125 0.070 -0.048 1.000       
Loss -0.146 -0.400 0.126 0.042 1.000      
Highly ranked 
underwriter 
0.165 0.101 0.453 -0.023 0.020 1.000     
Big6 auditor 0.036 -0.006 0.164 -0.076 0.015 0.161 1.000    
Venture capitalist -0.164 -0.274 0.091 -0.136 0.390 0.021 0.175 1.000   
Industry-adjusted 
ROA 
0.078 0.270 -0.032 -0.356 -0.615 0.028 0.018 -0.247 1.000  
CAPEX -0.025 -0.122 0.032 0.110 0.080 0.020 0.005 0.029 -0.179 1.000 
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Table 2. 4 Regressions of accrual-based earnings management on credit rating existence 
The table presents the regression analyses of the association between abnormal accruals and credit rating 
existence for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1991-2011 using the three estimation approaches: 
Heckman’s two-step treatment effect model, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect 
model, and instrumental variable (IV) model. Panel A and Panel B show the results of the regressions with 
abnormal accruals being measured using the performance-matching modified Jones (1991) model and 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model, respectively. All regressions control for year fixed effects 
whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
Panel A: Modified Jones (1991) model with performance matching 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
 Heckman MLE IV 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -0.650***  -0.283***  -1.207**  
  (-2.79)  (-4.58)  (-2.04)    
Log(1+ firm age)  -0.185***  -0.184*** 0.066*** -0.106*   
  (-5.32)  (-5.18) (2.92) (-1.79)    
Ln(market value)  0.001  0.001 0.044*** 0.050    
   (0.11)  (0.08) (4.39) (1.57)    
Leverage  0.067**  0.063* 0.046*** 0.119**  
   (2.14)  (1.94) (2.67) (2.34)    
Loss  0.074*  0.076* 0.006 0.078    
   (1.95)  (1.72) (0.28) (1.60)    
Highly ranked 
underwriter 
  
 -0.033  -0.036 0.017 -0.014    
 (-1.10)  (-1.16) (0.95) (-0.36)    
Big6 auditor  0.029  0.029 0.008 0.035    
   (0.60)  (0.69) (0.35) (0.72)    
Venture capitalist  -0.056**  -0.049* -0.047*** -0.109**  
   (-2.04)  (-1.85) (-3.93) (-2.54)    
Industry-adjusted ROA  0.002  0.000 0.012 0.015    
  (0.04)  (0.00) (0.67) (0.29)    
CAPEX  0.014***  0.014*** -0.001 0.013*** 
  (4.69)  (3.56) (-1.39) (3.61)    
Intercept -2.183*** 0.381*** -2.217*** 0.357*** -0.284*** 0.066    
 (-15.36) (3.86) (-17.58) (4.03) (-4.71) (0.35)    
Industry fraction 8.235***  8.564***  0.533**  
 (6.01)  (6.86)  (2.31)  
Industry profitability 0.191  0.288  0.045  
 (0.19)  (0.31)  (0.57)  
Industry risk -0.004  -0.003  0.000  
 (-0.28)  (-0.48)  (-1.07)  
       
Inverse Mills ratio 0.265**      
 (2.40)      
Likelihood ratio test 
against  
H0: ρ = 0  (p-value) 
  
 0.000 
  
    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test against H0: 
variables are exogenous 
(p-value) 
     0.018 
Number of observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
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Panel B: Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
 Heckman MLE IV 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -0.345***  -0.157***  -0.755** 
  (-2.85)  (-5.56)  (-2.22) 
Log(1 + firm age)  -0.052**  -0.054** 0.000 -0.048 
  (-2.24)  (-2.22) (0.00) (-1.22) 
Ln(market value)  -0.002  -0.003 0.060*** 0.041* 
   (-0.25)  (-0.38) (3.79) (1.66) 
Leverage  0.026  0.025 0.093** 0.093** 
   (1.50)  (1.10) (2.51) (2.11) 
Loss  -0.056**  -0.052** -0.080*** -0.112*** 
   (-2.23)  (-1.99) (-2.63) (-2.60) 
Highly ranked 
underwriter 
  
 -0.009  -0.008 0.029 0.011 
 (-0.52)  (-0.51) (1.11) (0.43) 
Big6 auditor  -0.029  -0.030 0.007 -0.025 
   (-1.05)  (-0.90) (0.19) (-0.60) 
Venture capitalist  -0.004  0.001 -0.036 -0.032 
   (-0.23)  (0.06) (-1.29) (-1.03) 
Industry-adjusted ROA  -0.141***  -0.141*** -0.020 -0.155*** 
  (-5.64)  (-3.38) (-0.63) (-3.58) 
CAPEX  0.046***  0.046** -0.038*** 0.021 
  (4.23)  (2.36) (-2.72) (1.02) 
Intercept -1.702*** 0.177** -1.746*** 0.168*** 0.024 0.183 
 (-10.96) (2.35) (-12.79) (3.00) (0.12) (1.20) 
Industry fraction 5.789***  6.550***  0.761*  
 (3.25)  (3.86)  (1.76)  
Industry profitability 1.127  1.045  -0.008  
 (1.12)  (0.83)  (-0.06)  
Industry risk -0.013  -0.014  -0.001  
 (-0.91)  (-1.45)  (-1.31)  
       
Inverse Mills ratio 0.151**      
 (2.41)      
Likelihood ratio test 
against  
H0: ρ = 0  (p-value) 
  
 0.000 
  
    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test against H0: 
variables are exogenous 
(p-value) 
     0.000 
Number of observations 494 494 494 494 494 494 
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Table 2. 5 Regressions of real earnings management on credit rating existence 
The table presents the regression analyses of the association between real earnings management and credit rating existence for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1991-
2011 using the three estimation approaches: Heckman’s two-step treatment effect model, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect model, and instrumental 
variable (IV) model. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are 
defined in Table 2.1. 
 
Panel A: Heckman’s two-step treatment effect 
 Abnormal cash flow 
from operations  
Abnormal production 
costs  
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -0.504**  -0.671**  -0.675***  -0.812**  -0.825*** 
  (-2.38)  (-2.04)  (-2.67)  (-2.01)  (-2.63) 
Log(1 + firm age)  -0.149***  0.056   -0.078  -0.091  -0.045 
  (-3.14)  (0.64)  (-1.48)  (-0.85)  (-0.72) 
Ln(market value)  0.008  -0.053*  0.031  -0.113***  0.029 
   (0.42)  (-1.69)  (1.40)  (-2.66)  (1.10) 
Leverage  0.089**  0.024  0.141**  0.053  0.178*** 
   (2.35)  (0.34)  (2.30)  (0.50)  (2.89) 
Loss  -0.102**  0.090  0.073  0.015  0.013 
   (-2.08)  (1.06)  (1.14)  (0.14)  (0.17) 
Highly ranked underwriter  -0.084**  -0.082  -0.137***  -0.114  -0.151*** 
   (-2.20)  (-1.34)  (-2.76)  (-1.38)  (-2.69) 
Big6 auditor  0.023  0.153  0.069  0.156  -0.024 
   (0.36)  (1.54)  (0.88)  (1.15)  (-0.27) 
Venture capitalist  -0.066*  0.009  -0.035  -0.066  -0.053 
   (-1.76)  (0.12)  (-0.71)  (-0.66)  (-0.94) 
Industry-adjusted ROA  -0.716***  -0.478***  -0.264***  -0.355***  -0.241*** 
  (-17.75)  (-6.07)  (-3.30)  (-2.95)  (-3.75) 
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CAPEX  0.018***  0.277***  0.007  0.232*  0.034*** 
  (4.55)  (4.18)  (0.28)  (1.80)  (2.89) 
Intercept -2.248*** 0.311** -1.778*** 0.478 -1.954*** 0.196 -1.515*** 1.261*** -2.004*** 0.262 
 (-17.73) (2.33) (-10.80) (1.59) (-13.06) (1.21) (-8.60) (3.10) (-14.12) (1.44) 
Industry fraction 9.438***  6.732***  9.418***  6.628***  8.839***  
 (7.46)  (3.58)  (5.65)  (3.26)  (5.61)  
Industry profitability 1.027  1.714*  -0.290  1.199  0.081  
 (1.25)  (1.81)  (-0.33)  (1.29)  (0.10)  
Industry risk -0.002  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.005  
 (-0.18)  (0.82)  (0.95)  (0.70)  (0.96)  
           
Inverse Mills ratio 0.182*  0.342*  0.292**  0.409*  0.348**  
 (1.73)  (1.95)  (2.22)  (1.81)  (2.18)  
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
           
           
Panel B: Treatment effect with maximum-likelihood estimation 
 Abnormal cash flow 
from operations  
Abnormal production 
costs  
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence   -0.424***   -0.518***   -0.475***   -0.643***   -0.547*** 
   (-5.39)   (-4.38)   (-5.04)   (-3.76)   (-5.01)    
Log(1 + firm age)   -0.149***   0.051   -0.080   -0.093   -0.047    
   (-3.61)   (0.67)   (-1.64)   (-0.96)   (-0.82)    
Ln(market value)   0.007   -0.054*   0.029   -0.116***   0.026    
    (0.35)   (-1.80)   (1.20)   (-2.66)   (0.94)    
Leverage   0.088*   0.026   0.136   0.051   0.173**  
    (1.83)   (0.35)   (1.50)   (0.42)   (2.06)    
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Loss   -0.101*   0.103   0.073   0.028   0.012    
    (-1.91)   (1.14)   (1.02)   (0.21)   (0.15)    
Highly ranked underwriter   -0.085**   -0.088   -0.135***   -0.119   -0.152*** 
    (-2.48)   (-1.57)   (-2.63)   (-1.43)   (-2.69)    
Big6 auditor   0.024   0.150   0.069   0.160   -0.021    
    (0.49)   (1.47)   (0.95)   (1.20)   (-0.25)    
Venture capitalist   -0.064*   0.012   -0.032   -0.066   -0.049    
    (-1.65)   (0.20)   (-0.63)   (-0.64)   (-0.78)    
Industry-adjusted ROA   -0.718***   -0.479***   -0.269**   -0.351**   -0.247*** 
   (-10.27)   (-4.10)   (-2.20)   (-2.29)   (-2.58)    
CAPEX   0.018***   0.282***   0.006   0.237   0.034*** 
   (2.75)   (2.72)   (0.30)   (1.21)   (5.11)    
Intercept -2.251*** 0.306** -1.817*** 0.484** -1.997*** 0.195 -1.554*** 1.242*** -2.032*** 0.252    
 (-18.60) (2.57) (-11.51) (2.02) (-14.54) (1.37) (-9.55) (3.73) (-14.95)    (1.50)    
Industry fraction 9.538***   7.235***   10.425***   7.320***   9.712***   
 (7.93)   (4.21)   (6.58)   (4.02)   (6.09)      
Industry profitability 1.117   1.997*   -0.348   1.263   -0.122      
 (1.03)   (1.91)   (-0.38)   (1.30)   (-0.14)      
Industry risk -0.007   0.001   -0.001   0.001   0.000      
 (-1.62)   (0.33)   (-0.31)   (0.15)   (0.01)      
           
Likelihood ratio test against 
H0: ρ = 0  (p-value) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
     
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
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Panel C: Instrumental variable regression 
 Abnormal cash flow from 
operations  
Abnormal production 
costs  
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Rating existence  -1.525*  -1.592*  -2.122**  -1.847**  -4.055** 
  (-1.82)  (-1.91)  (-2.50)  (-1.98)  (-2.16) 
Log(1 + firm age) 0.045* -0.079 -0.041 0.000 -0.006 -0.076 -0.045 -0.163 0.015 0.036 
 (1.76) (-1.23) (-0.74) (0.00) (-0.18) (-0.94) (-0.69) (-1.17) (0.46) (0.24) 
Ln(market value) 0.050*** 0.080 0.070*** 0.059 0.040*** 0.113** 0.071*** 0.021 0.045*** 0.214** 
  (5.08) (1.55) (3.61) (0.83) (3.03) (2.36) (2.81) (0.23) (3.33) (1.98) 
Leverage 0.033** 0.137** 0.105*** 0.197 0.114*** 0.382** 0.147** 0.329 0.087*** 0.531** 
  (2.09) (2.16) (2.66) (1.41) (3.02) (2.36) (2.31) (1.45) (3.01) (2.41) 
Loss -0.042** -0.154** -0.008 0.054 -0.024 0.022 -0.006 0.004 -0.004 0.006 
  (-2.18) (-2.11) (-0.16) (0.45) (-0.64) (0.22) (-0.09) (0.02) (-0.12) (0.04) 
Highly ranked underwriter 0.047*** -0.012 0.038 -0.021 0.079** 0.033 0.065 0.004 0.072** 0.148 
  (2.60) (-0.21) (1.13) (-0.24) (2.53) (0.31) (1.60) (0.03) (2.55) (0.79) 
Big6 auditor 0.015 0.035 0.041 0.208 0.019 0.092 0.023 0.188 0.031 0.074 
  (0.52) (0.55) (0.77) (1.55) (0.56) (0.91) (0.32) (1.00) (0.84) (0.45) 
Venture capitalist -0.056*** -0.155** -0.074** -0.112 -0.061*** -0.167** -0.130** -0.282* -0.063*** -0.310** 
  (-4.12) (-2.36) (-2.10) (-1.03) (-2.93) (-2.00) (-2.39) (-1.66) (-2.99) (-2.10) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.006 -0.717*** 0.036 -0.424*** 0.010 -0.242* 0.088* -0.209 0.037* -0.082 
 (-0.52) (-9.99) (1.22) (-3.54) (0.27) (-1.72) (1.74) (-1.10) (1.67) (-0.57) 
CAPEX -0.001 0.017*** -0.074*** 0.174* -0.015** -0.022 -0.099* 0.071 -0.003* 0.023** 
 (-1.37) (2.76) (-3.01) (1.74) (-2.15) (-0.80) (-1.91) (0.36) (-1.70) (2.02) 
Intercept -0.291*** -0.074 -0.126 0.264 -0.266*** -0.319 -0.087 1.051* -0.275*** -0.809 
 (-4.83) (-0.28) (-0.62) (0.61) (-3.15) (-1.04) (-0.32) (1.84) (-3.61) (-1.29) 
Industry fraction 0.894***  0.925*  1.034***  1.355**  0.707**  
 (3.74)  (1.94)  (2.75)  (2.20)  (2.09)  
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Industry profitability -0.055  0.131  -0.063  -0.077  -0.053  
 (-0.77)  (0.96)  (-0.46)  (-0.38)  (-0.46)  
Industry risk -0.001*  0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (-1.71)  (0.26)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (-0.20)  
           
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
against H0: variables are 
exogenous (p-value) 
 
0.079 
 
0.004 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.000 
     
Number of observations 1,037 1,037 361 361 544 544 266 266 610 610 
 
 
 
Table 2. 6 Analyses of post-issue accounting performance 
The table presents the regression analyses of the association between at-issue earnings management and post-issue accounting performance for the sample of US 
IPOs over the period 1991-2011. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
Panel A: Analyses of post-issue cash flow from operations  
Dependent variable: Cash flow from operations  
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.034 -0.044 0.035 -0.059*** -0.026 -0.032    
 (-1.19) (-1.51) (1.31) (-2.65) (-1.23) (-1.31)    
EM*Rating existence 0.146*** 0.319** 0.230*** 0.202*** 0.131*** 0.293*** 
 (2.59) (2.26) (2.96) (3.16) (2.71) (3.68)    
CFO 0.044** 0.062*** 0.172*** 0.047** 0.156*** 0.056* 
 (2.15) (2.93) (6.63) (1.99) (6.38) (1.66) 
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CAPEX 0.005 0.009** -0.093* 0.038 -0.069 0.029 
 (1.30) (2.46) (-1.92) (1.53) (-1.53) (1.63) 
Intercept 0.031 -0.131** -0.010 -0.021 -0.028 -0.034    
 (0.94) (-2.24) (-0.57) (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.68)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.035 0.058 0.001 0.025 0.041 0.001 
R-squared 0.172 0.279 0.547 0.281 0.545 0.227    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
       
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted cash flow from operations  
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.026 -0.044 0.033 -0.043** -0.023 -0.025    
 (-0.94) (-1.52) (1.29) (-2.03) (-1.09) (-1.03)    
EM*Rating existence 0.163** 0.362*** 0.230*** 0.158** 0.112** 0.271*** 
 (2.53) (2.71) (2.88) (2.52) (2.21) (3.38)    
Industry-adjusted CFO 0.045** 0.061*** 0.169*** 0.049** 0.155*** 0.059* 
 (2.35) (2.96) (7.09) (2.22) (6.95) (1.79) 
CAPEX 0.006 0.009** -0.089* 0.038 -0.067 0.031* 
 (1.47) (2.56) (-1.75) (1.54) (-1.54) (1.74) 
Intercept 0.028 -0.308*** -0.076*** -0.148** -0.129* -0.073    
 (0.84) (-7.38) (-4.18) (-2.42) (-1.87) (-1.55)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.028 0.021 0.002 0.069 0.098 0.002 
R-squared 0.138 0.212 0.491 0.234 0.480 0.185    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
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Panel B: Analyses of post-issue ROA 
Dependent variable: ROA  
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.080* -0.061* -0.019 -0.087** -0.032 -0.024    
 (-1.73) (-1.92) (-0.57) (-2.15) (-1.32) (-0.68)    
EM*Rating existence 0.214*** 0.453*** 0.255*** 0.200** 0.186*** 0.319*** 
 (2.66) (3.44) (2.67) (2.14) (2.96) (3.26)    
ROA 0.042 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.022 0.064*** 0.040*   
 (1.38) (4.75) (4.82) (1.41) (9.55) (1.87)    
CAPEX 0.016 0.024*** -0.182** 0.023 -0.047 0.016**  
 (1.13) (3.82) (-2.54) (1.36) (-1.20) (2.35)    
Intercept -0.050 -0.127** -0.125*** -0.012 -0.121 -0.151**  
 (-1.37) (-2.28) (-5.80) (-0.18) (-1.33) (-2.39)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.055 0.004 0.018 0.201 0.016 0.004 
R-squared 0.224 0.287 0.528 0.240 0.610 0.299    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
       
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted ROA 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.068 -0.059* -0.022 -0.066* -0.026 -0.012    
 (-1.51) (-1.83) (-0.70) (-1.71) (-1.12) (-0.35)    
EM*Rating existence 0.245** 0.508*** 0.259*** 0.133 0.160** 0.288*** 
 (2.45) (3.72) (2.77) (1.58) (2.41) (3.00)    
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Industry-adjusted ROA 0.041 0.056*** 0.072*** 0.024* 0.065*** 0.043**  
 (1.47) (4.84) (5.20) (1.68) (10.35) (2.00)    
CAPEX 0.017 0.024*** -0.174** 0.024 -0.050 0.016**  
 (1.27) (4.03) (-2.28) (1.43) (-1.30) (2.28)    
Intercept -0.007 -0.260*** -0.144*** -0.112* -0.129 -0.191*** 
 (-0.19) (-6.12) (-6.65) (-1.67) (-1.59) (-3.19)    
       
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.055 0.004 0.018 0.201 0.016 0.006 
R-squared 0.157 0.216 0.484 0.157 0.559 0.231    
Number of observations 1,125 1,152 393 601 288 676    
 
 
 
Table 2. 7 Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance 
The table presents the regression analyses of the association between at-issue earnings management and post-issue long-run stock performance for the sample of US 
IPOs over the period 1991-2011. All regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed.  One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
Panel A: Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance - Event-time approach 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
EM -0.203* -0.093* -0.222** 0.015 -0.133 -0.059 
 (-1.80) (-1.67) (-2.18) (0.13) (-0.95) (-0.56) 
EM*Rating existence 1.224* 0.331 0.007 0.489 0.049 0.359 
 (1.90) (0.63) (0.02) (1.29) (0.21) (1.09) 
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Underpricing -0.137 -0.236** 0.075 -0.234 0.215 -0.309    
  (-0.95) (-2.05) (0.18) (-0.87) (0.34) (-1.36)    
Log(1+firm age) -0.134 -0.078 0.088 -0.025 0.309* -0.170    
  (-1.22) (-0.71) (0.50) (-0.18) (1.89) (-1.18)    
Market BHR 0.121 0.481** 0.567 -0.165 -0.004 0.351    
 (0.57) (2.02) (1.31) (-0.53) (-0.01) (1.11)    
Book-to-market 0.179 0.117 -0.097 -0.037 -0.125 0.099    
 (1.53) (1.04) (-0.61) (-0.31) (-0.63) (0.85)    
Ln(market value) 0.005 -0.041 -0.056 0.039 -0.075 0.027    
 (0.11) (-1.01) (-0.86) (0.67) (-0.94) (0.49)    
ROA 0.012 -0.018 -0.000 0.027* 0.014 0.028*   
 (1.34) (-0.62) (-0.01) (1.75) (1.00) (1.80)    
Highly ranked underwriter 0.033 0.038 -0.060 -0.024 -0.073 0.071    
 (0.33) (0.40) (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.49) (0.56)    
Big6 auditor 0.341*** 0.418*** 0.318 0.265* 0.388 0.308**  
 (3.07) (3.27) (1.20) (1.74) (1.54) (2.47)    
High-tech industry 0.275*** 0.192* 0.115 0.244 0.107 0.308*   
 (2.70) (1.94) (0.71) (1.63) (0.60) (1.92)    
Intercept -0.673** -0.914** -0.438 -0.251 0.087 -0.887* 
 (-2.02) (-2.48) (-0.64) (-0.51) (0.12) (-1.95) 
 
      
P-value of F-test [EM + 
EM*Rating existence= 0] 
0.114 0.653 0.572 0.211 0.766 0.397 
R-squared 0.086 0.056 0.115 0.079 0.174 0.059 
Number of observations 1,087 1,122 393 574 286 642 
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Panel B: Analyses of post-issue long-run stock performance - Calendar-time approach 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Fama-French three-factor model      
Without credit ratings -0.007*** -0.004* -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-2.90) (-1.74) (-1.35) (-0.53) (-1.24) (-1.26)    
With credit ratings 0.001 -0.001 -0.010* 0.004 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.23) (-0.18) (-1.81) (0.80) (-0.53) (0.26) 
Carhart four-factor model       
Without credit ratings -0.006** -0.004* -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (-2.36) (-1.82) (-1.59) (-0.65) (-1.47) (-1.55) 
With credit ratings 0.003 -0.004 -0.011* 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 
 (0.45) (-0.56) (-1.93) (0.42) (-0.96) (-0.45) 
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Table 2. 8 Instrumental variable regressions of earnings management on credit rating levels 
The table presents the results of instrumental variable regressions of earnings management on credit rating levels for the sample of rated US IPOs over the period 1991-
2011. All regressions, control for the year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables 
are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating level 0.111 -0.428 -0.358 0.020 -0.827 -0.001 
 (0.96) (-1.06) (-1.55) (0.15) (-0.48) (-0.00) 
Log(1+ firm age) -0.272*** 0.088 -0.038 -0.089* -0.254 -0.055 
 (-3.01) (0.35) (-0.21) (-1.72) (-0.46) (-0.65) 
Ln(market value) -0.057 0.239 0.192 0.013 0.483 0.015 
  (-0.99) (1.02) (1.05) (0.22) (0.37) (0.12) 
Leverage 0.012 0.208 0.374 0.093 1.233 0.153 
  (0.21) (1.41) (1.40) (0.58) (0.48) (0.65) 
Loss 0.083 -0.271 -0.028 0.086 -0.251 0.012 
  (1.64) (-1.37) (-0.15) (0.91) (-0.32) (0.12) 
Highly ranked underwriter 
  
-0.051 0.072 0.034 -0.161 0.395 -0.161 
(-1.22) (0.41) (0.24) (-1.48) (0.36) (-0.89) 
Big6 auditor 0.024 0.026 0.234 0.075 0.173 -0.022 
  (0.48) (0.22) (1.23) (1.02) (0.32) (-0.24) 
Venture capitalist 0.020 -0.317 -0.243 -0.006 -0.956 -0.030 
  (0.30) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-0.06) (-0.49) (-0.20) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.012 -0.728*** -0.378*** -0.278** 0.161 -0.258* 
 (-0.22) (-8.98) (-2.65) (-2.22) (0.14) (-1.93) 
CAPEX 0.016*** 0.016** 0.082 0.010 -0.384 0.034*** 
 (3.47) (2.39) (0.49) (0.37) (-0.30) (3.47) 
Intercept 0.671** -0.861 -0.021 0.256 0.359 0.284 
 (2.13) (-0.74) (-0.03) (0.71) (0.13) (0.40) 
       
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
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Table 2. 9 Analyses of interaction effects between credit rating agencies and venture capitalists, top-tier investment banks, and Big Six auditors 
The table presents the results of instrumental variable regressions that analyse the association of earnings management and credit rating existence for the sample of US IPOs over 
the period 1991-2011 controlling for the interaction effects between credit rating agencies and venture capitalists, reputable investment banks, and Big Six auditors. All regressions 
are controlled for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Panel A: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and venture capitalists 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -1.271** -1.628* -1.088* -2.136** -1.347** -3.456** 
 (-2.00) (-1.76) (-1.87) (-2.53) (-2.19) (-2.47) 
Venture capitalist  -0.126** -0.188** -0.128 -0.222** -0.313* -0.367** 
  (-2.51) (-2.27) (-1.11) (-2.35) (-1.77) (-2.54) 
Rating existence * Venture capitalist  1.044* 1.355* 0.935* 1.910** 1.007* 2.861** 
 (1.78) (1.69) (1.73) (2.49) (1.79) (2.40) 
Log(1 + firm age) -0.109* -0.080 -0.014 -0.071 -0.180 -0.017 
 (-1.84) (-1.25) (-0.15) (-0.90) (-1.52) (-0.14) 
Ln(market value) 0.043 0.075 0.009 0.110** -0.026 0.161** 
  (1.47) (1.49) (0.18) (2.31) (-0.39) (2.08) 
Leverage 0.114** 0.124** 0.107 0.343** 0.182 0.413*** 
  (2.34) (2.08) (1.07) (2.29) (1.18) (2.63) 
Loss 0.082* -0.137** 0.108 0.025 0.064 0.039 
  (1.69) (-2.01) (1.08) (0.25) (0.44) (0.29) 
Highly ranked underwriter -0.003 -0.014 -0.043 0.011 -0.027 0.081 
  (-0.08) (-0.26) (-0.61) (0.11) (-0.26) (0.57) 
Big6 auditor 0.040 0.046 0.196* 0.101 0.189 0.085 
  (0.82) (0.68) (1.66) (0.98) (1.15) (0.57) 
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Industry-adjusted ROA 0.014 -0.720*** -0.452*** -0.281** -0.287* -0.138 
 (0.27) (-10.01) (-3.94) (-2.05) (-1.77) (-1.16) 
CAPEX 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.204** -0.020 0.117 0.027*** 
 (3.55) (2.75) (2.16) (-0.74) (0.63) (2.82) 
Intercept  0.111 -0.031 0.466 -0.267 1.271*** -0.434 
 (0.66) (-0.12) (1.33) (-0.91) (2.78) (-1.04) 
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating 
existence*Venture capitalist = 0] 
0.012 0.067 0.266 0.295 0.134 0.066 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
      
Panel B: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and top-tier underwriters 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -2.596** -3.871 0.448 -1.360 -0.617 -2.336 
 (-2.10) (-1.33) (0.64) (-1.31) (-0.63) (-1.06) 
Highly ranked underwriter -0.153** -0.242* -0.037 -0.218** -0.171 -0.294* 
  (-2.43) (-1.82) (-0.40) (-2.47) (-1.22) (-1.96) 
Rating existence * Highly ranked underwriter 2.384** 3.540 -0.489 1.164 0.469 2.088 
 (1.98) (1.27) (-0.73) (1.17) (0.51) (0.98) 
Log(1 + firm age) -0.144*** -0.136** 0.046 -0.086 -0.116 -0.047 
 (-2.88) (-2.00) (0.58) (-1.60) (-1.18) (-0.67) 
Ln(market value) 0.062* 0.100 -0.082* 0.062* -0.087 0.090 
  (1.87) (1.27) (-1.74) (1.67) (-1.34) (1.24) 
Leverage 0.080** 0.105* 0.017 0.179* 0.043 0.196** 
  (2.04) (1.89) (0.22) (1.75) (0.34) (2.12) 
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Loss 0.055 -0.199** 0.114 0.086 0.044 0.030 
  (1.00) (-1.97) (1.26) (1.06) (0.33) (0.29) 
Big6 auditor 0.007 0.011 0.165 0.064 0.156 -0.035 
  (0.11) (0.12) (1.64) (0.75) (1.11) (-0.33) 
Venture capitalist -0.076** -0.128** 0.048 -0.051 -0.056 -0.079 
  (-2.42) (-2.00) (0.76) (-0.89) (-0.52) (-0.99) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.007 -0.739*** -0.484*** -0.239* -0.328** -0.204* 
 (-0.14) (-10.24) (-4.05) (-1.84) (-1.96) (-1.84) 
CAPEX 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.260*** -0.002 0.179 0.033*** 
 (3.98) (2.97) (2.63) (-0.10) (0.93) (4.67) 
Intercept  0.118 -0.059 0.530* 0.036 1.120*** 0.009 
 (0.73) (-0.18) (1.87) (0.18) (3.18) (0.03) 
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating 
existence* Highly ranked underwriter = 0] 
0.001 0.027 0.618 0.011 0.250 0.034 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
 
 
 
Panel C: Interaction effect between credit rating agencies and Big Six auditors 
 
Abnormal 
accruals 
Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence  -9.104 -11.382 6.351 -19.558 -0.862 -12.664    
 (-1.10) (-0.91) (0.99) (-1.46) (-0.31) (-1.20)    
Big6 auditor -0.315 -0.605 0.564 -0.845*** 0.102 -0.566*   
  (-1.25) (-0.96) (1.61) (-2.80) (0.35) (-1.73)    
Rating existence * Big6 auditor 8.899 11.038 -6.362 19.156 0.721 12.412    
 (1.08) (0.90) (-1.00) (1.43) (0.26) (1.18)    
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Log(1 + firm age) -0.255*** -0.289 0.142 -0.310*** -0.122 -0.158    
 (-3.18) (-1.64) (1.07) (-3.27) (-1.08) (-1.37)    
Ln(market value) 0.080 0.141 -0.169* 0.178** -0.096 0.172*   
  (1.41) (1.02) (-1.72) (2.06) (-1.17) (1.67)    
Leverage 0.043 0.044 0.053 0.184* 0.032 0.143*   
  (1.01) (0.68) (0.66) (1.70) (0.25) (1.69)    
Loss -0.009 -0.241 0.155 -0.141 0.034 -0.052    
  (-0.09) (-1.39) (1.54) (-1.15) (0.26) (-0.47)    
Highly ranked underwriter -0.088* -0.095 0.011 -0.320** -0.126 -0.310**  
  (-1.84) (-1.43) (0.10) (-2.46) (-1.25) (-2.34)    
Venture capitalist -0.070** -0.089* 0.055 -0.070 -0.045 -0.055    
  (-2.06) (-1.72) (0.76) (-1.10) (-0.44) (-0.82)    
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.040 -0.755*** -0.466*** -0.328*** -0.358** -0.231**  
 (-0.61) (-9.08) (-3.80) (-2.62) (-2.28) (-2.36)    
CAPEX 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.292*** 0.012 0.188 0.032*** 
 (3.63) (2.74) (2.86) (0.40) (0.96) (4.48)    
Intercept  0.442*** 0.484* 0.505** 0.759** 1.205*** 0.323 
 (2.99) (1.88) (2.02) (2.00) (3.83) (1.58) 
       
P-value of F-test [Rating existence + Rating 
existence* Big6 auditor = 0] 
0.048 0.093 0.907 0.001 0.171 0.025 
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
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Table 2. 10 Other robustness tests 
The table presents other robustness tests regarding the analysis of the association between earnings management and credit rating existence. Panel A shows the variance 
inflation factor of the estimated coefficients for all variables in the regressions of different earnings management proxies on rating existence. Panel B presents the results 
for the regressions in which the sample of rated IPOs is expanded to include IPO firms with either S&P, Moody’s or Fitch credit rating. Panel C provides the results of 
the regressions controlling for periods of the Internet bubble (1999-2000), financial crisis (2007-2008), and post-Sarbanes-Oxley (after 2002).  One, two and three 
asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
 
Panel A: Variance inflation factor  
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal cash 
flow from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence 1.19 1.27 1.43 1.27 1.51 1.29 
Log(1+ firm age) 1.30 1.39 1.51 1.39 1.52 1.42 
Ln(market value) 1.92 2.02 1.82 2.06 1.90 1.99 
Leverage 1.29 1.31 1.35 1.32 1.51 1.37 
Loss 2.07 2.37 2.35 2.04 2.22 2.27 
Highly ranked underwriter 1.40 1.35 1.26 1.45 1.31 1.41 
Big6 auditor 1.17 1.17 1.26 1.17 1.26 1.16 
Venture capitalist 1.32 1.39 1.66 1.42 1.85 1.45 
Industry-adjusted ROA 2.23 2.18 1.93 1.91 2.15 2.04 
CAPEX 1.11 1.07 1.24 1.16 1.21 1.14 
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Panel B: The sample of rated IPOs is expanded to include IPO firms with either S&P, Moody’s or Fitch credit rating 
 
Abnormal accruals 
Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence -0.974** -1.512* -1.119** -1.685*** -1.308** -2.872*** 
 (-2.08) (-1.87) (-2.12) (-3.00) (-2.28) (-2.65)    
Log(1 + firm age) -0.125** -0.087 0.010 -0.102 -0.167 -0.014    
 (-2.50) (-1.42) (0.10) (-1.42) (-1.32) (-0.13)    
Ln(market value) 0.044 0.080 0.027 0.097** -0.016 0.167**  
  (1.54) (1.58) (0.51) (2.44) (-0.23) (2.26)    
Leverage 0.109** 0.142** 0.146 0.343** 0.241 0.442*** 
  (2.34) (2.19) (1.33) (2.48) (1.37) (2.70)    
Loss 0.070 -0.153** 0.043 0.006 -0.040 -0.031    
  (1.48) (-2.12) (0.40) (0.06) (-0.27) (-0.24)    
Highly ranked underwriter 
  
-0.015 -0.012 -0.024 0.024 -0.003 0.080    
(-0.40) (-0.20) (-0.32) (0.27) (-0.03) (0.62)    
Big6 auditor 0.037 0.038 0.220* 0.114 0.218 0.079    
  (0.81) (0.59) (1.80) (1.20) (1.29) (0.58)    
Venture capitalist -0.103** -0.155** -0.102 -0.170** -0.255* -0.263**  
  (-2.55) (-2.39) (-1.03) (-2.26) (-1.72) (-2.36)    
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.010 -0.709*** -0.446*** -0.243* -0.262 -0.110    
 (0.19) (-9.81) (-3.89) (-1.79) (-1.54) (-0.89)    
CAPEX 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.201** -0.017 0.107 0.026*** 
 (3.60) (2.75) (2.11) (-0.66) (0.55) (2.66)    
Intercept 0.106 -0.069 0.269 -0.227 1.057** -0.537 
 (0.65) (-0.26) (0.77) (-0.92) (2.32) (-1.27) 
       
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610 
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Panel C: Controlling for time periods of the Internet bubble (1999-2000), financial crisis (2007-2008), post-Sarbanes-Oxley (after 2002) 
 
Abnormal accruals 
Abnormal cash flow 
from operations 
Abnormal 
production costs 
Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Rating existence -1.277** -1.361** -1.579* -1.867** -2.335* -3.244**  
 (-2.14) (-2.09) (-1.90) (-2.31) (-1.83) (-1.99)    
Log(1 + firm age) -0.114* -0.085 -0.058 -0.083 -0.234 -0.019    
 (-1.91) (-1.43) (-0.47) (-1.12) (-1.34) (-0.15)    
Ln(market value) 0.055* 0.069* 0.050 0.096** 0.087 0.178*   
  (1.76) (1.71) (0.70) (2.06) (0.71) (1.94)    
Leverage 0.132** 0.144** 0.198 0.356** 0.440* 0.471**  
  (2.57) (2.33) (1.52) (2.32) (1.65) (2.40)    
Loss 0.086* -0.151** -0.014 0.066 -0.087 0.016    
  (1.70) (-2.20) (-0.11) (0.69) (-0.45) (0.12)    
Highly ranked underwriter 
  
-0.013 -0.021 0.016 0.037 0.095 0.087    
(-0.33) (-0.41) (0.18) (0.36) (0.54) (0.54)    
Big6 auditor 0.026 0.019 0.184 0.090 0.237 0.060    
  (0.53) (0.30) (1.39) (0.95) (1.08) (0.41)    
Venture capitalist -0.120*** -0.143** -0.109 -0.174** -0.326* -0.282**  
  (-2.73) (-2.49) (-0.97) (-2.12) (-1.67) (-2.03)    
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.029 -0.719*** -0.451*** -0.164 -0.202 -0.097    
 (0.54) (-9.89) (-3.59) (-1.11) (-0.99) (-0.72)    
CAPEX 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.124 -0.013 -0.009 0.024**  
 (3.69) (2.84) (1.24) (-0.45) (-0.04) (2.46)    
SOX 0.039 -0.026 0.069 0.165 0.244 0.276    
 (0.71) (-0.41) (0.78) (1.37) (1.62) (1.38)    
Crisis -0.171* -0.074 -0.096 -0.220 -0.448 -0.589*   
 (-1.90) (-0.76) (-0.47) (-0.93) (-1.28) (-1.70)    
Dotcom 0.192*** 0.084 0.088 0.227* 0.275 0.232    
 (2.75) (1.11) (0.67) (1.85) (1.32) (1.42)    
Intercept 0.158 0.106 0.057 -0.199 0.285 -0.542    
 (0.87) (0.51) (0.18) (-0.76) (0.49) (-1.02)    
       
Number of observations 1,000 1,037 361 544 266 610    
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 Chapter 3 – Financial expert CEOs and earnings 
management around IPOs 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Earnings are commonly used by investors to evaluate the prospective performance 
of the firm. Therefore, managers may be tempted to manipulate earnings to influence 
short-term stock prices. The incentives to manage earnings are stronger around initial 
public offerings (IPOs) due to the high level of information asymmetry between managers 
and investors. Previous research on earnings management (EM) around IPOs provides 
evidence of positive abnormal accruals in the issue year and a negative relation between 
at-issue EM and post-issue long-run stock performance, suggesting that managers 
manipulate earnings to mislead investors (Aharony et al. 1993; Friedlan 1994; Teoh et al. 
1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b; Roosenbloom and Van De Goot 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004; 
Gramlich and Sorensen 2004). 
Researchers have attempted to understand factors driving EM such as firm-level 
factors (e.g., firm size, firm performance, leverage, growth, corporate governance, 
financing needs, target beating, the involvement of external parties such as underwriters, 
venture capitalists, and auditors), and external factors (e.g., capital requirements, and 
regulations) (see Dechow et al. (2010) for a review). Based on the upper echelons theory 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007) which predicts that managerial background 
characteristics can partially influence top managers’ decision making, increasing 
attention has been drawn to examine another potential determinant of accounting choices: 
managerial specific factors. Particularly, various studies link earnings quality with some 
managerial characteristics such as CEO reputation (Francis et al. 2008), superstar CEOs 
(Malmendier and Tate 2009), and managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2013). However, 
to the best of my knowledge, the impact of CEOs’ financial experience on EM around 
IPOs remains unexplored. 
The financial experience of CEOs may play an important role in determining the 
quality of financial reporting. Past financial experience equips CEOs with a deeper 
understanding of financial and accounting issues and structures, thus, allows them to be 
more capable of providing higher quality financial reports. Moreover, financial expert 
CEOs tend to have an affiliation with or accreditation from professional organisations, 
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which requires them to adhere to ethical codes of conduct. This considerably influences 
their risk attitudes towards more conservatism in financial reporting. In addition, 
misrepresentations in financial reporting will reflect badly on the career and adversely 
affect the reputation of financial expert CEOs. Thus, financial expert CEOs will have 
lower incentives to manipulate earnings. Although CEOs are not directly involved in 
overseeing the financial reporting process, they can set the tone from the top and influence 
the decisions of the Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) (Feng et al. 2011). Additionally, the 
financial knowledge also facilitates the communication between CEOs and CFOs and 
allows them to work efficiently with each other to develop sound accounting policies. 
Moreover, financial expert CEOs are more likely to appreciate the importance of 
accounting information in influencing investors’ evaluation of the firm and better aware 
of the types of information demanded by capital market participants. Therefore, they are 
more likely to effectively communicate financial information to the market (Custódio and 
Metzger 2014).   
Therefore, I am motivated to investigate whether the variation in an IPO firm’s 
EM is partially attributable to a CEO’s past financial experience. I pose two main research 
questions: (1) whether IPO firms with financial expert CEOs exhibit lower EM in the 
offering year, and (2) whether financial expert CEOs exercise their accounting discretion 
for informative purposes. To address these questions, I examine a sample of US common 
share IPOs over the period 2003-2011. I gather detailed CEOs’ biographies from BoardEx 
and prospectuses. I define financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in either 
banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or financial related roles such as an 
accountant, a treasurer, a VP of finance, and a CFO. I also test the robustness of the results 
using more specific measures of financial expertise, specifically, experience as a CFO 
and a CPA certification. In addition, utilising the detailed data on the CEO’s work history, 
I measure the variety of CEO financial experience and examine the association between 
financial experience variety and EM. I use four variables to proxy for the variety: the 
number of firms in which the CEO had financial experience, the number of financial 
related roles that the CEO held, the financial experience at another firm, and the length 
of time of the financial experience. I also use the principal component analysis to create 
a single variable - financial experience variety index that accounts for the effects of all 
the four individual factors. The results are robust to alternative measures of CEOs’ 
financial experience.  
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An important concern of the study of the impact of managerial characteristics on 
corporate decisions is the selection bias which occurs due to the non-random matching of 
CEOs to firms. With this study, EM may be driven by some unobserved firm and/or CEO 
characteristics that are correlated with CEOs’ financial experience. To account for the 
endogenous selection bias issue, I employ the propensity score matching method. I also 
check the robustness of the findings using alternative econometric approaches which are 
commonly used to address the selection concern: propensity score matching, instrumental 
variable two-stage least square model, Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effect model, 
and maximum likelihood treatment effect model. The results remain robust after 
controlling for the endogenous selection.  
I find that financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in EM around IPOs. The 
influence of financial expert CEOs on EM is strengthened when the CEO has more 
decision-making power. Specifically, among IPO firms with financial expert CEOs, EM 
in the offering year is lower for firms with more powerful CEOs. I also document the 
positive link between at-issue abnormal accruals and subsequent accounting performance 
for IPO firms with financial expert CEOs; however, the relationship is insignificant for 
firms with non-financial expert CEOs. In terms of stock performance, while IPO firms 
with non-financial expert CEOs that engage in aggressive EM in the issue year exhibit 
negative post-issue long-run stock performance, the stock performance of IPO firms with 
financial expert CEOs following the issue is not associated with the EM in the offering 
year. The evidence suggests that while non-financial expert CEOs tend to manage 
earnings to mislead investors, financial expert CEOs are more likely to provide investors 
with informative financial figures to allow them to better gauge the fair value of the firm.  
My study makes several contributions to the IPO, EM, and management literature. 
First of all, it adds to the growing literature on determinants of EM by highlighting 
managerial financial experience as a new dimension of influencing factors which can be 
further explored in future research. In terms of managerial skills, Demerjian et al. (2013) 
argue that managerial ability is positively related to earnings quality. They measure the 
ability of managers based on the extent of their efficiency in utilising the firm’s resources. 
My research is distinguishable from their study because I examine a different perspective 
of managerial skills - the functional experience of managers. Specifically, I show that the 
financial skills and experience that managers have accumulated over their career will 
equip them with relevant understanding to make proper accounting decisions, thereby 
improving the financial reporting process. Jiang et al. (2013) examine Chinese listed firms 
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and document that CEOs who have past financial experience are less likely to engage in 
real EM. My research is different from the study by Jiang et al. (2013) because I analyse 
the impact of financial expert CEOs on EM in the US IPO context. Differences in 
institutional and regulatory characteristics between Chinese and the US markets may not 
ensure the consistency and validity of the results. Moreover, the IPO market is a more 
favourable setting to explore the incentives of managers in undertaking EM because 
managerial opportunism is more strongly driven by information asymmetries (Dye 1988; 
Trueman and Titman 1988), which are strongly manifested in the IPO context. Moreover, 
I focus on accrual-based EM rather than real EM because accrual-based EM mainly 
involves financial reporting, to which the financial background is more relevant. To the 
best of my knowledge, my study provides the first empirical evidence on the association 
between CEOs’ financial experience and EM around IPOs. This research also contributes 
to the literature of upper echelons theory by providing consistent evidence with the 
theory’s prediction of the influence of managerial functional experience on corporate 
strategic choices. Moreover, my findings provide implications for investors in assessing 
financial reports of IPO firms led by financial expert CEOs and for firms in considering 
to recruit CEOs with financial experience.    
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 3.3 describes the sample and methodology. Section 3.4 
explains the empirical models of the impact of financial expert CEOs on EM around IPOs 
and the association between at-issue EM and the post-issue accounting and stock 
performance. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results. Section 3.6 provides additional 
tests and robustness checks. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Earnings management around IPOs 
The main theory governing this study is agency theory. The theory is primarily 
concerned with the principal-agent problem which occurs due to the conflicts of interests 
between the principal, who provides capital for the firm such as shareholders, and the 
agent, who manages day to day activities of the firm such as company executives. The 
principal-agent issue arises when information asymmetry is present between the two 
parties (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Since the principal does not involve directly in the 
management of the firm and cannot monitor the agent completely, they have less 
information about the firm and the agent’s intentions. The information asymmetry creates 
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the problem of adverse selection, which happens when managers have more information 
relevant to decision making than outside investors, and moral hazard, which occurs when 
informed managers behave inappropriately from the perspective of less informed 
investors. Information asymmetry is an inherent issue in the IPO markets. Managers can 
mitigate the problem by exercising their accounting discretion to communicate 
information about the timing, magnitude, and risk of future cash flows to the market; 
however, self-interested managers may be tempted to exploit the information disparity to 
mislead less informed investors and manipulate earnings to influence stock prices (Fields 
et al. 2001).  
There are two contrasting arguments over EM around IPOs. The first argument 
suggests that IPO can be viewed as an external financing opportunity. Thus, managers 
have the incentive to alleviate the information asymmetry to improve price efficiency and 
lower the cost of capital. They will employ accounting choices to convey private 
information to the market to signal the firm’s future prospects (Watts and Zimmerman 
1978; Healy and Palepu 1993; Guay et al. 1996; Subramanyam 1996; Fields et al. 2001; 
Kallunki and Martikainen 2003; Louis and Robinson 2005; Herbohn et al. 2010). The 
opposing argument postulates that the IPO is an event for primary investors to cash their 
stock. Thus, managers have strong incentives to maximize their gains by overstating 
earnings to increase short-term stock prices. If managers manipulate accruals to boost 
current reported earnings, the reversal of accruals in the subsequent period will deteriorate 
future earnings. This causes investors to adjust downward their firm evaluation, resulting 
in the decrease in stock prices in the long-run. Therefore, opportunistic EM in the issue 
year will adversely influence stock performance in the post-issue period. This notion of 
opportunistic EM around IPOs is supported by various studies. The early studies of 
Aharony et al. (1993) and Friedlan (1994) state that managers involve in accrual-based 
EM before the stock offering in an effort to increase reported earnings. Teoh et al. (1998a) 
find positive abnormal accruals in the issue year and a negative association between the 
accruals and post-issue long-run stock performance, indicating that managers manipulate 
earnings around IPOs to mislead investors. Several later studies also attest the aggressive 
use of accruals during the stock offerings to overstate earnings (DuCharme 2001; 
Roosenboom et al. 2003; DuCharme et al. 2004; Marquardt and Wiedman 2004; 
Morsfield and Tan 2006; Lee and Masulis 2011; Alhadab et al. 2014).  On the other hand, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) suggest that the stringent monitoring from various parties 
such as regulators, auditors, analysts, and the press will discourage IPO firms to engage 
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in aggressive EM. In their study, they analyse a sample of UK firms whose financial 
statements filed as private firms are comparable to those restated and included in the IPO 
prospectuses. They find that IPO firms tend to be conservative in their financial reporting. 
However, Lo (2008) argues that the restriction in the sample selection by  Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) may exclude firms that engage in EM since managers tend to hide 
their misbehaviours by providing non-comparable reports. Thus, the finding of lower EM 
among UK IPO firms reported by Ball and Shivakumar (2008) may not hold.  
 
3.2.2. CEO’s financial experience and earnings management around IPOs 
The neoclassical view of the firm assumes that managers are homogenous; thus, 
different managers will make the same rational choices if they are confronted with the 
same economic circumstances (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Ge et al. 2011). Under this 
view, corporate policies will not be affected by managerial characteristics. In contrast, 
the upper echelons theory emphasises the influence of managerial heterogeneity on 
corporate outcomes. The theory suggests that managerial personalities, backgrounds, and 
experiences such as age, socioeconomics background, formal education, and functional 
track can partially affect managers’ interpretations of the situations and problems they 
have to deal with and, in turn, impact their decision making (Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Hambrick 2007). 
Since the development of the upper echelons theory, voluminous studies have 
empirically examined the correlation between various managerial specific characteristics 
and corporate decisions and provided findings consistent with the theory. Prior empirical 
studies have shown that managerial heterogeneity has significant explanatory power for 
corporate decisions and performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Adams et al. 2005; 
Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2009; Malmendier et al. 2011; Malmendier and Tate 2008; 
Graham et al. 2013). Most studies focus on education (Malmendier and Tate 2005), 
personal characteristics (Kaplan et al. 2012), and personal traits (Malmendier and Tate 
2005, 2008; Malmendier et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2013). Recent research has further 
examined the work experience of CEOs. Custódio and Metzger (2013); Custódio et al. 
(2013) study CEOs’ work experience in the context of diversifying M&A and show that 
CEOs with industry expertise perform better in deal negotiations and pay a lower 
premium for the target. The findings of Custódio et al. (2013) suggest that CEOs with 
more general managerial skills are better paid than specialist CEOs, suggesting the 
importance of general managerial skills over firm and industry specific expertise in hiring 
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CEOs. Moreover, Custódio and Metzger (2014) provide evidence that CEOs’ past 
financial experience influences firms’ financial policies such as cash holdings, leverage, 
and payout policies.  
Prior literature also documents that managers’ characteristics can affect their 
accounting choices. Bamber et al. (2010) argue that idiosyncratic differences in managers 
play a significant role in firms’ voluntary financial disclosure choices. Specifically, 
managers with financial, accounting, and legal backgrounds, those born before World 
War II, and those with past military service tend to be more conservative in disclosures. 
Additionally, Dyreng et al. (2010) document that individual executive effects 
significantly influence firms’ tax avoidance. Moreover, Francis et al. (2008) report a 
negative association between earnings quality and CEO reputation which is measured by 
press coverage. They argue that the reason for this correlation is because firms with poor 
earnings quality tend to hire reputable CEOs for the expertise that they can bring to the 
firm, rather than CEOs taking actions to manipulate earnings to influence the market’s 
perceptions. Malmendier and Tate (2009) investigate behaviour changes of CEOs after 
winning prestigious awards in the business press and find that EM increases considerably 
subsequent to the award. Regarding managerial skills, Demerjian et al. (2013) show that 
managerial ability is associated with greater earnings quality represented by fewer 
subsequent restatements, higher earnings persistence, fewer errors in bad debt provision, 
and better accrual estimations. Jiang et al. (2013) study Chinese listed firms and find 
evidence that the appointment of financially experienced CEOs reduces real EM, and thus 
provides higher quality earnings information. 
Despite prior findings of the influence of managerial characteristics on accounting 
decisions, it remains an empirical question of whether CEOs’ financial experience 
manifests itself in IPO firms’ financial reporting behaviours – in other words, whether 
IPO firms with financial expert CEOs provide higher quality financial information.  
Demerjian et al. (2013) provide evidence of the association between earnings quality and 
managerial ability. However, they analyse the overall managerial ability and estimate this 
measure based on how efficient managers utilise the firm’s resources such as cost of 
goods sold, SG&A expenses, PPE, operating leases, R&D, goodwill, and other intangible 
assets. I investigate a more specific skill set of managers, that is the financial expertise of 
CEOs in terms of their work experience in the financial sector such as banking or 
investment firms and auditing firms and in finance related roles such as an accountant, a 
treasurer, a VP of finance, and a CFO. I argue that CEOs who have the financial 
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experience in their past career will have more technical training and deeper understanding 
of accounting and financial concepts and structures. According to the upper echelons 
theory, managers with financial experience will rely on their prior work experience when 
making accounting decisions. Therefore, I expect that financial expert CEOs will be more 
capable of monitoring the accounting process and providing higher quality financial 
statements.  
Poor financial reporting will also reflect badly on the career of CEOs with a track 
record as a financial expert. Furthermore, CEOs with financial experience tend to be 
affiliated with or accredited by professional organisations; thus, they are required to 
adhere to strict ethical codes of conduct. This considerably affects their risk attitudes 
towards financial reporting; specifically, they will be more conservative in their financial 
reporting. Moreover, since IPO firms face stringent monitoring from SEC and various 
parties such as auditors, investors, analysts, and the press, if the financial reporting 
misbehaviours are detected, it will severely affect the reputation of financial expert CEOs. 
Therefore, I expect that financial expert CEOs will have lower incentives to engage in 
EM around IPOs. 
In addition, although CFOs are directly involved in overseeing the accounting 
process and the preparation of financial statements, CEOs may set the tone from the top 
and influence the decisions of CFOs (Feng et al. 2011). The conjecture that the financial 
expertise of CEOs may influence their accounting decisions is further supported by the 
theory of top management teams (Bunderson and Sutcliffe 2002; Cannella et al. 2008). 
This theory posits that common functional backgrounds facilitate the communication 
among top management team members. Therefore, a CEO with financial background will 
be able to monitor the firm’s CFO more effectively to strengthen the firm’s accounting 
policies. 
I focus on investigating the effects of financial expert CEOs on accrual-based EM 
rather than real EM. Real EM involves adjusting real operating activities such as those 
related to sales, production, and discretionary expenditures to bias reported earnings. 
Since it involves real actual business decisions, managers may need to employ other 
general managerial abilities and skills besides the functional experience in finance and 
accounting in order to effectively implement strategies to influence the profit margin. On 
the other hand, accrual-based EM happens when managers exploit the flexibility in 
accounting policies that is permitted within GAAP to manage earnings towards their 
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preferable direction. Accrual-based EM is largely related to financial accounting; 
therefore, financial experience, skills, and knowledge accrued over their career will be 
relevant to managers in order to have better control over the accounting process.  
Based on existing theories and empirical evidence, I predict that IPO firms with 
financial expert CEOs will exhibit lower accrual-based EM and pose the first hypothesis 
as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: IPO firms with financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in 
accrual-based EM in the offering year. 
CEOs who have past financial experience can understand better how investors 
view the firm’s financial statements and reports. Moreover, their intensive interactions 
with the market over their lifetime career allow them to be highly aware of the information 
needs and the types of information demanded by capital market participants. They will 
also be conscious of the importance of disclosing relevant and useful information to the 
market in order to lower the cost of capital for the firm (Custódio and Metzger 2014). 
Therefore, their financial expertise allows them to effectively communicate financial 
information to investors. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the understanding of CEOs 
about financial and accounting issues will enhance the communication between CEOs 
and CFOs. Thus, financial expert CEOs will be able to work more efficiently with the 
firm’s CFO to develop a financial reporting strategy in which accounting choices can 
serve as a channel to convey private information to the market to signal the firm’s 
prospects. Therefore, I expect that financial expert CEOs will be more likely to provide 
investors with informative financial reporting. If financial expert CEOs use EM in the 
offering year for informative purposes, the managed accruals in the offering year will be 
positively linked to the accounting performance in the subsequent period. Moreover, 
since the earnings in the offering year truly reflect the firm’s prospective performance, 
there will be no significant abnormal stock returns in the post-issue period. This leads us 
to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: At-issue abnormal accruals are positively associated with post-
issue accounting performance for IPO firms with financial expert CEOs. 
Hypothesis 2b: At-issue abnormal accruals are not related to post-issue long-run 
abnormal stock returns for IPO firms with financial expert CEOs.  
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3.3. Sample and methodology 
3.3.1. Sample selection 
I retrieve my sample of common share US IPOs from 1st January 2003 to 31st 
December 2011 from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues database. I start 
the sample from 2003 since I focus on examining the EM of IPOs after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002). The U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 as a respond 
to a number of corporate accounting scandals such as the cases of Enron and World.com 
in the early 2000s. The Act includes many stringent regulations to strengthen financial 
disclosures and improve corporate governance practices. Lobo and Zhou (2006) find that 
the SEC’s requirement that financial statements be certified by CEOs and CFOs 
influences managerial behaviours towards more conservatism in financial reporting. 
Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2008) also report a decrease in accrual-based EM in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley period. Thus, I aim to examine EM of IPO firms after the passage of the 
Act and mitigate the potential effects of the Act on my findings. I require data three years 
after the IPO to analyse post-issue long-term performance; hence, my sample ends in 
2011. 
Following prior IPO literature, I exclude IPOs with an offer price of below five 
dollars per share, limited partnerships, unit offerings, rights issues, American depositary 
receipts (ADRs), leveraged buyouts (LBOs), closed-end funds, real estate investment 
trusts (REITs), spin-offs, privatizations, and financial institutions. After applying the 
restrictions, there are 688 IPOs. Then, I match the sample with BoardEx database to 
obtain managerial characteristics such as CEO age, gender, work experience, and 
education. I also search the SEC’s EDGAR database for IPO firms’ prospectuses and 
proxy statements to gather data on executive compensation and board meetings. 
Regarding CEO reputation, I use Factiva to track the number of business related articles 
in which the CEO is cited over the five-year period before the offering. In my search for 
the articles, I include both the CEO’s full name and the company name, and limit the 
results to selected business publications including major U.S. newspapers (Wall Street 
Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today), top international publications 
(FT, Asian Wall Street Journal, European Wall Street Jmynal, International Herald 
Tribune), and press releases (PR Newswire, Business Wire). Additionally, I perform the 
data match with Compustat to obtain accounting information, and with the Centre for 
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to collect stock prices. Definitions of all variables are 
presented in Table 3.1.  
 
3.3.2. Earnings management methodology 
I compute abnormal accruals as a proxy for EM using the cross-sectional modified 
Jones (1991) model described in Dechow et al. (1995). I run the following cross-sectional 
OLS regression in Equation (3.1) for each industry-year with at least ten observations. 
The industry is identified by its two-digit SIC code, and I exclude firms going public in 
three years’ time. This cross-section approach partially controls for industry-wide 
changes in economic conditions that influence total accruals independent of managerial 
manipulation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Kasznik 1999). 
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where TACCi,t is total accruals computed as earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations less cash flow from operations10; TAi.t-1 is lagged total assets; 
∆SALESi,t is the change in total sales from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year 
of the offering; and PPEi,t is the gross value of property, plant and equipment. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence 
of outliers.  
The expected component of total accruals (NACCi.t) for the IPO sample is 
computed using the coefficient estimates from Equation (3.1) as follows. 
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(3.2) 
where ∆RECi.t is the change in receivables from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal 
year of the offering. The abnormal accruals (DACCi.t) are computed as the difference 
between total accruals and expected accruals. 
                                                          
10 Following Hribar and Collins (2002), I compute total accruals using the cash flow approach to avoid the non-
articulation problem of the balance sheet method. 
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In addition, to mitigate the potential correlation between the abnormal accruals 
measured using the Jones model and firms’ performance (Dechow et al. 1995), I employ 
the performance matching procedure suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) to match an IPO 
firm to a non-IPO firm in the same two-digit SIC industry and year with the closest ROA 
in the fiscal year before the offering. I allow the difference in ROA to be within the range 
of +/- 10% of the IPO firm’s ROA. The matched firm’s abnormal accruals are deducted 
from the IPO firm’s abnormal accruals to get the performance-matched abnormal accruals 
for the IPO firm.  
 
3.3.3. Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the IPO sample by time and industry. The 
majority of IPOs are concentrated from 2004 to 2007, which is consistent with the 
recovery of the U.S. economy after the early 2000s recession. Subsequently, the IPO 
activity shows a considerable decline due to the 2008 financial crisis before improving 
again from 2010. The industry clustering is also observed in the sample, specifically, 
approximately 40% of IPOs are in the computer and high-tech industries (SIC codes of 
35, 36, 38, and 73).  
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for the overall IPO sample and the 
comparison between IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial 
expert CEOs. I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate 
the issue of outliers. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of CEO characteristics. 
Following Custódio and Metzger (2014), I define financial expert CEOs as those having 
past experience in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms 
(Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Coopers, Touche 
Ross), or finance related roles (accountant, treasurer, VP of finance, CFO). On average, 
26% of IPO firms in the sample have financial expert CEOs. In particular, 11% of the 
overall CEOs have past experience as a CFO, 10% in accounting-related roles (i.e., 
auditor, accountant, and treasurer), 5% in banking, 3% as a VP of finance, and 13% in 
other financial roles.  
In general, CEOs are approximately 51 years old, have been working as a CEO in 
the firm for around 4.5 years, and hold roughly 11% ownership of the firm. Moreover, 
only 3% of the CEOs are female, 7% are a firm founder, and 44% are also the chairman 
of the board. Firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert CEOs 
have the mean values of CEO age, gender, tenure, ownership, founder, and duality in line 
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with those of the overall sample; and there are no significant differences in these CEO 
characteristics between the two samples. 
Furthermore, 77% of the CEOs hold a bachelor’s degree, 48% a master’s degree, 
29% an MBA, 10% a Ph.D., and 5% a CPA certification. 16% of the CEOs are Ivy League 
alumni. IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert CEOs 
show significant differences in their CEOs’ education background. Specifically, 
compared to non-financial expert CEOs, on average, more financial expert CEOs appear 
to have a bachelor’s degree (82% versus 76%), an advanced management degree such as 
an MBA (36% versus 26%), and a professional certification such as a CPA (15% versus 
1%). However, a research degree such as a Ph.D. is less popular among financial expert 
CEOs (6% of financial expert CEOs versus 11% of non-financial expert CEOs). In 
addition, financial expert CEOs are more likely to have graduated from an Ivy League 
institution than non-financial expert CEOs (20% and 15% respectively).  
Moreover, 69% of the CEOs are recruited from outside the firm. Financial expert 
CEOs are less likely to be hired externally than non-financial expert CEOs (64% and 71% 
respectively). A typical CEO became a CEO either at the IPO firm or another firm at the 
age of around 43. Regarding reputation, on average, there are around 23 articles in major 
U.S. and international newspapers and newswires over five years before the IPO 
mentioning about the CEO. Concerning CEO compensation, the mean equity 
compensation is $400 thousand, and the mean total compensation is $1.2 million. There 
are no significant differences in the press coverage and the compensation between firms 
with and without financial expert CEOs.  
Panel B illustrates firm and offering characteristics for all firms, and those with 
and without financial expert CEOs. Regarding firm characteristics, on average, IPO firms 
are in operation for 20 years. They have a mean leverage ratio of 0.42. In terms of 
profitability, approximately 40% of firms report a loss in the fiscal year prior to the 
offering. The average Altman’s Z-score is -5.86, suggesting that IPO issuers appear to be 
in financial distress. The mean industry-adjusted ROA of -0.1 also indicates the 
underperformance of IPO firms compared to the industry. Since IPO firms are generally 
not profitable, the mean ratio of retained earnings to total equity is also negative (-0.71). 
The mean ratio of total capital expenditures to total assets is 0.12 and R&D to total assets 
0.11. Moreover, 16% of IPO firms have more than one business segment, and 35% are 
operating in the high-tech industry. The IPO firms’ board of directors meet quite 
frequently for an average of nearly eight meetings a year.  
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Regarding offering characteristics, issuers raise an average of $166 million in the 
stock offering. They have the mean market value at the time of listing of $476 million 
and an average initial return of 11%. The mean value of Tobin’s Q of 4.11 and the book-
to-market ratio of 0.30 reflect potential perceived growth opportunities for IPO firms. On 
average, 45% of IPOs are underwritten by top-tier investment banks, 83% audited by big 
four accounting firms, and 49% venture-backed. In addition, IPO firms have the mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of 4% three years after the offering.  
Some of the firm and offering characteristics appear to differ between IPOs with 
financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert CEOs. Compared to firms with 
non-financial expert CEOs, those with financial expert CEOs tend to be younger (mean 
firm age of around 18 years versus 21 years), have a lower leverage ratio (mean leverage 
ratio of 0.38 versus 0.44), more profitable (mean industry-adjusted ROA of -0.06 versus 
-0.11), and less R&D intensive (mean ratio of R&D to total assets of 0.09 versus 0.12). 
Moreover, on average, a smaller proportion of IPOs with financial expert CEOs are 
audited by big four auditors and supported by venture capitalists (80% and 41% 
respectively) than issuers with non-financial expert CEOs (84% and 52% respectively). 
With respect to the EM proxy - abnormal accruals, I rely on the median for 
statistical inferences because the median is less likely than the mean to be influenced by 
extreme observations. The median value of abnormal accruals (-0.07) is significantly 
lower than zero, suggesting that IPO firms are less likely to engage in income-increasing 
EM. Since my sample covers the period from 2003 to 2011, this finding is consistent with 
prior literature which documents that the magnitude of EM tends to decrease in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) period. IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-
financial expert CEOs also show significantly negative median abnormal accruals. 
However, issuers with financial expert CEOs have lower abnormal accruals in the 
offering year than those with non-financial expert CEOs (-0.13 versus -0.06). The 
difference is strongly significant at the 1% level. This suggests that IPO firms with 
financial expert CEOs tend to be more conservative in their financial reporting than those 
with non-financial expert CEOs. I also present the correlation matrix of variables used in 
my empirical analysis in Panel C. No multicollinearity is detected among variables. 
My initial univariate result shows that IPO firms with financial expert CEOs are 
less likely to engage in EM than non-financial expert CEOs. In order to provide more 
concrete empirical evidence, I conduct the multivariate analysis of the association 
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between EM and financial expertise of CEOs controlling for various determinants of EM 
in the next section. 
 
3.4. Empirical models 
3.4.1. Financial expert CEOs and earnings management around IPOs 
To investigate the association between CEOs’ financial experience and EM, I 
model abnormal accruals as a function of CEOs’ financial experience and various firm 
characteristics which have been identified by prior research as important determinants of 
EM. The model is summarised as follows. The definitions of all variables are presented 
in Table 3.1.  
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 +
𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑔4 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑝 − 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑛
′𝑠 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 +
𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 − 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽14𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐶𝐸𝑂 −
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑂 − 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖 +
𝛽19𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽20𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖 +
𝛽22𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖 + 𝛽23𝐼𝑣𝑦 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽24 Log(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  
(3.3) 
Prior research suggests several firm characteristics influencing the level of EM.  
Firm age is an important factor since younger firms appear to have more volatile earnings 
and less solid accounting systems, which creates more incentives for managers to 
manipulate earnings. The size of the firm also matters since managers of larger firms tend 
to have more discretion over the accounting policies due to the complexity in financial 
structures of these firms compared to smaller ones. However, more stringent scrutiny 
from regulators and market participants over larger firms may discourage the financial 
reporting misbehaviours. I include the firm’s market value at the time of listing as a 
control variable to account for firm size.  
In addition, financial intermediaries participating in the IPO process can exert an 
influence on the degree of EM among IPO firms. Specifically, Jo et al. (2007) and Lee 
and Masulis (2011) document that the reputation issue creates strong incentives for top-
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tier investment banks to detect financial reporting misrepresentations; thus, EM is 
reduced among IPO firms underwritten by reputable investment banks. Morsfield and 
Tan (2006), Hochberg (2012), and Wongsunwai (2013) find that the monitoring of 
venture capitalists also contributes to lowering EM around IPOs. Moreover, Becker et al. 
(1998), Krishnan (2003), and Gul et al. (2009) report that higher quality audit provided 
by big four accounting firms discourages managers from manipulating earnings. 
Therefore, I control for the effects of reputable underwriters, venture capitalists, and big 
four auditors on restraining EM. 
Prior literature also documents that firms close to debt covenant violations or 
under financial distress are more likely to engage in EM to overstate earnings (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994; Franz et al. 2014; DeAngelo et al. 1994). Moreover, loss firms have 
more incentives to manage earnings upward to exceed the positive threshold (Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999). Therefore, I include the leverage ratio, Altman’s 
Z-score, and the incidence of a loss in the fiscal year prior to the offering as control 
variables. 
Furthermore, Fan (2007) argues that the uncertainty in high-growth firms creates 
stronger incentives and better chances for managers of these firms to manipulate earnings 
to mislead investors. I capture the effect of growth opportunities by including in my model 
the level of capital expenditures and Tobin’s Q as proxies for growth. I also control for 
the influence of firm performance on EM by including the variable industry-adjusted 
ROA (Kothari et al. 2005).  
Additionally, corporate governance mechanisms play a substantial role in 
constraining managers from manipulating earnings. The degree of board interactions and 
activities is documented to be positively related to corporate governance (Vafeas 1999). 
Xie et al. (2003) further find that board meeting frequency is associated with a lower level 
of EM. Moreover, the greater independence of the board will enhance its overseeing roles 
(Klein 2002). The dual role of CEO and chairman reduces the board independence, and 
thus, adversely affects the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring activities. Therefore, I 
include the number of board meetings and CEO duality as control variables. Furthermore, 
the ownership structure is documented to influence the level of EM (Dempsey et al. 1993; 
Kim and Yi 2006; Yeo et al. 2002; Fan and Wong 2002; Fan 2007; Huang et al. 2013).To 
account for this effect, I control for CEO ownership and whether a CEO is also a founder 
of the firm.   
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Various prior studies indicate that managers have strong incentives to engage in 
EM to maximise their compensation (Healy 1985; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 
1999; Balsam 1998). Particularly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that earnings 
manipulation is more pronounced when CEO compensation is more closely tied to stocks 
and options. To control for this effect of executive compensation on EM practices, I 
include a control variable for CEOs’ equity compensation.  
Previous research shows that various CEO characteristics can influence financial 
and accounting policies (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Bamber 
et al. 2010; Demerjian et al. 2013; Ge et al. 2011). To mitigate the issue of omitted 
variables on the CEO level (e.g., CEOs’ financial experience may be correlated with other 
CEO characteristics that drive the results), I control for various CEO characteristics, 
especially those documented in prior research as determinants of EM. I control for CEO 
gender since Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that firms with female directors exhibit higher 
quality financial reporting. Moreover, Kuang et al. (2014) argue that compared with 
CEOs appointed from within the firm, CEOs hired externally have more incentives to 
demonstrate their abilities; thus, they tend to engage in income-increasing EM in the early 
years of service. Ali and Zhang (2015) provide evidence that managers are more likely to 
overstate earnings in their initial years of tenure to exert a favourable influence on the 
market’s perception of their ability. Thus, I include CEO age, CEO tenure, and external 
hire as control variables. Additionally, Francis et al. (2008) document that CEO 
reputation, which is proxied by press coverage, is negatively associated with earnings 
quality. I also use the number of articles about the CEO over the five-year period before 
the offering to control for the linkage between CEO reputation and EM. Last but not least, 
the work experience of CEOs may capture the CEO innate talent instead of accumulated 
skills (Custódio et al. 2013; Custódio and Metzger 2014). Following Custódio and 
Metzger (2013), Custódio et al. (2013), and Custódio and Metzger (2014) I include the 
variables Ivy League alumnus and the age first became CEO as proxies for innate talent.  
 
3.4.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance 
I examine the association between abnormal accruals in the issue year and 
subsequent accounting performance to shed light on whether financial expert CEOs are 
more likely to provide informative financial reporting. Subramanyam (1996) posits that 
the positive relationship between abnormal accruals and subsequent operating cash flows 
suggests the informative role of EM in signalling the firm’s future prospects. Although 
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cash flows from operations (CFO) are less influenced by accrual reversals which are the 
problem of using ROA as a performance measure, it is more likely to have the timeliness 
issue than ROA as a performance measure (Dechow 1994; Bowen et al. 2008). Therefore, 
in order to provide more robust evidence, I analyse both CFO and ROA as accounting 
performance measures. I estimate the following regressions to examine the association 
between at-issue abnormal accruals and subsequent accounting performance. 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=0 +
𝛽2𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡=0 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=0 +
𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡=0 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖  
(3.4) 
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡=1 is cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets in the fiscal 
year following the offering; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡=1 is net income scaled by lagged total assets in the 
fiscal year following the offering. Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
I include the current CFO to control for potential mean-reversion in accounting 
performance measures (Barber and Lyon 1996; Bowen et al. 2008). I also account for the 
effect of the investment of proceeds on post-issue performance by including capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) as a control variable (Teoh et al. 1998b). 
Besides accounting performance, I also analyse the post-issue stock performance. 
If managers engage in EM for informative purposes, investors will more accurately 
incorporate the information into their firm valuation. The price adjustment will happen in 
the short-term, leading to insignificant long-term abnormal stock returns. First of all, I 
use buy-and-hold returns to examine long-run stock performance. Since buy-and-hold 
returns mimic investors’ investment experience, they are widely used in long-run 
performance studies. I run the following regression of post-issue three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) on at-issue aggressive EM to examine the effect of at-issue 
aggressive EM on post-issue long-run stock performance.  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽2𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖 +
Industry dummies + Year dummies + 𝜀𝑖  (3.5) 
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where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the IPO firm’s post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return 
calculated starting from the day after the annual financial report date in the offering year 
to the earlier of the three year anniversary date and the delisting date; 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is an indicator variable which equals to one if the 
firm’s abnormal accruals are greater than the 75th percentile of the overall IPO sample, 
and zero otherwise. I include control variables in the Equation (3.5) as suggested by prior 
literature (Ritter 1991; Teoh et al. 1998a; Chen et al. 2013). Definitions of all variables 
are presented in Table 3.1.  
 Fama (1998) raises several concerns about using buy-and-hold returns to examine 
long-run performance such as the skewness in the distribution of buy-and-hold returns, 
the exaggeration of short-term estimation errors through compounding, and the cross-
correlation problems caused by time-period overlap. He suggests employing the calendar-
time approach to mitigate the weaknesses of the use of buy-and-hold returns. Therefore, 
for robustness check, I examine the long-run stock performance using the following 
calendar-time portfolio approaches: the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and 
the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. I estimate the following regression based on Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model. 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (3.6) 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐸𝑀𝑝𝑡 is the return from taking a long position in a portfolio of 
IPO firms that aggressively manage earnings and a short position in a portfolio of IPO 
firms that conservatively manage earnings for each calendar month in the sample period. 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index for each calendar 
month in the sample period. 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference in the returns of value-weighted 
portfolios of small and large stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
is the difference in the returns of value-weighted portfolios of high book-to-market and 
low book-to-market stocks for each calendar month in the sample period. The portfolio 
returns include returns of IPO firms for three years after the IPO fiscal year end. The 
Carhart four-factor model adds to the Fama and French three-factor model a factor to 
account for one-year momentum price return. The factors for both models are retrieved 
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from Professor Kenneth French’s website11. The regression is estimated separately for 
the sample of IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-financial expert 
CEOs. The intercept of the factor model represents the average monthly abnormal return. 
The intercept test indicates the difference in post-issue stock performance between firms 
with aggressive EM and those with conservative EM. 
 
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. Financial expert CEOs and earnings management around IPOs 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis of the association 
between financial expert CEOs and EM around IPOs.  The regressions include both year 
and industry fixed effects, and the standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Specification (1) reports the estimates of an OLS regression of abnormal accruals on 
financial expert CEO dummy variable and a set of firm-level control variables. 
Specification (2) presents the estimates of an OLS regression of abnormal accruals on 
financial expert CEO dummy variable and both firm-level and CEO-level control 
variables. The results are consistent for both regressions. The coefficients on the variable 
Financial expert CEO are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
suggests that IPO firms managed by CEOs with financial experience are less likely to 
engage in EM in the offering year. The signs of the control variables are generally in line 
with prior literature. EM is positively associated with the level of leverage and negatively 
related to growth opportunities  measured by Tobin’s Q. In terms of CEO characteristics, 
CEOs recruited externally are less likely to manipulate earnings in the offering year, and 
those graduated from Ivy League institutions also tend to engage less in EM, but CEO 
reputation is positively linked to the level of EM around IPOs.  
 
3.5.2. At-issue earnings management and post-issue performance 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results on whether the EM in the issue year 
explains the firm performance in the post-issue periods. Panel A illustrates the analysis 
of post-issue accounting performance measured by CFO and ROA. Specification (1) 
shows the result of the regression with ROA as the dependent variable, and Specification 
(2) reports the result of the regression with CFO as the dependent variable. I include 
industry and year fixed effects and adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity. The 
                                                          
11 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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results are consistent for both regressions. The coefficients on Abnormal accruals are 
insignificant, suggesting that the level of abnormal accruals of IPO firms with non-
financial expert CEOs is unrelated to subsequent accounting performance. This supports 
the conjecture that non-financial expert CEOs tend to manipulate earnings 
opportunistically. If managers manipulate accruals to overstate earnings to mislead 
investors, the managed earnings will not be sustainable in the subsequent period. Thus, 
the level of abnormal accruals in the offering year will not reflect future performance. 
The coefficients on the interaction term Abnormal accruals*Financial expert CEO are 
positive and significant at the 10% level. Additionally, the sum of the estimated 
coefficients of Abnormal accruals and Abnormal accruals*Financial expert CEO are 
significantly positive at the 1% level. The results suggest that financial expert CEOs tend 
to use accruals to communicate private information to the market to signal the firm’s 
future prospects; thus, the degree of abnormal accruals in the issue year is positively 
related to future accounting performance.  
Panel B presents the regression analysis of the post-issue long-run stock 
performance. I include both the industry and year fixed effects and adjust the standard 
errors for heteroskedasticity. The coefficient on Aggressive EM is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. This indicates that non-financial expert CEOs engage in aggressive EM 
in the issue year to mislead investors. When actual earnings are revealed and do not meet 
the expectations, investors revise downward their valuation, leading to negative abnormal 
stock returns in the post-issue period. The coefficient on the interaction term Aggressive 
EM*Financial expert CEO is significantly positive, indicating that for IPO firms with 
financial expert CEOs, the post-issue long-run stock performance improves with the 
existence of aggressive EM in the issue year. In addition, the sum of the estimated 
coefficients of Aggressive EM and Aggressive EM*Financial expert CEO are 
insignificantly different from zero. This finding confirms that financial expert CEOs tend 
to exercise their accounting discretion to communicate private information to the market, 
allowing investors better gauge the firm value. Price adjustment will occur in the short-
run, leaving insignificant long-run abnormal stock returns.  
Panel C presents the intercept estimates of the Fama and French three-factor 
model and Carhart four-factor model. Both models provide consistent results. The 
intercept estimates are significantly negative for the sample of IPO firms with non-
financial expert CEOs. However, for the sample of IPO firms with financial expert CEOs, 
the intercept estimates are insignificantly different from zero. The results suggest that 
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while IPOs managed by non-financial expert CEOs that engage in aggressive EM in the 
issue year underperform those that employ conservative financial reporting, IPOs 
managed by financial expert CEOs exhibit no significant difference in post-issue long-
run stock performance between aggressive and conservative issuers.  
Overall, the findings from the analysis of both accounting and stock performance 
in the post-issue period are consistent with my conjecture that financial expert CEOs tend 
to employ their accounting discretion to better convey the firm’s prospects to the market. 
 
3.6. Additional tests and robustness checks 
3.6.1. Endogeneity control 
The literature on the influence of CEO characteristics on corporate behaviours and 
outcomes commonly raises the concern about the endogenous CEO-firm matching which 
may bias the estimation of the impact of CEO characteristics on corporate decisions. For 
instance, IPO firms that are committed to providing high-quality financial information to 
investors may have preferences to hire managers with financial experience, but according 
to the upper echelons theory, managers with financial backgrounds are more likely to 
draw on their past finance and accounting experience to implement proper accounting 
policies. The endogeneity of CEO selection makes it unclear whether the variation in EM 
is attributable to CEOs’ financial experience or due to the non-random assignment of 
CEOs to firms.  
To address the endogeneity of CEO selection problem, I employ the propensity 
score matching procedure (PSM). Using this method, I can compare the EM of a firm that 
appoints a financial expert CEO with the EM of the same firm if it had appointed a non-
financial expert CEO. In order to perform the matching, I measure the propensity score, 
which is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment (having a financial expert 
CEO) given a firm’s pre-treatment characteristics, for all the IPOs by estimating a probit 
regression for the likelihood of firms having a financial expert CEO based on various 
observable CEO, firm, and industry characteristics. I then match each observation in the 
treated group with the control group based on its propensity score obtained from the 
predicted probability taken from the first stage probit estimation.  
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the results for the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATET) on EM for IPO firms with financial expert CEOs and those with non-
financial expert CEOs. The matching variables include firm-level factors (firm age, firm 
size, big four auditor, top-tier investment bank, venture capitalist, leverage, loss, 
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Altman’s Z-score, Tobin’s Q, capital expenditures, R&D intensity, retained earnings, 
diversification, ROA, and board meetings), CEO-level factors (dual position of CEO and 
Chairman, founder, ownership, age, gender, tenure, innate talent proxied by age first 
became CEO and Ivy League alumnus, CEO reputation measured by press coverage), 
industry factor (high-tech industry), and year effects. The ATET is negative and strongly 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that IPO firms with financial expert CEOs are 
associated with significantly lower EM. This finding is consistent with the results 
presented previously on my baseline regression (Equation 3.3).  
I also check the robustness of my results using other commonly used econometric 
methods for addressing endogeneity concerns including two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable (2SLS IV), Heckman (1979) two-step treatment effect, and 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect. These econometric approaches 
all require the estimation of a selection model accounting for the assignment of financial 
expert CEOs to firms. Custódio and Metzger (2014) document that financial expert CEOs 
are more likely to be matched to firms in the mature stage of their life cycle, while non-
financial expert CEOs are more likely to be appointed by growth firms. Therefore, in the 
selection model, I control for firm characteristics associated with firms’ life cycle as 
suggested by Custódio and Metzger (2014) including R&D intensity, retained earnings, 
diversification, and an indicator controlling for high-tech industries. For the 2SLS IV 
model, in the first stage, I estimate the regression of the endogenous variable Financial 
expert CEO on instrumental variables and exogenous variables to obtain the fitted 
probabilities of having a financial expert CEO. In the second stage, I run the original 
regression (Equation 3.3) with the endogenous variable replaced by the fitted value from 
the first stage regression. For the two-step treatment effect model, in the first stage, I 
estimate the selection equation using a probit regression of the likelihood that a firm 
appoints a financial expert CEO. The estimated self-selection correction term, inverse 
Mills ratio, is added to the original regression (Equation 3.3) and the linear outcome 
regression is estimated as normal. For the MLE model, both the selection and the outcome 
regressions are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood estimation. MLE is 
more efficient than the two-step treatment effect model if the error terms in the selection 
and outcome equations have a bivariate normal distribution.  
Panel B of Table 3.6 presents the results of the regressions of abnormal accruals 
on financial expert CEO using the three estimation models: 2SLS IV, Heckman two-step 
treatment effect, and MLE treatment effect. The results hold for the alternative 
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econometric models. For the 2SLS IV model, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of 
endogeneity is significant at the 5% level, indicating the endogeneity problem. The 
inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman two-step treatment effect model is significant at the 
10% level, suggesting the issue of selection bias. The likelihood ratio test of the 
correlation between the two error terms of the selection and outcome equations from the 
MLE treatment effect model shows a strongly significant result at the 1% level. The 
evidence from the endogeneity tests of the three estimation approaches confirms the 
potential endogenous selection issue in my sample. In terms of the instruments, the 
variable Retained earnings is significantly positive, which is in line with prior literature. 
The level of retained earnings is greater in mature firms and as shown in Custódio and 
Metzger (2014) financial expert CEOs are more likely to be appointed among firms in the 
mature stage of their life cycle. Most importantly, the coefficients on the variable 
Financial expert CEO are all significantly negative, which is consistent with the result 
obtained using the baseline OLS regression (Equation 3.3) and the result from the PSM 
method.  
 
3.6.2. CEO’s financial experience, CEO power, and earnings management 
In this section, I examine whether the CEO power and CEOs’ financial experience 
interact and further reduce EM around the stock offerings. Prior research suggests that 
CEOs with more decision-making power can impose a significant impact over corporate 
financial strategies and firm performance (Daily and Johnson 1997; Adams et al. 2005; 
Veprauskaitė and Adams 2013; Chikh and Filbien 2011). Particularly, CEOs may set the 
tone from the top and influence CFOs’ decisions (Feng et al. 2011). Therefore, I expect 
that the influence of financial expert CEOs over EM will be more pronounced if the CEOs 
have more power over the board and other executives. I employ four dimensions 
suggested by Finkelstein (1992) to measure CEO power, namely, structural power, 
ownership power, expertise power, and prestige power. These power sources are widely 
used in research on CEO power, for example, Adams et al. (2005), Chikh and Filbien 
(2011), Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013). Structural power is based on the organizational 
structure. The authority earned at a higher rank allows managers to have a greater degree 
of control over their subordinates. To proxy for structural power, I use CEO duality, 
which occurs when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. Regarding ownership 
power, managers will have a stronger position in the agent-principal relationship if they 
have more ownership in the firm. To proxy for ownership power, I use CEO ownership, 
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which is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO before the offering. In addition, 
being a founder of the firm also strengthens the relationship between the CEO and the 
board; thus, I include another proxy for ownership power – CEO founder, which takes 
the value of one if the CEO is also a founder of the firm. Regarding expertise power, 
relevant expertise that is critical to the organisation allows managers to more effectively 
handle both internal and external factors influencing the organisational success. I use 
CEO tenure as a proxy for expertise power since the CEO’s understanding of the firm 
accumulates over the time that the CEO works in the firm. Concerning prestige power, 
managerial prestige enhances the power of managers in many ways, for example, by 
conveying to other executives about their personal importance and adding value to the 
firm through their external connections. I use the variable Ivy League alumnus as a proxy 
for prestige power because CEOs graduated from Ivy League institutions not only possess 
top qualifications but also tend to have more powerful friends and contacts.  
I standardize and aggregate the five variables (i.e., CEO-Chairman, CEO-
Founder, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy League alumnus) to generate the variable 
CEO power accounting for the effects of all four sources of managerial power. I create 
the interaction term between CEO power and Financial expert CEO and run the original 
regression (Equation 3.3) including the interaction effect. The result is presented in Table 
3.7. The coefficient on the variable Financial expert CEO remains negative and strongly 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on the interaction term is also significantly 
negative, indicating that the CEO power strengthens the effect of financial expert CEOs 
on EM. Moreover, the F-test of the sum of the coefficients of the variable Financial expert 
CEO and the interaction term Financial expert CEO*CEO power gives a significant 
negative result. This suggests that among IPO firms with financial expert CEOs the level 
of EM is lower for firms whose CEOs have more power in decision making. Overall, my 
results confirm the importance of CEO power in facilitating the influence of financial 
expert CEOs on financial reporting.  
 
3.6.3. Alternative measures of financial expertise 
In the main analysis, I examine the association between EM and the CEO’s 
financial experience. I define financial experience broadly to cover past financial 
experience of the CEO in either a banking or investment firm, auditing firm, and other 
financial related roles. In this section, I check the robustness of my results with more 
specific measures of financial expertise: CFO experience, CPA certification, and both 
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CFO experience and CPA certification. CFOs are directly responsible for overseeing 
financial reporting process, so the past experience as a CFO equips the managers with 
relevant knowledge and skills which can influence their decisions on the firm’s 
accounting choices. In order to gain the accreditation by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), CPA holders need to meet both the knowledge 
and professional experience requirements. They also need to keep their knowledge up to 
date and adhere to ethical codes of conduct. Thus, I postulate that CEOs having a CPA 
certification show a greater understanding of financial reporting and higher professional 
ethics.  
I run the regressions of abnormal accruals on CFO experience and CPA 
certification. All control variables are similar to the original regression model (Equation 
3.3). The regression analyses are presented in Panel A of Table 3.8. The coefficients on 
the variables CFO, CPA, and CFO&CPA are all significantly negative. This suggests that 
CEOs who have past CFO experience, hold a CPA certification, or possess both the CFO 
experience and CPA certification are less likely to manipulate earnings in the offering 
year.  
Utilising my data on the detailed work experience history of CEOs, I expand to 
investigate whether the variety of CEOs’ financial experience influences the degree of 
EM around IPOs. I examine four aspects of financial experience variety: (1) the number 
of firms in which the CEO has past financial experience, (2) the number of financial and 
accounting related roles that the CEO holds in their past work history, (3) whether the 
CEO has past financial experience at another firm, and (4) the length of time of CEO 
financial experience. For each of these aspects, a higher value is interpreted as greater 
financial experience variety. I employ the principal component analysis (PCA) to extract 
common components from the four variables to create a Financial experience variety 
index as the first factor of applying PCA on the four proxies of financial experience 
variety. Using one variable instead of the five variables individually helps mitigate the 
multicollinearity problem, reduce measurement errors, and enhance the power of 
regression tests. In addition, I create an indicator variable Financial experience variety 
dummy, which takes the value of one if the CEO has the financial experience variety index 
greater than the median of the sample.  
To analyse the association between EM and financial experience variety, I run the 
regressions of EM on each of the variable proxies for financial experience variety, 
financial experience variety index, and financial experience variety dummy. The results 
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of the PCA and regressions are presented in Panel B of Table 3.8. All the variables used 
to proxy for financial experience variety are highly correlated, which is desirable since 
the single common factor generated by PCA will better summarize the effects of 
individual factors. Using the PCA method, I obtain only one component with an 
eigenvalue higher than one (eigenvalue of 3.507). The four variables have positive 
loadings, being positively correlated with the index. The index gives the highest weight 
to the number of firms in which the CEO has past financial experience and the lowest 
weight to the CEO’s financial experience at another firm. Regarding the regression 
results, the coefficients on the individual financial experience variety variables, the index, 
and the financial experience variety dummy are all negative and significant at the 5% 
level. The findings indicate that CEOs with more varied financial experience tend to 
engage less in EM. I also check the robustness of my results on the relationship between 
abnormal accruals in the offering year and the post-issue performance for IPO firms 
whose CEOs has prior CFO experience and high-variety of financial experience. The 
results remain stable and also suggest that financial expert CEOs tend to manage earnings 
for informative purposes.  
 
3.6.4. Financial expert CEOs and real earnings management 
In the main analysis, I argue that financial skills and knowledge provide CEOs 
with deeper understanding of the accounting process, thereby allowing them to more 
effectively utilise their discretion in accounting policies to make financial  reporting more 
informative to investors. Meanwhile, real EM involves making actual operating decisions 
to bias reported earnings. Thus, it requires a strategic perspective from the managers, 
which relates more to overall managerial experience. In this study, I focus on the CEO’s 
functional experience in finance and accounting, so I emphasize the EM through 
accounting choices rather than operating activities. Accrual-based EM is, therefore, more 
relevant to my research. As an additional check, in this section, I further test the 
association between having a financial expert CEO and real EM of IPO firms. I follow 
Roychowdhury (2006) and use three proxies for real EM: abnormal cash flow from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses.  
The normal level of cash flow from operations is estimated as: 
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(3.7) 
where CFOi,t is cash flows from operations, TAi,t-1 is lagged total assets, SALESi,t is total 
sales, ∆SALESi,t is the change in sales from the fiscal year before the issue to the fiscal 
year of the IPO. 
The model for normal production costs is: 
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(3.8) 
where PRODi,t  is the production costs computed as the sum of the cost of goods sold and 
the change in inventory from the fiscal year before the IPO to the fiscal year of the IPO. 
∆SALESi,t-1 is the change in sales from the fiscal year two years before the issue to the 
fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
The normal discretionary expenses are expressed as: 
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ti
ti
titi
ti
TA
SALES
TATA
DISEXP
,
1,
1,
1
1,
0
1,
, 1
 



 
(3.9) 
 
where DISEXPi,t is the discretionary expenses computed as the sum of SG&A, R&D, and 
advertising expenses. SALESi,t-1 is total sales in the fiscal year prior to the IPO.  
All the three equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) are estimated cross-sectionally for 
each industry-year with at least ten observations. I winsorize all variables at the 1st and 
99th percentiles to alleviate the problem of outliers. The abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses for each IPO 
firm are computed as the deviation of the actual level from the normal level calculated 
using the estimated coefficients from the regressions (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9). I then match 
the real EM measures of IPO firms to those of their non-IPO counterparts based on year, 
industry, and ROA to produce performance-matched real EM measures. Moreover, I 
multiply the estimated abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary 
expenses by (-1) so that higher values reflect greater real EM. Besides the three individual 
metrics, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I also compute two aggregate measures of 
real EM: REM1 as the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses and REM2 as the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and abnormal 
discretionary expenses.  
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I present the results of the association between the presence of financial expert 
CEOs and real EM in Table 3.9. Consistent with my argument, I do not find significant 
relationship between CEOs’ financial experience and real EM around IPOs, indicating 
that having financial expert CEOs do not seem to explain the variation in real EM of IPO 
firms.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
The chapter provides new empirical evidence on the association between CEOs’ 
financial experience and EM around IPOs. I find that IPO firms with financial expert 
CEOs are associated with lower EM in the offering year. Moreover, the restraining effect 
of financial expert CEOs on EM is more pronounced if the CEO has more decision-
making power over the board of directors. I also test the link between EM in the issue 
year and post-issue performance to examine whether financial expert CEOs exercise their 
accounting discretion to opportunistically manipulate earnings or to provide investors 
with more informative financial reporting. I find the positive relation between at-issue 
abnormal accruals and subsequent accounting performance measured by both operating 
cash flows and return on assets for issuers with financial expert CEOs. For issuers with 
non-financial expert CEOs, on the other hand, the at-issue abnormal accruals are not 
related to the subsequent accounting performance. In terms of stock performance, I 
document the negative relationship between the incidence of aggressive EM in the 
offering year and the post-issue abnormal stock returns for IPO firms with non-financial 
expert CEOs. The relationship is insignificant for IPO firms with financial expert CEOs. 
My findings are consistent with the conjecture that financial expert CEOs tend to manage 
accruals to better inform the investors about the firm’s future prospects. The results are 
robust to alternative measures of CEOs’ financial experience and different econometric 
methods to address the edogenous selection problem. Overall, this chapter provides 
evidence supporting the role of financial expert CEOs in curtailing EM of IPO firms in 
the issue year and providing more informative reported earnings to the market. 
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Table 3. 1 Variable definition 
Panel A: CEO characteristics 
Variable Definition 
CEO age Age of the CEO in years (BoardEx). 
CEO gender Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is female, and zero 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO tenure Number of years working as CEO in the firm (BoardEx). 
CEO-Chairman Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is also chairman of the 
board, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO-Founder Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is also founder of the 
firm, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares owned by the CEO before the offering (SEC’s 
EDGAR). 
Bachelor’s degree Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has a bachelor’s degree, 
and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Master’s degree Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has a master’s degree, 
and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
MBA Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has an MBA degree, 
and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
PhD Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has a Ph.D. degree, and 
zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CPA Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has a CPA certification, 
and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Ivy League alumnus Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO is an alumnus of an Ivy 
League institution, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Age first became CEO Age at which the CEO became CEO for the first time (BoardEx). 
External hire Dummy variable that equal to one if the CEO is hired externally, and 
zero if the CEO is internally promoted (BoardEx). 
CEO press coverage Number of articles containing the CEO’s name and company in major 
U.S. newspapers (Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington 
Post, USA Today), top international publications (FT, Asian Wall 
Street Journal, European Wall Street Journal, International Herald 
Tribune), and press releases (PR Newswire, Business Wire) (Factiva). 
Compensation equity Equity compensation of the CEO which consists of equity incentives 
and value of options granted (SEC’s EDGAR). 
Compensation total Total compensation of the CEO which consists of salary, bonus, equity 
incentives, non-equity incentives, options, and other compensation 
(SEC’s EDGAR).  
CFO role Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO used to be a chief 
financial officer, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Financial expert CEO Dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO has past financial 
experience in either a banking or investment firm, a large auditing firm 
(Pricewaterhouse, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Arthur Andersen, 
Coopers, Touche Ross), or a finance related role (accountant, 
treasurer, VP of finance, CFO), and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
101 
 
 
 
Financial experience variety index First factor of applying principal component analysis to four proxies 
of the variety of financial experience: (1) number of firms in which the 
CEO has past financial experience, (2) number of financial and 
accounting related roles that the CEO holds in their past career, (3) 
whether the CEO has past financial experience at another firm, and (4) 
the length of time of the CEO’s financial experience (BoardEx).  
Financial experience variety 
dummy 
Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO’s financial experience variety 
index is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel B: Firm and offering characteristics 
Variable Definition 
Abnormal accruals  Abnormal accruals computed using modified Jones (1991) model and 
adjusted for abnormal accruals of a performance-matched non-IPO 
firm based on performance matching procedure suggested by Kothari 
(2005). The methodology to estimate abnormal accruals is explained 
in Section 3.3.2. 
Abnormal cash flow from 
operations 
Abnormal cash flow from operations multiplied by minus one. The 
methodology to estimate abnormal cash flow from operations is 
explained in Section 3.6.4. 
Abnormal production costs Abnormal production costs, where production costs are the sum of cost 
of goods sold and change in inventories. The methodology to estimate 
abnormal production costs is explained in Section 3.6.4. 
Abnormal discretionary expenses Abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by minus one, where 
discretionary expenses are the sum of advertising expenses, R&D 
expenses, and SG&A expenses. The methodology to estimate 
abnormal discretionary expenses is explained in Section 3.6.4. 
REM1 First measure of overall level of real earnings management computed 
as the sum of abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses.  
 REM2 Second measure of overall level of real earnings management 
computed as the sum of abnormal cash flow from operations and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. 
Firm age Firm age in years measured as the difference between the firm’s IPO 
year and its founding year. Company founding years are collected 
from the Field-Ritter dataset.12 
Market value Market value of the firm in the year of the offering (Compustat 
PRCC_F*CSHO). 
Leverage Ratio of total debts to total assets (Compustat (DLC + DLTT)/AT). 
Loss Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has negative earnings 
before interest and taxes (Compustat EBIT) in the fiscal year prior to 
the offering, and zero otherwise. 
CAPEX Average capital expenditures (Compustat CAPX) in the offering year 
and one year after scaled by total assets (Compustat AT) at the 
beginning of the offering year. 
Industry-adjusted ROA Industry-adjusted ROA that is calculated by subtracting median ROA 
of the two-digit SIC industry group from the firm’s ROA. ROA is 
calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets (Compustat NI/AT). 
                                                          
12 The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm. 
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Big4 auditor Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is audited by a big four 
audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big four audit firms include Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Compustat AU). 
Venture capitalist Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is venture backed, and 
zero otherwise (SDC). 
Top-tier investment bank Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is underwritten by most 
reputable underwriters, and zero otherwise. Most reputable 
underwriters are those with a ranking score of 9.0 or above based on 
Jay Ritter’s underwriter rankings.13 
Book-to-market Ratio of book value to market value at the end of the fiscal year of the 
offering (Compustat CEQ/PRCC_F*CSHO). 
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q = (Total assets + Market value of equity – Book value of 
equity)/Total assets (Compustat (AT + PRCC_F*CSHO – CEQ)/AT). 
Altman’s Z-score Z-score = 6.56*(Working capital/Total assets) + 3.26*(Retained 
earnings/Total assets) + 6.72*(Earnings before interest and 
taxes)/Total assets) + 1.05*(Book value of equity/ Book value of total 
liabilities) (Compustat 6.56*((ACT-LCT)/AT) + 3.26*(RE/AT) + 
6.72*(EBIT/AT) + 1.05*(CEQ/LT)). 
Board meetings The number of board meetings in the year of the offering (SEC’s 
EDGAR). 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book value of total 
assets (Compustat XRD/AT). 
Retained earnings Ratio of retained earnings to common equity (Compustat RE/CEQ). 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm has more than one 
business segment, and zero otherwise (Compustat). 
High-tech industry Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is in the high-tech 
industry, and zero otherwise. High-tech industries are those with a SIC 
code of 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 
3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 
3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 
3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 
(medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 
(communications services), 7371-7375, 7378, 7379 (software) (SDC). 
 
Panel C: Stock returns variables 
Variable Definition 
BHAR Post-issue three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return is calculated as 
the difference between the three-year buy-and-hold return of the firm 
and the three-year buy-and-hold return of the benchmark.  The three-
year period starts from the day after the annual financial report in the 
offering year to the earlier of the three year anniversary date and the 
delisting date. Stock returns are collected from CRSP, the benchmark 
is the CRSP market index. 
Market BHR Three-year buy-and-hold value weighted market index return (CRSP). 
Underpricing Stock return of the firm on the first day of trading (CRSP). 
POSEM  Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake aggressive 
earnings management in the offering year. 
                                                          
13 IPO underwriter reputation rankings are available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
103 
 
 
 
NEGEM Monthly return of the portfolio of IPO firms that undertake 
conservative earnings management in the offering year. 
MKT Excess monthly return on the value-weighted CRSP index. The factor 
is retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website14. 
SMB Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of 
small and large stocks. The factor is retrieved from Professor Kenneth 
French’s website. 
HML Difference in the monthly returns of value-weighted portfolios of high 
book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The factor is 
retrieved from Professor Kenneth French’s website. 
                                                          
14 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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Table 3. 2 Distribution of IPOs by time and industry 
Panel A: Time distribution 
Year 
 
All IPOs 
(N = 688) 
IPOs with financial 
expert CEO 
(N = 180) 
IPOs with 
nonfinancial expert 
CEO 
(N = 508) 
 N % N % N % 
2003  41 6 16 9 25 5 
2004  129 19 35 19 94 19 
2005  113 16 30 17 83 16 
2006  113 16 33 18 80 16 
2007  126 18 29 16 97 19 
2008  16 2 4 2 12 2 
2009  35 5 9 5 26 5 
2010  59 9 15 8 44 9 
2011  56 8 9 5 47 9 
 
 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Industry name SIC codes 
All IPOs 
 
IPOs with 
financial 
expert CEO 
 
IPOs with 
nonfinancial 
expert CEO 
 N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  13 30 4 9 5 21 4 
Food products 20 8 1 3 2 5 1 
Chemical products 28 125 18 25 14 100 20 
Manufacturing 30-34 23 3 3 2 20 4 
Computer equipment & services 35, 73 160 23 57 32 103 20 
Electronic equipment 36 60 9 10 6 50 10 
Scientific instruments 38 64 9 14 8 50 10 
Transportation and public utilities 41, 42, 44-49 57 8 12 7 45 9 
Wholesale and retail trade 50-59 61 9 19 11 42 8 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 9 1 4 2 5 1 
Health services 80 15 2 3 2 12 2 
All others 
01, 12, 15, 17, 22-
27, 29, 37, 39, 72, 
75, 82, 87, 96 
76 11 21 12 55 11 
Total 51 688 100 180 100 508 100 
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Table 3. 3 Descriptive statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample of US IPOs over the period from 2003 to 2011. CEO characteristics, firm and offering characteristics, and correlation matrix are 
illustrated in Panel A, B, and C respectively. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. T-tests and Wilcoxon sign rank tests are used to test the difference of means and medians from 
zero. Tests of difference in means and medians between two samples of IPO firms with a financial and nonfinancial expert CEO are based on t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
Panel A: CEO characteristics 
CEO financial expertise 
 All IPOs    
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 sd    
Financial expert  688 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44    
CFO 688 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32    
Banker 688 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22    
Auditor 688 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18    
Accountant 688 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14    
Treasurer  688 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22    
VP of finance  688 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16    
Other financial roles 688 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34    
CEO characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
IPOs with non-
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
CEO age 652 51.14 46.00 51.00 57.00 8.05 50.91 51.22 0.338 
CEO gender 688 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.177 
CEO tenure 665 4.64 1.56 3.72 6.61 4.11 4.33 4.75 0.118 
CEO-Chairman 688 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.47 0.43 0.138 
CEO-founder 688 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.405 
CEO ownership 663 11.21 2.00 4.50 10.20 18.44 11.10 11.25 0.461 
Bachelor’s degree 688 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.82 0.76 0.048 
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Master’s degree 688 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.199 
MBA 688 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.36 0.26 0.006 
PhD 688 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.014 
CPA 688 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.000 
Ivy League alumnus 688 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.20 0.15 0.051 
External hire 688 0.69 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.64 0.71 0.061 
Age first became CEO 615 42.52 37.00 42.00 49.00 8.34 42.26 42.61 0.324 
CEO press coverage 688 23.37 5.00 15.00 31.00 25.92 23.04 23.49 0.422 
Equity compensation 673 0.40 0.00 
 
0.01 0.20 1.30 0.37 0.41 0.345 
Total compensation 673 1.20 0.38 0.60 1.20 2.00 1.10 1.30 0.169 
 
Panel B: Firm and offering characteristics 
Firm characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
IPOs with non-
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
Firm age 676 20.03 6.00 10.00 21.00 24.51 17.67 20.88 0.067 
Leverage 512 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.57 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.083 
Loss 528 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.42 0.44 0.335 
Altman’s Z-score 558 -5.86 -8.63 -0.53 1.79 15.57 -5.65 -5.93 0.426 
Industry-adjusted ROA 688 -0.10 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.33 -0.06 -0.11 0.050 
Retained earnings 514 -0.71 -1.21 -0.16 0.18 3.50 -0.34 -0.86 0.065 
CAPEX 587 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.12 0.227 
R&D 514 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.052 
Diversification 688 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.17 0.16 0.322 
High-tech 688 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.32 0.37 0.145 
Board meetings 670 7.73 5.00 7.00 10.00 3.99 7.47 7.83 0.155 
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Offering characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
IPOs with non-
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
Proceeds 688 165.57 54.00 91.35 169.00 212.65 182.46 159.59 0.108 
Market value 688 475.72 0.00 265.68 597.29 679.65 486.67 471.84 0.401 
Underpricing 665 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.433 
Tobin’s Q 600 4.11 1.95 2.92 4.75 3.63 4.23 4.07 0.323 
Book to market 495 0.30 0.15 0.27 0.42 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.160 
Top-tier investment bank 686 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.235 
Big4 auditor 686 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.80 0.84 0.082 
Venture capitalist 688 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.41 0.52 0.008 
BHAR 513 0.04 -0.59 -0.12 0.38 0.92 0.20 -0.02 0.008 
 
Earnings management proxy 
    All IPOs   
IPOs with 
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
IPOs with non-
financial expert 
CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Median Median p-value 
Abnormal accruals 551 -0.21 -0.30 -0.07*** 0.08 0.89 -0.13*** -0.06*** 0.010 
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Panel C: Correlation matrix 
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Financial expert CEO 1.000           
Log(firm age) -0.040 1.000          
Ln(market value) 0.000 0.109 1.000         
Big4 auditor -0.053 0.064 0.120 1.000        
Top-tier investment bank -0.028 0.147 0.157 0.281 1.000       
Venture capitalist -0.092 -0.486 0.053 0.196 0.016 1.000      
Leverage -0.062 0.160 -0.125 -0.099 0.028 -0.288 1.000     
Loss -0.019 -0.416 -0.181 0.055 -0.061 0.465 0.005 1.000    
Altman’s Z-score 0.008 0.267 0.414 0.005 0.126 -0.222 -0.327 -0.515 1.000   
Tobin’s Q 0.019 -0.178 0.124 -0.011 0.001 0.214 -0.001 0.183 -0.132 1.000  
CAPEX 0.031 -0.164 -0.115 -0.172 -0.042 -0.111 -0.079 -0.042 0.052 -0.022 1.000 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.063 0.221 -0.071 -0.023 0.039 -0.263 -0.077 -0.579 0.488 -0.084 0.023 
Board meetings -0.039 -0.187 0.078 0.084 -0.013 0.350 -0.122 0.190 -0.122 0.110 -0.077 
External hire -0.059 -0.059 -0.002 -0.023 0.016 -0.019 0.013 0.007 -0.028 0.001 0.023 
Log(equity compensation) 0.014 -0.136 -0.010 0.042 0.033 0.214 -0.024 0.199 -0.078 -0.019 -0.020 
CEO-Chairman 0.042 -0.051 0.092 -0.107 -0.036 -0.035 0.012 -0.028 0.068 0.039 0.073 
CEO-Founder 0.009 -0.134 0.029 -0.048 -0.050 0.081 -0.078 0.074 -0.065 0.060 0.098 
Log(CEO ownership) 0.005 -0.206 0.037 -0.168 -0.092 0.140 -0.116 0.015 0.032 0.189 0.120 
Log(CEO age) -0.017 0.212 -0.007 -0.036 -0.032 -0.223 0.081 -0.092 0.018 -0.150 0.006 
CEO gender -0.035 -0.013 0.041 0.049 -0.003 0.095 -0.035 0.035 -0.054 0.062 0.000 
Log(CEO tenure) -0.050 -0.140 0.174 -0.012 -0.069 0.264 -0.177 0.083 0.015 0.131 -0.073 
Log(age first became CEO) -0.020 0.153 -0.089 0.052 -0.009 -0.193 0.091 -0.104 -0.013 -0.147 0.042 
Ivy League alumnus 0.063 -0.047 -0.038 0.091 -0.026 0.133 -0.051 0.062 0.004 0.065 -0.002 
Log(CEO press coverage) -0.011 -0.136 0.125 0.139 0.092 0.315 -0.177 0.231 -0.016 0.126 -0.111 
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Industry-adjusted ROA 1.000             
Board meetings -0.084 1.000            
External hire -0.030 -0.075 1.000           
Log(equity compensation) -0.138 0.125 -0.013 1.000          
CEO-Chairman 0.029 -0.055 0.084 -0.085 1.000         
CEO-Founder -0.067 0.014 0.032 -0.016 0.121 1.000        
Log(CEO ownership) 0.002 0.013 0.030 -0.160 0.373 0.123 1.000       
Log(CEO age) -0.010 -0.104 0.051 -0.032 0.122 -0.013 -0.055 1.000      
CEO gender 0.001 0.039 0.031 0.000 -0.053 0.064 -0.016 0.007 1.000     
Log(CEO tenure) -0.092 0.192 0.106 -0.069 0.161 0.023 0.365 0.015 0.000 1.000    
Log(age first became CEO) 0.030 -0.100 -0.133 0.016 -0.102 -0.095 -0.313 0.656 0.027 -0.306 1.000   
Ivy League alumnus -0.050 0.094 -0.040 0.010 0.091 -0.025 0.029 -0.079 0.002 0.024 -0.118 1.000  
Log(CEO press coverage) -0.108 0.245 0.046 0.097 0.050 0.024 0.066 -0.114 0.013 0.180 -0.159 0.118 1.000 
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Table 3. 4 Effect of CEOs’ financial experience on earnings management 
The table illustrates the effect of CEOs’ financial experience on abnormal accruals for the sample of US 
IPOs over the period 2003-2011. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
  (1)  (2) 
Financial expert CEO -0.242***  -0.296*** 
  (-2.89)  (-3.45) 
Log(firm age) -0.068  -0.128 
  (-0.76)  (-1.20) 
Ln(market value) 0.019  0.019 
  (0.85)  (0.87) 
Big4 auditor -0.076  -0.043 
  (-0.90)  (-0.50) 
Top-tier investment bank -0.022  -0.062 
  (-0.35)  (-0.91) 
Venture capitalist 0.039  0.040 
  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Leverage 0.215*  0.292** 
  (1.73)  (2.03) 
Loss -0.027  -0.073 
  (-0.28)  (-0.63) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.014  0.016 
  (1.34)  (1.48) 
Tobin’s Q -0.027**  -0.028** 
  (-2.24)  (-2.27) 
CAPEX 0.058  0.185 
  (0.23)  (0.83) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.102  -0.098 
  (-0.44)  (-0.36) 
Board meetings 0.007  0.009 
  (0.81)  (0.81) 
External hire   -0.146* 
    (-1.93) 
Log(equity compensation)   0.016 
    (1.38) 
CEO-Chairman   -0.032 
    (-0.45) 
CEO-Founder   -0.047 
    (-0.35) 
Log(CEO ownership)   -0.080 
    (-0.72) 
Log(CEO age)   0.746 
    (1.14) 
CEO gender   -0.177 
    (-0.79) 
Log(CEO tenure)   0.083 
    (1.02) 
Log(age first became CEO)   -0.362 
    (-0.61) 
Ivy League alumnus   -0.214** 
    (-2.10) 
Log(CEO press coverage)   0.156** 
    (2.08) 
Intercept 0.325  -0.374 
  (1.31)  (-0.44) 
    
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
Number of observations 370  323 
R-squared 0.467  0.546 
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Table 3. 5 Effect of at-issue earnings management on post-issue performance 
The table illustrates the effect of at-issue earnings management on post-issue accounting and stock 
performance for the sample of US IPOs over the period 2003-2011. All regressions control for industry and 
year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two and 
three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics 
are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
Panel A: Post-issue accounting performance 
 ROA  CFO 
 (1)  (2) 
Abnormal accruals 0.008  -0.008 
  (0.47)  (-0.43) 
Abnormal accruals * Financial expert CEO 0.037*  0.038* 
  (1.90)  (1.75) 
CFO 0.279***  0.216*** 
  (9.69)  (6.15) 
CAPEX 0.022  0.148*** 
  (0.31)  (2.79) 
Intercept 0.061  0.109** 
  (1.07)  (2.44) 
Industry dummies Yes  Yes 
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
P-value of F-test [Abnormal accruals + Abnormal 
accruals * Financial expert CEO = 0] 
0.000  0.009 
Number of observations 454  454 
R-squared 0.615  0.589 
Panel B: Post-issue stock performance (event-time approach) 
 BHAR 
Aggressive earnings management -0.274** 
 (-2.25) 
Aggressive earnings management * Financial expert CEO 0.538* 
 (1.76) 
Log(firm age) 0.083 
  (0.50) 
Ln(market value) -0.001 
  (-0.01) 
Venture capitalist -0.057 
 (-0.43) 
Book-to-market 0.299 
 (1.41) 
ROA 0.024*** 
 (3.05) 
Underpricing 0.344 
 (1.07) 
Market BHR 0.095 
 (1.00) 
Intercept -1.420*** 
 (-2.87) 
Industry dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
P-value of F-test [Aggressive earnings management + 
Aggressive earnings management * Financial expert CEO = 0] 
0.374 
Number of observations 460 
R-squared 0.110 
Panel C: Post-issue stock performance (calendar-time approach) 
Fama-French three-factor model  
Without financial expert CEO -0.013** 
 (-2.04) 
With financial expert CEO -0.006 
 (-0.60) 
Carhart four-factor model  
Without financial expert CEO -0.013* 
 (-1.95) 
With financial expert CEO -0.007 
 (-0.65) 
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Table 3. 6 Endogeneity control 
The table illustrates the analyses of the effect of CEOs’ past financial experience on earnings management 
in the issue year for the sample of US IPOs over the period 2003-2011, controlling for the endogeneity of 
CEO selection using alternative econometric approaches: propensity score matching, instrumental variable 
(IV), Heckman’s two-step treatment effect, maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) treatment effect. All 
variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Propensity score matching 
 
Matching variables: R&D, retained earnings, diversification, log(firm age), ln(market value), big4 auditor, 
top-tier investment bank, venture capitalist, leverage, loss, Altman’s Z-score, Tobin’s Q, CAPEX, industry-
adjusted ROA, board meetings, CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, log(CEO ownership), log(CEO age), CEO 
gender, log(CEO tenure), log(age first became CEO), Ivy League alumnus, log(CEO press coverage), high-
tech industry, year dummies 
 Abnormal accruals 
ATET 
(Financial expert CEO vs. Non-financial expert CEO) 
-0.255*** 
(-3.48) 
Number of observations 285 
 
Panel B: Instrumental variable approach and Treatment effect models 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
  IV Heckman MLE 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
Financial expert 
CEO 
  
 -1.701**  -2.912*  -0.698*** 
 (-2.00)  (-1.80)  (-3.45) 
Log(firm age) -0.058 -0.075  0.029  -0.013 
  (-0.45) (-0.40)  (0.14)  (-0.15) 
Ln(market value) 0.002 0.032  0.037  0.036** 
  (0.09) (0.85)  (0.80)  (1.97) 
Big4 auditor 0.057 0.051  -0.045  -0.034 
  (0.54) (0.31)  (-0.24)  (-0.41) 
Top-tier investment 
bank 
  
-0.002 -0.033  -0.040  -0.036 
(-0.03) (-0.29)  (-0.33)  (-0.60) 
Venture capitalist -0.200** -0.247  0.012  0.063 
  (-2.12) (-1.06)  (0.07)  (0.62) 
Leverage -0.048 0.119  0.199  0.229* 
  (-0.60) (0.81)  (1.19)  (1.66) 
Loss 0.108 0.100  -0.048  -0.065 
  (1.04) (0.52)  (-0.28)  (-0.65) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.000 0.017**  0.016***  0.017* 
  (0.16) (2.01)  (2.68)  (1.66) 
Tobin’s Q -0.001 -0.012  -0.006  -0.011 
  (-0.07) (-0.71)  (-0.31)  (-1.33) 
CAPEX -0.079 -0.126  -0.013  -0.081 
  (-0.24) (-0.27)  (-0.03)  (-0.38) 
Industry-adjusted 
ROA 
  
0.054 -0.070  -0.077  -0.148 
(0.42) (-0.23)  (-0.33)  (-0.62) 
Board meetings 0.002 0.005  0.000  0.005 
  (0.19) (0.32)  (0.03)  (0.55) 
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External hire -0.153** -0.334**  -0.106  -0.119* 
  (-1.99) (-2.07)  (-0.80)  (-1.67) 
Log(equity 
compensation) 
  
0.000 0.016  0.014  0.013 
(0.01) (0.80)  (0.63)  (1.14) 
CEO-Chairman 0.054 0.018  -0.061  -0.077 
  (0.74) (0.16)  (-0.47)  (-1.22) 
CEO-Founder 0.007 -0.125  -0.114  -0.136 
  (0.07) (-0.74)  (-0.56)  (-1.14) 
Log(CEO 
ownership) 
  
-0.051 -0.120  -0.036  -0.048 
(-0.53) (-0.78)  (-0.24)  (-0.54) 
Log(CEO age) 0.092 0.435  0.135  0.432 
  (0.12) (0.35)  (0.11)  (0.74) 
CEO gender -0.085 -0.427  -0.344  -0.278 
  (-0.61) (-1.45)  (-1.10)  (-1.33) 
Log(CEO tenure) 0.029 0.161  0.121  0.116 
  (0.38) (1.38)  (0.89)  (1.55) 
Log(age first became 
CEO) 
  
0.331 0.389  -0.009  -0.143 
(0.51) (0.36)  (-0.01)  (-0.27) 
Ivy League alumnus 0.137 0.060  -0.127  -0.127 
  (1.27) (0.32)  (-0.74)  (-1.60) 
Log(CEO press 
coverage) 
  
-0.003 0.136  0.139  0.155** 
(-0.03) (1.20)  (1.02)  (2.06) 
Intercept -0.532 -1.086 -0.492*** 0.674 -0.535*** -0.375 
  (-0.52) (-0.72) (-3.95) (0.33) (-4.43) (-0.50) 
R&D 0.237  0.109  0.483  
 (0.88)  (0.23)  (0.95)  
Retained earnings 0.017*  0.041*  0.080**  
 (1.76)  (1.76)  (2.30)  
Diversification 0.038  0.031  0.068  
 (0.40)  (0.15)  (0.37)  
High-tech industry -0.079  -0.033  0.036  
 (-0.60)  (-0.19)  (0.21)  
       
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test against  
H0: variables are 
exogenous (p-value) 
 0.046 
 
   
Inverse Mills ratio   1.625*    
   (1.66)    
Likelihood ratio test 
against  
H0: ρ = 0  (p-value)  
 
 
  
0.004 
Number of 
observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 
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Table 3. 7 Analysis of the interaction effect between financial expert CEOs and CEO power 
The table illustrates the effect of financial expert CEOs on earnings management controlling for the 
interaction effect between financial expert CEOs and CEO power for the sample of US IPOs over the period 
2003-2011. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. 
CEO power is measured as the sum of the standardised variables: CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO 
ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy League alumnus. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two 
and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test 
statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
 Abnormal accruals 
Financial expert CEO -0.297*** 
  (-3.69) 
Financial expert CEO * CEO power -0.066* 
 (-1.72) 
Log(firm age) -0.120 
  (-1.22) 
Ln(market value) 0.019 
  (0.84) 
Big4 auditor -0.037 
  (-0.42) 
Top-tier investment bank -0.055 
  (-0.82) 
Venture capitalist 0.026 
  (0.25) 
Leverage 0.258* 
  (1.88) 
Loss -0.051 
  (-0.45) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.014 
  (1.39) 
Tobin’s Q -0.028** 
  (-2.20) 
CAPEX 0.107 
  (0.47) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.050 
  (-0.19) 
Board meetings 0.007 
  (0.73) 
External hire -0.137* 
  (-1.81) 
Log(equity compensation) 0.012 
  (1.08) 
Log(CEO age) 1.076* 
  (1.68) 
CEO gender -0.239 
  (-1.10) 
Log(age first became CEO) -0.686 
  (-1.37) 
Log(CEO press coverage) 0.162** 
  (2.17) 
Intercept -0.410 
  (-0.52) 
  
Industry dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
P-value of F-test [Financial expert CEO + 
Financial expert CEO*CEO power = 0] 
0.000 
Number of observations 323 
R-squared 0.548 
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Table 3. 8 Robustness checks – Alternative measures of financial experience 
The table illustrates the analyses of the effect of a CEO’s past CFO experience, CPA qualification, and 
financial experience variety on earnings management in the issue year for the sample of U.S. IPOs over the 
period 2003-2011. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose coefficients are 
suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Panel A: Effect of CEO’s past CFO experience and CPA qualification on earnings management 
 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CFO -0.186**   
 (-2.23)   
CPA  -0.338*  
  (-1.79)  
CFO&CPA   -0.208* 
   (-1.78) 
Log(firm age) -0.108 -0.106 -0.111 
  (-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.03) 
Ln(market value) 0.020 0.021 0.021 
  (0.93) (0.95) (0.95) 
Big4 auditor -0.056 -0.035 -0.048 
  (-0.64) (-0.39) (-0.55) 
Top-tier investment bank -0.049 -0.071 -0.059 
  (-0.72) (-1.00) (-0.85) 
Venture capitalist 0.105 0.095 0.104 
  (0.84) (0.77) (0.84) 
Leverage 0.312** 0.305** 0.307** 
  (2.04) (2.02) (2.02) 
Loss -0.112 -0.087 -0.102 
  (-1.00) (-0.75) (-0.90) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.016 0.016 0.016 
  (1.37) (1.39) (1.37) 
Tobin’s Q -0.030** -0.028** -0.029** 
  (-2.39) (-2.31) (-2.27) 
CAPEX 0.232 0.199 0.206 
  (1.03) (0.88) (0.90) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.119 -0.105 -0.103 
  (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.37) 
Board meetings 0.008 0.007 0.008 
  (0.70) (0.66) (0.74) 
External hire -0.133 -0.110 -0.116 
  (-1.64) (-1.39) (-1.47) 
Log(equity 
compensation) 
  
0.012 0.013 0.014 
(1.00) (1.04) (1.14) 
CEO-Chairman -0.052 -0.045 -0.042 
  (-0.71) (-0.64) (-0.58) 
CEO-Founder -0.043 -0.065 -0.048 
  (-0.31) (-0.46) (-0.35) 
Log(CEO ownership) -0.081 -0.075 -0.080 
  (-0.71) (-0.66) (-0.69) 
Log(CEO age) 0.694 0.615 0.716 
  (1.08) (0.97) (1.12) 
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CEO gender -0.155 -0.161 -0.153 
  (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.67) 
Log(CEO tenure) 0.072 0.070 0.076 
  (0.87) (0.85) (0.91) 
Log(age first became 
CEO) 
  
-0.376 -0.393 -0.423 
(-0.64) (-0.67) (-0.73) 
Ivy League alumnus -0.241** -0.256** -0.251** 
  (-2.23) (-2.41) (-2.32) 
Log(CEO press 
coverage) 
  
0.157* 0.166** 0.158** 
(1.95) (2.08) (1.98) 
Intercept -0.318 -0.221 -0.301 
  (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.35) 
    
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 323 323 323 
R-squared 0.522 0.526 0.518 
 
Panel B: Effect of CEO’s financial experience variety on earnings management 
 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
 
   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Number of firms -0.086**   
  (-2.03)   
Number of roles  -0.061**  
  (-2.01)  
Financial experience at another firm   -0.194** 
   (-2.48) 
Log(firm age) -0.104 -0.110 -0.090 
  (-0.95) (-1.01) (-0.82) 
Ln(market value) 0.019 0.018 0.020 
  (0.88) (0.83) (0.92) 
Big4 auditor -0.053 -0.060 -0.043 
  (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.50) 
Top-tier investment bank -0.052 -0.051 -0.054 
  (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.79) 
Venture capitalist 0.103 0.105 0.104 
  (0.83) (0.85) (0.84) 
Leverage 0.317** 0.311** 0.314** 
  (2.07) (2.05) (2.06) 
Loss -0.118 -0.119 -0.113 
  (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.02) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.016 0.016 0.016 
  (1.39) (1.39) (1.38) 
Tobin’s Q -0.029** -0.029** -0.030** 
  (-2.33) (-2.33) (-2.40) 
CAPEX 0.218 0.216 0.248 
  (0.95) (0.95) (1.10) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.125 -0.124 -0.119 
  (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.43) 
Board meetings 0.009 0.008 0.009 
  (0.80) (0.77) (0.80) 
External hire -0.128 -0.119 -0.117 
  (-1.61) (-1.52) (-1.49) 
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Log(equity compensation) 0.014 0.013 0.012 
  (1.14) (1.10) (0.97) 
CEO-Chairman -0.045 -0.038 -0.052 
  (-0.62) (-0.52) (-0.71) 
CEO-Founder -0.046 -0.043 -0.049 
  (-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.35) 
Log(CEO ownership) -0.078 -0.084 -0.068 
  (-0.68) (-0.73) (-0.60) 
Log(CEO age) 0.698 0.714 0.726 
  (1.08) (1.11) (1.12) 
CEO gender -0.149 -0.150 -0.166 
  (-0.67) (-0.67) (-0.74) 
Log(CEO tenure) 0.077 0.078 0.069 
  (0.92) (0.93) (0.83) 
Log(age first became CEO) -0.363 -0.377 -0.343 
  (-0.62) (-0.64) (-0.58) 
Ivy League alumnus -0.251** -0.245** -0.240** 
  (-2.34) (-2.28) (-2.23) 
Log(CEO press coverage) 0.162** 0.157* 0.164** 
  (2.01) (1.96) (2.06) 
Intercept -0.379 -0.364 -0.490 
  (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.57) 
    
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 323 323 323 
R-squared 0.521 0.520 0.524 
 
Panel B: Effect of CEO’s financial experience variety on earnings management (continued) 
 
Dependent variable: Abnormal accruals 
 
   
 (4) (5) (6) 
Log(financial experience time) -0.192**   
 (-2.20)   
Financial experience variety index  -0.034**  
  (-2.31)  
Financial experience variety dummy   -0.163** 
   (-2.34) 
Log(firm age) -0.094 -0.098 -0.103 
  (-0.86) (-0.90) (-0.94) 
Ln(market value) 0.020 0.020 0.023 
  (0.93) (0.89) (1.03) 
Big4 auditor -0.047 -0.052 -0.049 
  (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.56) 
Top-tier investment bank -0.058 -0.053 -0.055 
  (-0.84) (-0.77) (-0.80) 
Venture capitalist 0.108 0.104 0.106 
  (0.87) (0.84) (0.85) 
Leverage 0.313** 0.315** 0.304** 
  (2.05) (2.06) (2.00) 
Loss -0.112 -0.117 -0.113 
  (-1.00) (-1.04) (-1.01) 
Altman’s Z-score 0.016 0.016 0.016 
  (1.37) (1.39) (1.37) 
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Tobin’s Q -0.029** -0.030** -0.030** 
  (-2.36) (-2.38) (-2.43) 
CAPEX 0.231 0.231 0.235 
  (1.02) (1.02) (1.04) 
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.116 -0.123 -0.121 
  (-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.43) 
Board meetings 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.77) (0.79) (0.72) 
External hire -0.125 -0.125 -0.119 
  (-1.57) (-1.57) (-1.51) 
Log(equity compensation) 0.012 0.013 0.011 
  (0.98) (1.03) (0.90) 
CEO-Chairman -0.046 -0.046 -0.040 
  (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.54) 
CEO-Founder -0.053 -0.048 -0.044 
  (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.32) 
Log(CEO ownership) -0.071 -0.076 -0.076 
  (-0.62) (-0.67) (-0.67) 
Log(CEO age) 0.699 0.701 0.662 
  (1.08) (1.08) (1.02) 
CEO gender -0.158 -0.157 -0.168 
  (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.75) 
Log(CEO tenure) 0.075 0.076 0.079 
  (0.89) (0.91) (0.94) 
Log(age first became CEO) -0.358 -0.348 -0.347 
  (-0.60) (-0.59) (-0.59) 
Ivy League alumnus -0.245** -0.244** -0.238** 
  (-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.22) 
Log(CEO press coverage) 0.162** 0.162** 0.147* 
  (2.03) (2.02) (1.84) 
Intercept -0.422 -0.447 -0.327 
  (-0.50) (-0.52) (-0.39) 
    
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 323 323 323 
R-squared 0.521 0.522 0.523 
 
Pairwise correlation of four aspects of financial experience variety 
 Number of 
firms 
Number of 
roles 
Financial 
experience at 
another firm 
Log(financial 
experience 
time) 
Number of firms 1.000    
Number of roles 0.908 1.000   
Financial experience at another firm 0.814 0.764 1.000  
Log(financial experience time) 0.853 0.818 0.856 1.000 
  
First component: Eigenvalue of 3.50742 and proportion explained of 0.8769 
 Loadings 
Number of firms 0.510 
Number of roles 0.498 
Financial experience at another firm 0.489 
Log(financial experience time) 0.503 
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Panel C: Post-issue accounting performance 
 ROA CFO ROA CFO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Abnormal accruals 0.013 -0.006 0.012 -0.007 
  (0.82) (-0.36) (0.74) (-0.38) 
Abnormal accruals * CFO 0.031 0.049**   
  (1.43) (2.05)   
Abnormal accruals * Financial experience 
variety dummy  
  0.034 0.046** 
  (1.64) (2.08) 
CFO 0.276*** 0.214*** 0.277*** 0.215*** 
  (9.49) (6.07) (9.55) (6.09) 
CAPEX 0.033 0.161*** 0.034 0.162*** 
  (0.46) (2.99) (0.47) (3.00) 
Intercept 0.062 0.114** 0.065 0.117** 
  (1.09) (2.52) (1.16) (2.54) 
     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value of F-test [ Abnormal accruals + 
Abnormal accruals * CFO = 0 ] 
0.000 0.001  
 
P-value of F-test [ Abnormal accruals + 
Abnormal accruals * Financial experience 
variety dummy= 0 ] 
  0.000 0.002 
Number of observations 454 
 
454 
 
454 454 
R-squared 0.614 
 
0.589 
 
0.614 0.589 
 
Panel D: Post-issue stock performance   
 BHAR BHAR 
 (1) (2) 
 Aggressive earnings management -0.202* -0.192 
 (-1.66) (-1.51) 
Aggressive earnings management * CFO 0.555  
 (1.14)  
Aggressive earnings management * Financial experience variety 
dummy  
 0.247 
 (0.76) 
Log(firm age) 0.071 0.071 
  (0.43) (0.43) 
Ln(market value) -0.006 -0.003 
  (-0.12) (-0.07) 
Venture capitalist -0.072 -0.065 
 (-0.54) (-0.48) 
Book-to-market 0.305 0.316 
 (1.42) (1.47) 
ROA 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (3.10) (3.08) 
Underpricing 0.351 0.329 
 (1.11) (1.00) 
Market index return 0.110 0.115 
 (1.22) (1.25) 
Intercept -0.417 -0.438 
 (-1.03) (-1.08) 
   
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
P-value of F-test [Aggressive earnings management + Aggressive 
earnings management * CFO = 0] 
0.469 
 
P-value of F-test [Aggressive earnings management + Aggressive 
earnings management * Financial experience variety dummy = 0] 
 0.863 
Number of observations 460 
 
460 
 R-squared 0.103 
 
0.100 
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Table 3. 9 Effect of CEOs’ financial experience on real earnings management 
The table illustrates the effect of CEOs’ financial experience on real earnings management for the sample 
of U.S. IPOs over the period 2003-2011. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. One, two and three asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Abnormal 
cash flow 
from 
operations 
Abnormal 
production 
costs 
Abnormal 
discretionary 
expenses 
REM1 REM2 
Financial expert CEO 0.026 -0.047 0.026 -0.028 -0.005    
  (0.42) (-0.44) (0.42) (-0.15) (-0.05)    
Log(firm age) -0.115 0.023 -0.115 0.272 -0.021    
  (-1.29) (0.18) (-1.29) (1.03) (-0.15)    
Ln(market value) -0.049* -0.040 -0.049* -0.005 -0.026    
  (-1.88) (-1.13) (-1.88) (-0.09) (-0.70)    
Big4 auditor -0.007 0.042 -0.007 -0.068 -0.050    
  (-0.10) (0.38) (-0.10) (-0.30) (-0.36)    
Top-tier investment bank 0.007 0.031 0.007 0.124 0.097    
  (0.12) (0.36) (0.12) (0.80) (0.98)    
Venture capitalist -0.091 -0.081 -0.091 -0.207 -0.211    
  (-1.38) (-0.70) (-1.38) (-0.89) (-1.45)    
Leverage 0.065 0.060 0.065 0.248 0.384*** 
  (0.82) (0.53) (0.82) (1.16) (2.87)    
Loss -0.253** -0.095 -0.253** 0.116 -0.150    
  (-2.53) (-0.68) (-2.53) (0.45) (-0.98)    
Altman’s Z-score -0.017*** 0.005 -0.017*** 0.044*** 0.033*** 
  (-4.19) (0.74) (-4.19) (3.90) (4.27)    
Tobin’s Q 0.012 -0.047*** 0.012 -0.120*** -0.061*** 
  (1.32) (-4.04) (1.32) (-4.99) (-4.20)    
CAPEX 0.302 0.563 0.302 0.414 0.123    
  (1.57) (1.21) (1.57) (0.59) (0.38)    
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.056 -0.499 -0.056 -0.558 -0.447**  
  (-0.32) (-1.60) (-0.32) (-1.11) (-1.97)    
Board meetings -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 0.006    
  (-0.78) (-0.54) (-0.78) (-0.07) (0.39)    
External hire 0.017 0.068 0.017 0.175 0.058    
  (0.27) (0.71) (0.27) (0.98) (0.52)    
Log(equity compensation) 0.020* -0.001 0.020* -0.024 -0.002    
  (1.94) (-0.09) (1.94) (-0.86) (-0.12)    
CEO-Chairman 0.058 0.069 0.058 -0.049 -0.080    
  (0.98) (0.79) (0.98) (-0.30) (-0.78)    
CEO-Founder 0.186* -0.249* 0.186* -0.273 0.114    
  (1.70) (-1.69) (1.70) (-1.03) (0.74)    
Log(CEO ownership) 0.039 -0.252** 0.039 -0.524** -0.303**  
  (0.57) (-2.20) (0.57) (-2.08) (-2.28)    
Log(CEO age) 0.078 0.758 0.078 1.398 1.392    
  (0.13) (0.91) (0.13) (0.77) (1.38)    
CEO gender 0.068 0.386 0.068 0.252 -0.008    
  (0.26) (0.91) (0.26) (0.44) (-0.02)    
Log(CEO tenure) -0.031 0.129 -0.031 0.313* 0.139    
  (-0.55) (1.24) (-0.55) (1.75) (1.38)    
Log(age first became CEO) 0.113 -0.888 0.113 -1.578 -1.271    
  (0.21) (-1.37) (0.21) (-1.03) (-1.37)    
Ivy League alumnus -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.022 -0.051    
  (-0.60) (-0.39) (-0.60) (-0.11) (-0.37)    
Log(CEO press coverage) 0.169** 0.065 0.169** -0.098 0.038    
  (2.50) (0.68) (2.50) (-0.54) (0.32)    
Intercept -0.391 -0.413 -0.391 -1.026 -0.730 
  (-0.50) (-0.35) (-0.50) (-0.46) (-0.53) 
      
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 329 309 329 291 306 
R-squared 0.477 0.367 0.477 0.442 0.449 
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Chapter 4 - Specialist CEOs and IPO survival 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been substantially increasing attention to the 
significance of CEOs in the organisational context. In the 1950s, CEOs were not 
particularly important, most of them ascended within the firm, were rarely fired, and 
received mainly a basic salary which was slightly higher than for their subordinate 
executives (Quigley and Hambrick 2015; Frydman and Jenter 2010; Khurana 2002). 
However, since the 1990s, there have been considerable changes in the perception of CEO 
significance. CEOs are featured more prominently in the press, more likely to be recruited 
from outside the firm, more easily fired, and receive much larger compensation packages 
including not only a salary but also bonuses and equity compensation (Quigley and 
Hambrick 2015; Kaplan and Minton 2012; Frydman and Jenter 2010; Murphy et al. 2004; 
Hayward et al. 2004; Khurana 2002). Quigley and Hambrick (2015) investigate the “CEO 
effect” based on the dataset spanning 60 years and provide the evidence that CEOs are in 
fact gaining growing significance; particularly, the proportion of the variation in firm 
performance attributable to CEOs increases considerably over the decades of the study. 
Another trend in the U.S. business environment is the considerable increase in the 
percentage of CEOs with diverse career backgrounds and experience (Crossland et al. 
2014). General managerial skills which are more readily transferable across firms and 
industries, as opposed to specialist managerial skills which are specific to particular firms 
and industries, tend to be more desirable in the executive labour market. Firms are more 
willing to offer higher pay packages to generalist CEOs than specialist ones (Custódio et 
al. 2013). Given the growing significance of CEOs in the organisational context and the 
increasing preference for CEOs with more general managerial ability, I ask whether there 
is heterogeneity in the long-term performance outcomes of firms led by generalist CEOs 
compared with firms led by specialist CEOs. In this research, I focus on the IPO market 
and investigate the survivability of IPO firms in subsequent periods after the offering.  
The extant empirical evidence from both the U.S. and international IPO markets 
indicates that although IPO firms exhibit significant initial returns, they demonstrate poor 
long-run performance with one-third of issuing firms either failing or being acquired 
within five years of going public (Ritter 2003; Ritter and Welch 2002; Loughran et al. 
1994; Ritter 1991). Newly listed firms face various challenges in the transition from 
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private to public status such as significant structural changes particularly in ownership 
and governance mechanisms, stringent monitoring from capital market participants and 
regulators, intense market competition, and increased susceptibility to changes in capital 
market conditions. Therefore, sound strategic choices made by top executives are crucial 
for issuing firms’ future growth and survival. Academic researchers have attempted to 
understand various firm and offering characteristics determining post-issue performance 
such as firm size, firm age, underpricing, ownership structure (Hensler et al. 1997), 
governance mechanism (Charitou et al. 2007), high quality audit (Demers and Joos 2007; 
Jain and Martin 2005; Weber and Willenborg 2003), venture capital participation (Jain 
and Kini 2000), investment bank prestige (Schultz 1993), and strategic investment 
choices (Jain and Kini 2008). However, the impact of CEOs’ prior career experience on 
the survivability of IPO firms has remained an unexplored area. 
Upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007) suggests that 
personalities, backgrounds, and experiences considerably influence managers’ 
interpretations of business situations, consequently, affect their decision making. 
Empirical research confirms the significance of managerial heterogeneity in influencing 
strategic corporate choices and outcomes. Particularly, several recent studies provide 
evidence of the impact of CEOs’ career experience on corporate decisions (for example, 
Hu and Liu (2015), Huang (2014), Mishra (2014), Crossland et al. (2014), Custódio and 
Metzger (2014), Custódio and Metzger (2013)). Based on the upper echelons theory and 
prior literature, I aim to investigate the influence of CEOs’ past work experience on the 
failure risks and survivability of IPO firms. I categorise CEOs’ managerial experience 
into general managerial ability and specialist managerial ability and examine which type 
of experience contributes to the survivability of IPO firms. I follow Custódio et al. (2013) 
to define general managerial ability to be knowledge, skills, and experiences that the CEO 
has obtained from various functional roles, firms, and industries in his lifetime 
employment. I also use their method to construct a general managerial ability index using 
the principal component analysis on the five aspects of CEOs’ past work experience: the 
number of roles the CEO has held, the number of firms the CEO has worked for, the 
number of industries the CEO has worked in, CEO experience in another firm, and 
experience in a conglomerate firm. If a CEO’s general managerial ability index is equal 
to or above the sample median, the CEO is categorised as a generalist, and specialist 
otherwise. 
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This study addresses the main question of whether CEOs with specialist 
managerial ability are more likely to improve the survival profiles of IPO firms than their 
counterparts with more general managerial ability. I argue that the incentives of generalist 
CEOs may be different from specialist CEOs, which may explain the differences in their 
course of actions and decision making, thereby influencing the failure risks and 
survivability of IPO firms. Mishra (2014) argues that generalist CEOs tend to be less risk 
averse than specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs are more like to engage in job-hopping 
(Giannetti 2011) and more easily get hired due to their prominent presence in executive 
search databases (Dasgupta and Ding 2010). Higher employability makes their wealth 
less contingent on the future of the firm that they manage. Moreover, they may want to 
undertake riskier strategies to show the market that they have superior ability. Therefore, 
generalist CEOs may have more incentives to pursue risky projects without much concern 
about the consequences of such strategies on the firm’s future survivability. On the other 
hand, specialist CEOs face greater career concerns due to their lower job mobility across 
firms and industries. Since the future wealth of specialist CEOs tend to be dependent on 
the long-term performance of the firm, they have stronger incentives to ensure that their 
firm remains viable for a longer time in the future. In addition, specialist CEOs’ industry 
expertise and thorough understanding of the firm may help them develop proper strategic 
corporate policies that allow the firm to capitalise on post-issue opportunities, thereby, 
ensuring growth and survivability. Therefore, I expect that specialist CEOs will be 
associated with lower probability of failure and higher survival rates. Conducting the 
survival analysis on the sample of common share US IPOs from 1999 to 2009, I find the 
evidence that IPO firms with specialist CEOs have a lower probability of failure and 
survive longer in subsequent periods after the offering. The failure risk of IPO firms with 
specialist CEOs is 35% that of firms with generalist CEOs. The results remain robust after 
controlling for the selection problem due to the endogenous matching between CEOs and 
firms using the propensity score matching approach. I also obtain similar results after 
taking into account the effects of high-tech industries, crisis periods, and CEO power.  
My study provides several contributions to the literature. First of all, my findings 
contribute to the literature that emphasises the influence of managerial characteristics on 
corporate decisions and outcomes. Previous research in this strand of literature focuses 
on CEO features such as age (Serfling 2014; Orens and Reheul 2013), education (King et 
al. 2016), early-life experiences (Malmendier et al. 2011), managers’ fixed effects 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003), overconfidence (Huang et al. 2016; Malmendier et al. 2011; 
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Malmendier and Tate 2008, 2005), and risk attitudes (Cain and McKeon 2016; Graham 
et al. 2013). Regarding CEOs’ work experience, prior research examines functional 
experience (Custódio and Metzger 2014; Malmendier and Tate 2005), industry expertise 
(Huang 2014; Custódio and Metzger 2013; Orens and Reheul 2013), and career variety 
(Hu and Liu 2015; Crossland et al. 2014). Those studies mainly link a CEO’s 
characteristics and experience with corporate strategic decisions; little has been done 
regarding the influence of CEOs’ career histories on firm performance, particularly the 
long-term survivability of IPO firms. Custódio et al. (2013) document that generalist 
CEOs receive higher pay than specialist CEOs; however, they do not find evidence 
suggesting that generalist CEOs positively affect firm performance. My findings suggest 
that generalist CEOs are not only more expensive than specialist CEOs but also associated 
with higher probability of failure and lower survival rates in the periods after going public. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to directly investigate the influence of 
specialist CEOs on IPO firms' survival profiles. My research also contributes to the 
literature that tries to understand the variation in the survivability of IPO firms. I find that 
specialist managerial experience of CEOs is significant for the survivability of IPO firms. 
My study also complements previous findings that managerial characteristics are an 
important determinant of corporate performance, which further confirms the predictions 
of the upper echelons theory. Moreover, identifying the extent to which work experience 
of CEOs is related to IPO survival provides useful insights into the CEO appointment 
decisions for IPO issuing firms. My findings suggest that specialist CEOs are not only 
less costly than generalist CEOs but also contribute positively to IPO firms’ survival 
profiles. Therefore, IPO firms may want to take specialist expertise into more 
consideration when recruiting a CEO.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section reviews relevant 
literature on managerial work experience and IPO survival. Section 4.3 discusses 
hypothesis development. Section 4.4 describes data and explains survival analysis 
methodology. Section 4.5 reports the empirical findings on the impact of specialist CEOs 
on the probability of failure and time to survive of IPO firms in subsequent periods to the 
offering. Section 4.6 presents several checks for the robustness of my results. Finally, 
Section 4.7 provides some concluding remarks.  
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4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. Theoretical framework 
The first theory that governs this study is agency theory. The theory focuses on 
the principal-agent problem which arises due to the conflict of interests between the 
principals (e.g., shareholders) and agents (e.g. company executives) in the presence of 
asymmetric information between the two parties. It also implies that managers can 
exercise their discretion in the firm to influence corporate decisions to achieve their 
objective (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Thus, the moral hazard problem will occur if 
managers acts for their own benefits which go against the interests of the shareholders. 
Managers’ decisions will be detrimental to the firm if they are not aligned with 
shareholders’ interests.  This problem is more severe for IPO firms since the IPO markets 
demonstrate high information asymmetries.  
Moreover, the upper echelons theory proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
postulates that managers’ decisions (and ultimately corporate outcomes) can be 
influenced by managerial backgrounds, personalities, values, and past experiences.  
Extensive research efforts have been put into providing empirical evidence of the 
association between various managerial specific attributes and corporate decisions and 
performance. Previous empirical studies have provided findings consistent with the 
theory and documented that managerial heterogeneity significantly explains firm 
behaviours and performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that managers’ fixed 
effects have significant explanatory power for the heterogeneity in various corporate 
decisions including investment policies (e.g., capital expenditures and acquisition), 
financial policies (e.g., cash holdings, financial leverage, interest coverage and dividend 
payouts), and organisational strategies (e.g., R&D, advertising, and diversification). 
Subsequent studies have investigated the effects of managers’ psychological traits such 
as overconfidence and personal risk attitudes on corporate decisions. For example, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs tend to be more responsive 
to cash flows when making investment decisions; particularly, they overinvest when 
internal funds are abundant, but restrain investment when external financing is required. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) further explore the linkage between CEO overconfidence 
and merger decisions. They find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overpay 
target firms and engage in value-destroying deals. Malmendier et al. (2011) suggest that 
overconfident managers prefer to use less risky financing options such as cash and riskless 
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debt than equity. They also prefer shorter-term debt, especially short-term debt due within 
12 months (Huang et al. 2016). Graham et al. (2013) also document the impact of 
managerial optimism and risk-aversion on corporate financial policies including capital 
structure and acquisition decisions. Cain and McKeon (2016) show that CEOs’ personal 
risk-taking is positively associated with equity return volatility. Kaplan et al. (2012) 
investigate specific managerial characteristics and find that managers who have general 
managerial ability and possess capabilities related to execution skills are more likely to 
contribute positively to subsequent performance.  
Moreover, CEOs’ past life events, age, and education have been shown to 
influence their decision making. Malmendier et al. (2011) suggest that CEOs who grew 
up during the Great Depression have less trust in capital markets, and hence, rely 
markedly on internal financing. In addition, CEOs who served in the military tend to 
prefer risk-taking and undertake more aggressive capital structures. Serfling (2014) 
argues that older CEOs are more risk averse and less likely to pursue risky investment 
policies. They undertake fewer R&D projects, engage in more diversifying acquisitions, 
manage more diversified firms, and maintain lower operating leverage. Orens and Reheul 
(2013) show that CEO age is positively associated with cash holdings. King et al. (2016) 
document that CEOs with MBAs make a positive contribution to bank performance; 
moreover, they tend to be responsive to risk-taking incentives and adopt riskier or more 
innovative strategies to improve performance. Furthermore, Mackey (2008) shows that 
the CEO effect explains 29.2 percent of the variation in a firm’s performance; and the 
impact is much more pronounced at the corporate level than the segment level and in 
diversified firms than focused firms. Overall, previous empirical studies confirm the 
relevance of managerial heterogeneity to corporate strategies, which ultimately influences 
firm performance.  
 
4.2.2. CEO work experience and corporate decisions 
Along with cognitive abilities, personal trait sand observable demographic 
backgrounds, work experience represents an important factor suggested by the upper 
echelons theory as having significant implications for managerial decision making. 
CEOs’ past work experience can exert influence on corporate strategic choices. Various 
empirical research has provided the evidence on the substantial impact of CEOs’ previous 
professional experience on firms’ strategy adoption. Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
document that CEOs’ work experience is relevant for a better understanding of corporate 
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investment decision making. Specifically, CEOs with an engineering or scientific career 
experience show higher investment-cash flow sensitivity, while those with a financial 
career experience display lower sensitivity. Orens and Reheul (2013) document a 
negative association between cash holdings and CEOs’ experience in other industries. 
Custódio and Metzger (2013) study CEO work experience in the context of diversifying 
M&A and show that CEOs with industry expertise perform better in deal negotiations and 
pay a lower premium for the target. Custódio and Metzger (2014) provide evidence that 
past financial experience of CEOs influences firms’ financial policies such as cash 
holdings, leverage, share repurchases, and pay-out policies. Huang (2014) shows that 
managers’ industry-specific experience influences their corporate divesture decisions. 
Particularly, CEOs in diversified conglomerates tend to divest divisions in industries in 
which they have less expertise to refocus on divisions in which they are more specialised; 
and better firm-CEO match enhances the firm’s operating and stock performance 
following the divesture. Hu and Liu (2015) suggest that strong external experience helps 
CEOs obtain various social connections and result in better access to external funds; 
therefore, firms managed by CEOs with more diverse career experience tend to 
demonstrate lower investment-cash flow sensitivity and raise more external funds such 
as bank loans and trade credit.  
More recent studies have examined the impacts of career variety on corporate 
strategies. The wide range of career experience broadens an individual’s cognitive 
breadth. As individuals progress through their careers, they encounter various business 
situations and work in different functions, organisations, and business environment, 
which helps them gain a broad array of experience and cognitive ability from which they 
may subsequently draw (Dragoni et al. 2011; Tesluk and Jacobs 1998). Therefore, CEOs 
with more general managerial ability may develop greater cognitive breadth for handling 
business situations, while CEOs with specialist managerial ability may prefer to follow 
more mainstream managerial actions. For instance, Hitt and Tyler (1991) find that 
executives with more diverse functional experience tend to adopt more criteria to assess 
acquisition targets. Hambrick et al. (1993) suggest that varied career experience makes 
CEOs less psychologically committed to current firm strategies. Dragoni et al. (2011) 
posit that the variety of managerial experience induces executives to analyse business 
situations from multiple perspectives to address problems. 
The breadth of work experience that CEOs have engaged in over the course of 
their careers reflects their motivations and personality. Crossland et al. (2014) find that 
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CEO career variety including professional and institutional experience is positively linked 
with both strategic dynamism, which refers to the degree of change in a firm’s allocation 
of resources over time, and distinctiveness, which relates to the extent of the difference 
between the firm and the industry average. Furthermore, there are differences in 
personality of CEOs who undergo many career changes such as risk propensity 
(Vardaman et al. 2008; Nicholson et al. 2005) and openness to experiences (Zimmerman 
2008; Boudreau et al. 2001).  
In addition, Mishra (2014) argues that CEOs with more general managerial skills 
possess greater human capital, have lower incentives to reduce risks, and raise agency 
issues compared with specialist CEOs. Varied career experiences also broaden their social 
connections and professional networks (Hu and Liu 2015; Campion et al. 1994). 
 
4.2.3. IPO survival 
Extant empirical evidence from both the US and international IPO markets 
suggests that although IPO firms often offer substantial initial returns, they show poor 
long-run operating and investment performance with almost 30% of firms either failing 
or being acquired in five years subsequent to the offering (Jain and Kini 2008) (see Ritter 
(2003), Ritter and Welch (2002), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Loughran et al. (1994) 
for a review of the US and international evidence on the phenomena). In the transition 
from private to public ownership, issuing firms face various challenges such as changes 
in ownership structure, governance mechanisms, more stringent scrutiny from capital 
market participants, analysts and regulators, increased market competition, and 
technological change (Jain and Kini 2008; Jain and Kini 2000). All of these challenges 
can threaten IPO firms’ survival.  
Research in this area has mainly concentrated on the role of firm and offering 
characteristics in determining survival profiles of IPO firms. For example, Schultz (1993) 
documents that underwriter prestige significantly reduces the probability of delisting. 
Hensler et al. (1997) find that the survival time for IPO firms increases with firm age, 
firm size, underpricing, IPO activity level, and the proportion of insider ownership, while 
the survival time decreases with the market level at the time of the issue and the number 
of risk factors. Willenborg and McKeown (2000) document that IPO issuers receiving an 
audit qualification about going-concern during the offering are more likely to be delisted 
for negative reasons within two years after the IPO. Jain and Kini (2000) document that 
the involvement of venture capitalists enhances the future survivability of IPO firms. 
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Weber and Willenborg (2003) show that auditor reports of big N auditors on smaller IPO 
firms tend to be predictive of involuntary delisting in the post-issue period. Jain and 
Martin (2005) suggest that IPO firms audited by high-quality auditors survive longer in 
the periods after the listing. Demers and Joos (2007) provide evidence that the presence 
of experienced auditors in the year before the IPO is related to a lower probability of IPO 
failure for high-tech IPO firms. Charitou et al. (2007) suggest that firms with more 
efficient boards have a lower likelihood of being involuntary delisted. Jain and Kini 
(2008) suggest that managerial strategic investment decisions influence the survival of 
newly public firms; particularly, managerial commitment to R&D and product 
diversification in the pre-issue period is positively associated with the probability of 
survival of IPO firms. Alhadab et al. (2014) show that IPO firms with high levels of real 
and/or accrual earnings management in the offering year tend to have a higher probability 
of failure and lower survival rates in post-issue periods.  
While prior studies have investigated firm and offering characteristics influencing 
IPO performance and survival, the extant literature provides few insights on the impact 
of CEOs on the probability of IPO firm survival. CEOs play a major role in the decision-
making process of organisational strategies. They are responsible for making important 
strategic corporate decisions to enable the firm to capitalise on post-IPO opportunities 
and ensure survival and growth. As reviewed previously, the heterogeneity in CEOs’ 
lifetime career experience can explain the differences in corporate behaviours and 
outcomes. Therefore, I aim to investigate whether the extent of work histories influences 
the probability of IPO firms to survive longer in the future. Prior literature has attempted 
to examine various aspects of executives’ experience in functional areas, firms, and 
industries to capture the differences among different institutional and occupational 
contexts (for example, Mishra (2014), Crossland et al. (2014), Custódio and Metzger 
(2014), Custódio and Metzger (2013), Custódio et al. (2013), Bunderson and Sutcliffe 
(2002)). I follow Custódio et al. (2013) and construct a proxy for general managerial 
ability of a CEO based on five aspects of his or her past work experience: functional 
positions, firms, industry sectors, CEO experience in another firm, and experience in a 
conglomerate firm. Further details on how I arrive at the construct are explained in 
Section 4.4. 
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4.3. Hypothesis development 
Prior literature provides several empirical evidence of the influence of CEOs’ 
work experience on corporate strategies; however, the study of CEO specialism on the 
survival outcome of firms remains unexplored. Following Custódio et al. (2013), the 
general managerial ability of CEOs is defined as a set of knowledge, skills, and 
experience acquired through employment histories, particularly obtained in a wide array 
of functional positions, firms, industry sectors, CEO experience in other firms, and 
experience in conglomerates. General managerial ability provides CEOs with smoother 
mobility across firms and industries. This ability may be preferred by firms that are 
conglomerates (Xuan 2009), facing changes in the product market (Hubbard and Palia 
1995), technology, and management practices (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006), 
undergoing restructuring and acquisitions, experiencing surges in M&A activities, and 
facing industry shocks and operational distress (Custódio et al. 2013). As opposed to 
general managerial ability, specialist managerial ability refers to more focused experience 
gained from a limited number of functional roles, firms, and industry sectors. The skill 
set is not instantly transferable across firms and industries and may be desirable within a 
particular firm and industry.  
Generalist CEOs may have different incentives from specialist CEOs. Generalist 
CEOs tend to have less risk-taking incentives than specialist CEOs (Mishra 2014). They 
are more likely to take advantage of a promising job market and undertake job-hopping 
(Giannetti 2011). They also tend to feature more prominently in executive search 
companies’ databases and be more easily recruited (Dasgupta and Ding 2010). Thus, they 
have lower risks of being unemployed and their long-term wealth is less dependent on the 
future of the firm that they manage. On the contrary, specialist CEOs with work 
experience concentrated on a particular type of firm or industry may have more limited 
choices in switching firms and may have a harder time in getting offers from other firms. 
Hence, their long-term wealth highly depends on the performance and viability of the 
firm they lead. Specialist CEOs also face greater career concerns. Due to lesser job 
mobility across firms and industries, the poor performance of the firm will reflect worse 
on specialist CEOs’ employment histories and adversely affect their future employability. 
Additionally, Crossland et al. (2014) argue that CEOs with high-variety of career 
experience tend to favour experimentation and change, while those with low-variety of 
career experience tend to prefer stability and incrementalism. Thus, if the incentives of a 
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generalist CEO is misaligned with the firm, adopting changes and novel strategies that 
involve a great deal of uncertainties and risks may be counter-productive and result in 
failure in the future. On the other hand, specialist CEOs with tighter connection with the 
firm may have more internal orientation and implement more stability approach to ensure 
the firm’s longevity. In addition, generalist CEOs may attempt to signal to the market that 
they are high-quality managers and have superior ability by pursuing riskier strategies. 
Therefore, I argue that generalist CEOs may have stronger incentives to focus more on 
short-term performance and pursue risky projects without concerning about the 
consequences of such strategies on the long-term viability of the firm. The incentives of 
generalist CEOs may be misaligned with those of the firm, and such misalignment is 
exacerbated with a high level of agency problem inherent in the IPO market. On the other 
hand, since the long-term interests of specialist CEOs tend to be more closely tied to the 
long-term performance of the firm, they have stronger incentives to adopt strategies to 
ensure that the firm remains viable, grow and survive in the long-term. 
Moreover, the IPO firm’s survival is likely to be influenced by the fit between 
strategies implemented and competitive environment of the firm (Jain and Kini 2008). 
CEOs are mainly responsible for making corporate decisions; thus, they can influence 
strategic resource allocation choices that can result in competitive advantages, thereby, 
influencing survival time in the post-issue period. The on-going involvement in a specific 
firm and industry equips specialist CEOs with more industry expertise and thorough 
understanding of the firm’s business situations. Therefore, they are expected to make 
more proper resource allocation decisions that are best suited for the market conditions 
of a particular IPO firm and help the firm adjust to various structural changes that result 
from going public. In addition, CEOs’ past work experience constitutes valuable 
organisational resources. The long-established reputation of specialist CEOs among 
customers and suppliers will help the firm maintain close business relationships and 
provide indirect financial support when the firm experiences a shortage of working 
capital.  
The above arguments lead us to expect that specialist CEOs – as opposed to 
generalist CEOs - will significantly make positive contributions to the survivability of 
IPO firms. I pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: IPO firms with specialist CEOs are more likely to have a lower 
probability of failure and longer time to survive. 
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4.4. Sample and data 
4.4.1. Sample selection 
I construct the initial sample of common share US IPOs from 1st January 1999 to 
31st December 200915 from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) New Issues database. 
Following prior IPO literature, I exclude IPOs which have offer prices less than five 
dollars a share, spin-offs, privatisations, American depositary receipts (ADRs), leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offerings, rights issues, 
limited partnerships, closed-end funds, and financial institutions. 
I obtain financial data on Compustat, stock prices and delist information on the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I gather detailed biographical information 
of CEOs from BoardEx to extract data on CEOs’ characteristics and work experience. I 
also complement my dataset with information on share ownership and executive 
compensation which is manually collected from S-1 filings available on SEC’s EDGAR 
database. I require data availability for all observations. After merging the databases and 
removing observations with missing values, the final sample consists of 722 IPO firms. 
I track each firm on CRSP from the IPO date until the delisting date or the end of 
2014, whichever is earlier. CRSP provides codes to indicate the status of the issuing firm, 
specifically, whether the firm is still trading and specific reasons for delisting such as 
failure to meet listing standards, corporate governance violation, liquidation, insufficient 
capital, and bankruptcy. Following prior research (for example, Alhadab et al. (2014), 
Ahmad and Jelic (2014), Espenlaub et al. (2012), Jain and Kini (2008), Demers and Joos 
(2007), Jain and Martin (2005), Jain and Kini (2000)), I define failures as IPO firms that 
are involuntarily delisted (i.e., delisted for negative reasons). Based on CRSP delist codes, 
I categorise IPO firms into three groups: survived, acquired, and failed firms. All firms 
that are still trading (i.e., delist code of 100) at the end of 2014 are classified as survived 
firms. I separate delisted firms into two groups: acquired versus failed. Acquired firms 
consist of firms acquired in mergers, which have a delist code from 200 to 299. Failed 
firms include firms with a delist code greater than or equal to 300. These firms are delisted 
due to various negative reasons such as financial distress, liquidation, and failure to meet 
listing standards. My sample of 722 IPOs is comprised of 297 survived firms, 342 
acquired firms, and 83 failed firms.  
                                                          
15 Data coverage of BoardEx is from 1997; however, the coverage of U.S. public companies is extremely limited prior 
to 2000. Therefore, I start my sample in 2000. My sample ends in 2009 because I require five years of post-issue data 
to assess the survival profiles of issuing firms. 
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To create a proxy for a CEO’s general managerial ability, I extract the information 
on work histories of the CEO before rising to the current position on BoardEx. I follow 
Custódio et al. (2013) to use principal component analysis to construct a general 
managerial ability index based on the CEO’s lifetime work experience. This method is 
also employed by Mishra (2014) to investigate CEOs’ general managerial skills. The 
index is the first factor of applying the principal component analysis to five proxies of 
general managerial ability based on  a CEO’s work experience before being appointed to 
the CEO position: the number of roles the CEO held, the number of firms the CEO worked 
for, the number of industries the CEO worked in, CEO experience at another firm, and 
experience in a conglomerate. A higher index refers to a greater degree of general 
managerial ability. This approach reduces measurement errors and enhances the power 
of the regression tests by mitigating the multicollinearity issue from using each of the five 
proxies (Custódio et al. 2013). This index emphasises external career mobility across 
industries and firms instead of internal mobility within a firm. This is relevant to my 
analysis since external recruitment is the recent trend observed in the executive labour 
market; thus, I want to focus on external mobility rather than internal mobility. The index 
summarises information on the general managerial ability of a CEO and allows me to 
classify a CEO as a generalist or a specialist. A CEO is categorised as a specialist if his 
or her general managerial ability index is below the sample median and as a generalist if 
the index is equal to or above the sample median. 
 
4.4.2. Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 provides the definition of all variables used in my analysis. All the 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the issue of 
outliers. 
Table 4.2 presents the distribution by year and industry for three groups of IPO 
firms: failed, acquired, and survived. Panel A shows the distribution by group of IPOs 
from 1999 to 2009. Tracking IPO firms in my sample from the offering date to the end of 
2014, 41.13% of firms survive, 47.37% are acquired, and 11.50% fail. Tracking the firms 
for five years after the issue date, 63.99% of firms survive, 28.53% are acquired, and 
7.48% fail.  
Panel B shows the distribution by issue year for the whole sample and each of the 
three groups of IPO firms. There is a high volume of IPOs during 1999-2000. However, 
the stock market crashes in 2001 following the collapse of the Dot-com bubble 
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considerably reduce the number of IPO deals being initiated in this period. The IPO 
market gradually rebounds from 2004 to 2007 before crashing once more due to the 2008 
financial crisis. Thus, there is a clustering of IPOs in the period of 1999-2000 and 2004-
2007. The percentage of firms being delisted for negative reasons within five years after 
the issue is highest for IPOs in 1999 and 2008 (nearly 15%). The percentage of firms that 
survive in five years after the offering is lowest for IPOs in 1999 (almost 47%). IPOs in 
1999 also have the most percentage of firms being acquired in five years after the issue 
(around 38%). These figures are consistent with the economic situations in those years. 
The financial crises have an adverse impact on the survivability of IPO firms.   
Panel C displays the distribution by industry for the overall sample and each of 
the three groups of IPO firms. The industry is classified by its two-digit SIC code. In the 
overall sample, IPOs cluster in high growth industries that develop high technological 
products including chemical products, computer equipment and services, electronic 
equipment, and scientific instruments. Chemical products and computer equipment and 
services are also the industries with the most number of firms being delisted for negative 
reasons within five years after the issue, the percentage of IPO failures in these industries 
is approximately 8%. The industries with the highest percentage of failed firms are food 
products (20%) and manufacturing industries (23.53%). Thus, these industries also have 
the lowest percentages of firms that survive in the post-issue period (ranging from 55% 
to 60%). The proportion of IPOs being acquired subsequent to the offering is highest 
among high-tech industries including computer equipment and services, electronic 
equipment, and scientific instruments (more than 30%). This makes sense because these 
firms tend to be high-tech start-up companies with high growth, making them attractive 
acquisition targets. Oil and gas sector appears to be the most stable industry with a low 
percentage of IPO failure (4.55%) and a high proportion of IPO survival (86.36%).  
Table 4.3 illustrates the survival distribution by year of issue and industry of the 
two groups of IPO firms: those with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs. The 
survival profiles of IPO firms are examined for five years following the offering. Panel 
A provides the comparison between IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with 
generalist CEOs during each year of the sample period regarding the number and 
percentage of firms as well as the cumulative number and percentage of firms that fail 
from one to five years after going public. For each year of the sample period, there are 
differences in the proportion of firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist 
CEOs.  From 1999 to 2002, the percentage of IPO firms with generalist CEOs increase 
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steadily from approximately 50% in 1999 to nearly 65% in 2000, and to more than 75% 
in 2002.  However, from 2003, IPO firms with specialist CEOs account for a greater 
proportion, with the yearly percentage ranging from 50% to 65%. This pattern is 
indicative of the greater appreciation of CEOs’ specialist skills and experience among 
IPO firms. Regarding the failure rate, the five-year cumulative failure rates by year of 
issue of firms with specialist CEOs are lower than the failure rates of firms with generalist 
CEOs in most years. For the overall sample, the cumulative percentage of firms failing 
within five years after the offering is 5.56% for IPO firms with specialist CEOs compared 
to 9.37% for issuers with generalist CEOs.  
Panel B provides the comparison of the distribution and failure rates of IPO firms 
with specialist CEOs versus those with generalist CEOs by industry. Among all sectors, 
the five-year failure rates of IPO firms with specialist CEOs are lower than those of 
issuing firms with generalist CEOs except for manufacturing, food products, and oil and 
gas industries. Specialist CEOs have more presence in manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade sectors, and particularly, industries that develop high technological products 
such as chemical products, computer equipment and services, and electronic equipment. 
The five-year cumulative failure rates of IPO firms with specialist CEOs are lower than 
the rates of firms with generalist CEOs in these industries except for manufacturing 
sector. Overall, the results so far have suggested that IPO firms with specialist CEOs tend 
to have a lower failure rate than those with generalist CEOs. 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analyses. Panel A presents the summary statistics of CEOs’ lifetime work experience. In 
the overall sample, on average, a CEO worked in five different functional areas, five 
firms, and nearly two industries before becoming the CEO of the current firm. In addition, 
52% of CEOs had CEO experience in another firm and 37% used to work for a 
conglomerate firm. In general, a specialist CEO used to hold approximately three 
different roles and work for around three employers in one industry. 33% of specialist 
CEOs used to be a CEO in a different firm, and 13% had career experience in a 
conglomerate. Generalist CEOs gained experience through nearly seven different 
positions, seven firms, and two industries. 70% of generalist CEOs had CEO experience 
in other firms and 61% worked for a conglomerate.  
Panel B provides the summary statistics of CEO characteristics for the overall 
sample and a comparison between specialist CEOs and generalist CEOs. In the whole 
sample, on average, a CEO is approximately 50 years old and has been working for the 
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firm for nearly 4.5 years. Only 3% of all CEOs are female, 27% are recruited internally, 
37% are in a dual position of both a CEO and a chairman of the board, and 27% are also 
a founder of the firm. The mean share ownership of a CEO is 12.63%. Regarding 
compensation, a CEO earns annually an average of 660 thousand dollars in cash 
compensation, 690 thousand dollars in equity compensation, and nearly 1.7 million 
dollars in total compensation. Concerning education, 26% of CEOs have an MBA, 10% 
have a Ph.D., and 17% graduated from an Ivy League institution. Specialist CEOs are 
significantly different from generalist CEOs in all characteristics examined except for the 
gender and cash compensation. The majority of specialist and generalist CEOs are male, 
and the average cash compensation is not significantly different among the two types of 
CEOs. In comparison between specialist and generalist CEOs, on average, specialist 
CEOs are younger and have spent more time of his career with the current firm. The mean 
age of a specialist CEO is around 48, and that of a generalist CEO is nearly 51. The 
average length of time a specialist CEO has served the firm is approximately five years, 
which is one year longer than the average tenure of a generalist CEO. A higher percentage 
of specialist CEOs are hired internally than that of generalist CEOs (29% and 24% 
respectively). Moreover, specialist CEOs are more likely to hold dual positions of a CEO 
and a chairman of the board (39% of specialist CEOs are also a chairman compared with 
34% of generalist CEOs). The percentage of specialist CEOs who are also a founder 
(35%) is almost double that of generalist CEOs (20%). Specialist CEOs also have 
significantly higher share ownership than generalist CEOs (around 14% for specialist 
CEOs and 11.5% for generalist CEOs). In terms of compensation, while cash 
compensation is not significantly different between the two groups of CEOs, equity 
compensation and total compensation are significantly higher for generalist CEOs than 
specialist CEOs. The average equity compensation of a generalist CEO is approximately 
830 thousand dollars, while that of a specialist CEO is approximately 554 thousand 
dollars. The average total compensation of a generalist CEO is around 1.87 million 
dollars, while that of a specialist CEO is around 1.47 million dollars. This is consistent 
with the findings by Custódio et al. (2013) that generalist CEOs are paid significantly 
higher than specialist CEOs. With regard to education, significantly more generalist 
CEOs (30%) hold an MBA compared to specialist CEOs (23%). However, for a more 
specialised degree like a Ph.D., the percentage of specialist CEOs pursued this degree 
(13%) is significantly higher than that of generalist CEOs (8%). In addition, a greater 
proportion of generalist CEOs (21%) are Ivy League alumnus than that of specialist CEOs 
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(14%). The longer tenure and higher percentage of share ownership of specialist CEOs, 
and the greater proportion of specialist CEOs holding simultaneously the position of a 
founder of the firm or a chairman of the board indicate that specialist CEOs tend to have 
a stronger tie with the firm than generalist CEOs. This evidence strengthens my argument 
that specialist CEOs may have more incentives to ensure the firm’s survivability in the 
future since their wealth is more contingent on the firm’s performance and longevity. 
Panel C presents the firm and offering characteristics for the overall sample and 
the two sub-samples of IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs. 
The significance of the mean difference between these two groups is also reported. In 
general, IPO firms are quite young and small with the mean firm age of approximately 
17 years and the average sales of around 400 million dollars. They have an average loss 
of 3% and the mean leverage ratio of 0.14. The mean number of business segments in 
which IPO firms operate is 1.38, indicating that IPO firms generally exhibit a low degree 
of diversification. IPO issuers allocate resources considerably in R&D and capital 
investments with the mean R&D and capital expenditure intensity of 10% and 6% 
respectively; meanwhile, the mean advertising intensity is merely 2%. IPO issuers raise 
an average of approximately 145 million dollars in the offering. They have the mean 
initial returns of 28% and the mean market to book of 4.12. Around half of IPO firms are 
underwritten by top-tier investment banks, 57% venture backed, and 92% audited by a 
big four auditor. 45% of IPO firms are in the high-tech industry. Concerning delisting 
events, on average, 7% of IPO firms are delisted due to negative reasons within five years 
after the offering. IPO firms with specialist CEOs are significantly different from those 
with generalist CEOs in most of the firm and offering characteristics. On average, IPO 
firms with generalist CEOs are more established with nearly 19 years in operation 
compared to 16 years for firms with specialist CEOs. The average sales of firms with 
generalist CEOs (approximately 526 million dollars) nearly double that of firms with 
specialist CEOs (roughly 277 million dollars). The mean number of business segments is 
1.52 for firms with generalist CEOs and 1.24 for firms with specialist CEOs. The proceeds 
raised in the IPO by issuers with generalist CEOs (around 170 million dollars) are 
significantly higher than by firms with specialist CEOs (around 119 million dollars). The 
finding that firms with generalist CEOs are larger and more diversified than those with 
specialist CEOs is consistent with the literature. Custódio et al. (2013) show that 
generalist CEOs are preferred in multi-segment firms that are expected to have more 
complex operations. Investment policies including R&D, advertising intensity and capital 
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investments are not significantly different between the two groups. In addition, firms with 
specialist CEOs are more profitable (profitability ratio of -0.01) and less leveraged 
(leverage ratio of 0.13) than firms with generalist CEOs (profitability ratio of -0.05 and 
leverage ratio of 0.16). The mean percentage of firms being underwritten by reputable 
investment banks is higher for issuers with generalist CEOs (54%) than those with 
specialist CEOs (49%). Notably, IPOs with specialist CEOs are less underpriced than 
those with generalist CEOs (the initial returns of 24% for firms with specialist CEOs and 
32% for those with generalist CEOs). This evidence supports the argument of Mishra 
(2014) that CEOs with higher general managerial ability may result in higher agency 
problems due to different risk-taking incentives; thus, investors require higher returns to 
compensate for increased uncertainties they may face. The two groups of IPO firms are 
not significantly different in the market-to-book ratio, and the percentage of firms 
receiving venture capital financing, being audited by a big four accounting firm, and being 
in the high-tech industry. Regarding the delisting incident, 9% of IPO firms with 
generalist CEOs are delisted due to negative reasons within five years after the issue, 
which is significantly higher than the percentage of IPO firms with specialist CEOs being 
involuntarily delisted (6%). Table 4.5 provides the correlation matrix of variables used in 
the analysis. No multicollinearity is detected among those variables. 
 
4.5. Empirical analysis of the impact of specialist CEOs on IPO 
survival 
4.5.1. Survival analysis methodology 
Survival analysis is a statistical technique that has been used extensively in prior 
research to examine determinants of IPO survivability (e.g., Alhadab et al. (2014), 
Espenlaub et al. (2012), Gerakos et al. (2013), Carpentier and Suret (2011), Jain and 
Martin (2005), Fama and French (2004), Jain and Kini (2000), Hensler et al. (1997)). The 
primary benefit of survival analysis over regression analyses such as cross-sectional 
logistic models lies in its ability to account for both event occurrence and time to the 
event. In addition, survival analysis is also useful in examining censored data and time-
series data with different time horizons (Shumway 2001; LeClere 2000), which are both 
characteristics of the IPO market. The survival time of IPO firms is right censored because 
many firms do not encounter failure for the duration of the study. The time window is 
different for each firm depending on the IPO date. For example, in my analysis, IPO firms 
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are tracked until the end of 2014. Thus, a firm that went public in 1999 is tracked for 15 
years compared to 5 years for a firm that went public in 2009.  
In analysing the association between specialist CEOs and IPO survival, I employ 
both nonparametric and semiparametric approaches. Nonparametric estimates of hazard 
and survival functions allow us to compare the failure risk and survival rates of IPO firms 
with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs, thereby, determining whether 
specialist CEOs improve the survival profiles of IPO issuing firms. The hazard function 
provides the conditional probability of failure given that the firm has survived up to the 
specified time. If the management of specialist CEOs reduces the failure risk, the hazard 
function for IPO firms with specialist CEOs will mainly remain below that of IPO firms 
with generalist CEOs. I estimate the hazard functions for the two groups of IPO firms 
using the Nelson-Aalen estimator, which is defined as: 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑛𝑖
𝑡𝑖≤𝑡
 
(4.1) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the number of failed firms at time 𝑡𝑖, and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of firms that are 
still trading at time 𝑡𝑖. 
The survival function provides the probability that the firm survives up to a 
particular time. If the management of specialist CEOs enhances the survivability of 
issuing firms, I expect that the survival function curve of issuers with specialist CEOs 
will be above that of firms with generalist CEOs. I estimate the survival function of the 
two groups of IPO firms using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which is defined as: 
 
?̂?(𝑡) = ∏
𝑛𝑖 − 𝑑𝑖
𝑛𝑖
𝑡𝑖≤𝑡
 
(4.2) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the number of failed firms at time 𝑡𝑖, and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of firms that are 
still trading at time 𝑡𝑖. In addition, I use the log-rank test to examine the difference 
between the estimated survival curves of IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with 
generalist CEOs.  
With regard to semiparametric approach, I employ Cox proportional hazards 
model. The primary advantage of the Cox proportional hazards model over other hazard 
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models is that the baseline hazard function does not have to be pre-specified and can take 
any functional form (Allison 2000). In addition, no assumption needs to be made about 
the distribution of event dates (Alhadab et al. 2014). I estimate the Cox proportional 
hazards model as follows: 
 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp [𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑝 − 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑖𝑔4 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐶𝐸𝑂 − 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑂 −
𝐹𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠] 
(4.3) 
 
where ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function, and 𝑡 is the time to failure (i.e., the duration 
to the delisting date). The dependent variable indicates the failure risk; thus, a positive 
(negative) coefficient suggests that failure is more (less) likely to happen and the survival 
time is shorter (longer). The hazard ratio for each independent variable is computed as 
the exponentiated coefficient for the variable. It measures the increase in the failure risk 
for a unit increase in the value of the independent variable. For indicator variables, the 
risk ratio is the ratio of the estimated hazard for those with the value of one to the 
estimated hazard for those with the value of zero. For continuous variables, the estimated 
change in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the independent variable is 100*(hazard 
ratio – 1) (Alhadab et al. 2014; Jain and Martin 2005; Allison 2000). 
The main variable of interest is Specialist CEO which indicates whether the CEO 
has specialist managerial ability. I control for various firm and offering characteristics 
that are suggested by prior literature as determinants of IPO survival. I include variables 
Log(firm age), Log(sales), Log(proceeds) and Initial returns to control for the positive 
effects of firm age, firm size, and underpricing on IPO survival as documented by Hensler 
et al. (1997). Schultz (1993) finds the positive association between reputable underwriters 
and IPO survival. Jain and Kini (2000) indicate that the involvement of venture capitalists 
in the IPO process improves the survival profile of IPO firms. Jain and Martin (2005) 
document that IPO firms audited by high-quality auditors survive longer in the following 
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years. To capture the impacts of these financial intermediaries on IPO survival, I include 
indicator variables Top-tier underwriter, Venture capitalist, and Big4 auditor. Moreover, 
I add the variable Leverage to control for the firm’s leverage based on the finding of 
Demers and Joos (2007) that the leverage ratio of IPO firms is positively related to the 
probability of failure. Additionally, Jain and Kini (2008) argue that managers’ strategic 
investment choices at the time of the IPO may influence the post-issue performance of 
IPO firms; particularly, the probability of IPO survival is positively associated with R&D 
intensity and product diversification. I control for the effects of managerial strategic 
investment decisions by adding variables indicating strategic investments of the firm, 
namely R&D, Advertising, Capital expenditure, and Diversification. Furthermore, I 
include controls for firm profitability and growth opportunity which are proxied by the 
book-to-market ratio as suggested by Alhadab et al. (2014). In addition, I control for the 
structural power of the CEO by adding variables CEO-Chairman and CEO-Founder. 
Since there may be differences in survival profiles of IPO firms in different industries and 
years, I also add to the model industry and year fixed effects. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in Table 4.1. 
 
4.5.2. Empirical results 
4.5.2.1. Analysis of hazard and survival curves 
First of all, I examine the nonparametric estimates of the survival distributions of 
the IPO sample. The hazard and survival functions for both groups of IPO firms with 
specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs are estimated. The plots of Nelson-Aalen 
cumulative hazard estimates and Kaplan-Meier survival estimates are provided in Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2 respectively. In Figure 4.1, the hazard function of IPO firms with 
specialist CEOs is below that of firms with generalist CEOs. The gap widens as the length 
of time after the issue increases. On the contrary, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, the survival 
function of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is above that of the firms with generalist 
CEOs. The longer the time elapses after the issue, the broader the gap between survival 
functions of the two groups of firms. I also provide the list of survival functions. The 
probability of surviving five years after the issue is 93.8% for firms with specialist CEOs, 
compared to 88.6% for firms with generalist CEOs. The survival probability after ten 
years after the IPO decreases considerably for firms with generalist CEOs to 79.3%, while 
this probability is 88.1% for firms with specialist CEOs. In addition, the log-rank test for 
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the equality of survival functions shows that the estimated survival curves of the two 
groups are different at the 1% significance level. Therefore, the plots of hazard and 
survival functions demonstrate that IPO firms with specialist CEOs have a higher survival 
profile and a lower risk profile compared to firms with generalist CEOs. Overall, the 
nonparametric approach of the survival analysis provides evidence that specialist CEOs 
can improve the survival profiles of IPO issuers. 
 
4.5.2.2. Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model of the 
probability of failure and time-to-failure which assesses the impact of specialist CEOs on 
IPO survival after controlling for various offering and firm factors influencing the 
survivability. I report the results of several model specifications. 
In Specification (1), the main variable of interest is the dummy variable Specialist 
CEO indicating whether the CEO is a specialist. The coefficient on Specialist CEO is 
negative and significant at the 1% level, indicating that IPO firms with specialist CEOs 
have a lower probability of failure and longer survival time in the periods following the 
offering. This result is consistent with the previous finding in the nonparametric analysis 
discussed in Section 4.5.2.1 that IPO firms with specialist CEOs survive for a longer 
period than those with generalist CEOs. The risk ratio of 0.351 suggests that the failure 
risk of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is 35.1% of the failure risk of IPO firms with 
generalist CEOs.  
Specifications (2) to (7) estimate the same regressions as Specification (1) but 
using the General ability index, and five individual measures of general managerial skills 
employed to generate the index, namely, Number of roles, Number of firms, Number of 
industries, CEO experience dummy, and Conglomerate experience dummy. I find a 
positive and significant coefficients on all those variables. This suggests that IPO firms 
led by CEOs who possess more general managerial ability in terms of more varied 
experience in different roles, firms, and industries have a higher probability of failure and 
shorter time to survive. The risk ratio of 1.443 of the variable General ability index 
suggests that for each unit increase in the general ability index, the failure risk of the firm 
increases by 44.3%. The variables Number of roles, Number of firms, and Number of 
industries have the risk ratios of 1.217, 1.157, and 1.314 respectively. This implies that 
for each additional number of roles, firms, and industries in which the CEO has worked, 
the failure risks of the firm increase by 21.7%, 15.7% and 31.4% respectively. Thus, the 
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variety of industry experience has a stronger impact on the failure risks of IPO firms 
compared to the variety of experience in functional roles and firms. The variables CEO 
experience dummy and Conglomerate experience dummy have the risk ratios of 1.717 and 
1.634 respectively. This suggests that the failure risks of firms whose CEOs used to 
worked as a CEO in other firms and have prior experience in a conglomerate are 172% 
and 163% the failure risks of firms whose CEOs do not have such experience.  
The coefficients on control variables are consistent across all specifications. In 
general, the signs of the control variables are in line with prior literature. Specifically, 
more profitable, and higher growth IPO firms tend to have a lower probability of failure 
and longer time to survive. However, firms with higher underpricing and leverage ratios 
have a higher likelihood of delisting in subsequent periods and survive for a shorter time. 
I do not find a significant association between strategic investment decisions including 
R&D, capital expenditure, and diversification and IPO survival. The coefficient on 
Advertising is just marginally significant. Moreover, the mean values of R&D, 
Advertising, and Capital expenditure presented in Table 4.4 do not show significant 
differences between IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs. 
Therefore, it appears that specialist CEOs influence the survival of IPO firms through a 
different channel other than strategic investment decisions such as R&D, advertising, 
capital expenditure, and diversification. Notably, the coefficient on Leverage is strongly 
significant at the 1% level across specifications. Additionally, the mean leverage is 
significantly different between IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist 
CEOs as described in Table 4.4. In line with my argument that specialist CEOs may be 
more risk-averse than generalist ones, specialist CEOs may want to reduce the firms’ 
overall risks through more conservative financial policies such as maintaining lower 
leverage ratios. The finding of  Hu and Liu (2015) also shows that CEOs with less diverse 
career experience are less likely to exploit external funds. Therefore, it is plausible that 
financial leverage may be one channel through which specialist CEOs influence IPO 
firms’ survival profiles. 
Overall, the results from both the nonparametric approach and the Cox 
proportional hazard model support the hypothesis that IPO firms with specialist CEOs 
tend to have a lower probability of failure and longer time to survive in subsequent periods 
following the offering. 
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4.6. Robustness checks 
4.6.1. Controlling for high-tech industries and crisis periods 
In the first set of robustness tests, I evaluate whether the relation between 
specialist CEOs and IPO survival differs depending on whether the firm belongs to high-
tech industries and whether the firm goes public during financial crisis periods. Firms in 
high-tech industries tend to have high growth, require continuous technological 
advancements, and face substantial competitiveness. Crisis periods put considerable 
financial constraints on the firm. Thus, high-tech industries and crisis periods may create 
more challenges for the job of a CEO, and require the CEO to make more careful 
consideration to decide the most plausible actions to help the firm to withstand 
competitive pressures and market shocks. Therefore, managerial discretion16 and job 
demands17, which are the two moderators of upper echelons predictions, may be different 
for IPO firms in high-tech industries and crisis periods. This may affect the influence of 
specialist CEOs on IPO survival. 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model controlling 
for high-tech industries. Specification (1) provides the results of the baseline Cox 
proportional hazard model (Equation 4.3) including the interaction effect between 
Specialist CEO and High-tech industry. The coefficient on Specialist CEO remains 
negative and significant, indicating that IPO firms led by specialist CEOs have a lower 
probability of failure and longer time to survive. Controlling for high-tech industries, the 
risk ratio of 0.537 suggests that the failure risk of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is 53.7% 
that of firms with generalist CEOs. The coefficient on the interaction term Specialist 
CEO*High-tech industry is not significant. This suggests that the influence of specialist 
CEOs on IPO survival is not significantly different between firms in the high-tech 
industries and those not. Specification (2) and (3) provide the results of the baseline Cox 
                                                          
16 The concept of managerial discretion is introduced by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) to reconcile two opposing 
views about the influence of top managers on corporate outcomes. One view supports the effects of top executives on 
organisational decisions; while the other view argues that organisations are inertial and constrained by external factors, 
conventions and norms. Discretion exists when constraint is absent and there are various plausible alternatives; and it 
comes from environmental conditions, organisational factors, and managers themselves (Hambrick 2007). The 
implication of managerial discretion for the upper echelons theory is that the influence of managerial characteristics on 
corporate strategies and performance is proportional to the magnitude of managerial discretion (Hambrick 2007). 
17 The concept of executive job demands is introduced by Hambrick et al. (2005). The difficulty level of executives’ 
job varies in different environments and business situations. Particularly, executive job demands come from task 
challenges, performance challenges and executive aspirations (Hambrick 2007). The implication of this moderator for 
the upper echelons theory is that the heavier job demands under which executives are, the more likely that executives 
rely on their past experience to find solutions to business problems; hence, the influence of managerial characteristics 
on their corporate strategic choices in the presence of increased job demands is stronger (Hambrick 2007). 
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proportional hazard model (Equation 4.3) performed on the sub-samples of IPO firms in 
high-tech industries and those not in high-tech industries. I still find that specialist CEOs 
improve the survival profiles of IPO firms. For IPO firms in high-tech industries, firms 
with specialist CEOs have the failure risk of 47.2% the failure risk of firms with generalist 
CEOs. For IPO firms not in high-tech industries, the failure risk of firms with specialist 
CEOs is 55.8% that of firms with generalist CEOs.  
Table 4.8 reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard model controlling for 
crisis periods. Specification (1) provides the results of the baseline Cox proportional 
hazard model (Equation 4.3) including the interaction effect between Specialist CEO and 
Crisis period. Consistent with the results reported in the main analysis, I find that having 
specialist CEOs is associated with a lower probability of failure and longer time to 
survive. Controlling for crisis periods, the risk ratio of 0.497 implies that the failure risk 
of firms with specialist CEOs is 49.7% that of issuers with generalist CEOs. The 
coefficient on the interaction term Specialist CEO*Crisis period is not significant. This 
means that the association between specialist CEOs and IPO firms’ survival profiles is 
not affected by crisis periods. I also re-estimate the Cox proportional hazard model 
(Equation 4.3) for the two sub-samples of IPO firms in the crisis periods and those not. I 
also find the negative linkage between specialist CEOs and the probability of failure for 
these sub-samples. IPO firms led by specialist CEOs in the crisis periods have the failure 
risk of 8.6% that of firms managed by generalist CEOs. The failure risk of IPO firms not 
in the crisis periods with specialist CEOs is 37.3% that of firms with generalist CEOs. 
Overall, the results reported in the main analysis still hold when I control for high-tech 
industries and crisis periods.  
 
4.6.2. Controlling for CEO power 
Adams et al. (2005) argue that more powerful CEOs tend to make decisions with 
extreme consequences; thus, firms whose CEOs have more power over the board are more 
likely to exhibit more variation in performance. The power of CEO may influence the 
association between specialist CEOs and IPO survival; hence, in my second set of 
robustness tests, I focus on whether my results are driven by CEOs’ decision-making 
power. I follow the literature on CEO power (e.g., Han et al. (2016), Jiraporn et al. (2014), 
Baldenius et al. (2014), Chikh and Filbien (2011), Liu and Jiraporn (2010); Adams et al. 
(2005)) and use four power dimensions suggested by Finkelstein (1992), namely, 
structural power, ownership power, expert power, and prestige power. As a proxy for 
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structural power, I use CEO-Chairman which indicates if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the board since CEO duality can be considered as the highest rank in the corporate 
hierarchy. As a proxy for ownership power, I use CEO-Founder which specifies if the 
CEO is also the founder of the firm, and CEO ownership which refers to the percentage 
of shares owned by the CEO. As a proxy for expert power, I use CEO tenure which shows 
the length of time the CEO has worked at the firm. Longer tenured CEOs tend to have 
more status and more experience with the company and its board. As a proxy for prestige 
power, I use Ivy League alumnus which indicates if the CEO graduated from an Ivy 
League institution. 
I then estimate a CEO power index as the first factor of applying principal 
component analysis to the five proxies of CEO power. I separate the sample into two 
groups based on the value of the CEO power index. CEOs are classified as powerful if 
their power index is greater than the sample median. Otherwise, I deem that they are less 
likely to be powerful. The dummy variable Powerful CEO indicates whether the CEO has 
decision-making power over the board of directors. The t-test of the difference in the 
mean of power score between specialist and generalist CEOs shows significant results, 
suggesting that,  on average, specialist CEOs are more powerful than generalist 
counterparts.  
Table 4.9 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model controlling 
for CEO power. In Specification (1), I include an interaction term between Specialist 
CEO and Powerful CEO to the baseline Cox model (Equation 4.3). I still find the 
significant and negative coefficient of Specialist CEO, indicating that specialist CEOs are 
associated with a lower probability of failure and longer time to survive. The coefficient 
on the interaction term is not significant. Thus, the influence of specialist CEOs on IPO 
survival does not differ depending on the magnitude of CEO power. Controlling for the 
effect of CEO power, the failure risk of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is 22.1% that of 
firms with generalist CEOs. Moreover, I partition my sample based on the degree of CEO 
power to investigate whether the impact of CEOs’ specialist experience on IPO survival 
varies across firms with CEOs of different power levels. Re-estimating the Cox 
proportional hazard model (Equation 4.3) on the two sub-samples of IPO firms with and 
without powerful CEOs provides us with similar results to the main finding. Specialist 
CEOs significantly reduce the probability of failure and increase the time to survive. 
Among IPO firms whose CEOs have more decision making power, those with specialist 
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CEOs have the failure risk of 34.8% the failure risk of those with generalist CEOs. This 
figure is only 7.3% among firms whose CEOs do not have much power over the board. 
 
4.6.3. Controlling for endogeneity   
First of all, I check if the influence of specialist CEOs on IPO survival is driven 
by CEO characteristics other than their past work experience. Thus, in addition to the 
control variables in the main hazard analysis, I include additional variables controlling 
for several observable executive characteristics based on prior literature. Previous 
empirical evidence suggests that strategic decision making may be influenced by CEO 
age, tenure, and education (Boeker 1997; Fondas and Wiersema 1997).  Age and tenure 
may also determine the risk attitudes of CEOs. As CEOs become older, their corporate 
risk-taking behaviours decrease, which, in turn, significantly influences firm performance 
(Serfling 2014). Moreover, CEOs who have worked for the firm for a longer time have 
lower incentives to establish a reputation and hence tend to be more risk-averse (Graham 
2013). There is also evidence for the association between ownership and compensation 
and strategic decision-making (for example, Sanders and Hambrick (2007), Goodstein 
and Boeker (1991); Sanders and Hambrick (2007)). Additionally, prior literature suggests 
the link between outsider CEOs and firm performance (Huson et al. 2001; Parrino 1997). 
Thus, I control for those CEO characteristics and include the following variables in the 
baseline Cox proportional hazard model (Equation 4.3): CEO age, CEO tenure, Internal 
hire, CEO ownership, Log(total compensation), MBA, Ph.D., Ivy League alumnus. The 
results demonstrate that specialist CEOs still significantly reduce failure risks after 
controlling for the impact of observable characteristics of CEOs. 
Moreover, it should be noted that a CEO may be selected due to the fit of the 
individual with the job requirements. A firm with particular characteristics may prefer to 
appoint a CEO with managerial characteristics that suit the firm’s organisational context.  
Thus, my results may be biased due to this selection problem. To address the endogenous 
matching between CEOs and firms, I employ the propensity score matching procedure. 
Using this method, I compare the occurrence of delisting within five years after the 
offering of an IPO firm with a specialist CEO with that of the same firm if it had appointed 
a generalist CEO. Initially, I measure the propensity score, which is the conditional 
probability of receiving the treatment (having a specialist CEO) given the firm’s pre-
treatment characteristics, for all of the IPO firms by estimating a probit regression for the 
probability of firms appointing a specialist CEO based on various observable CEO, firm, 
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and industry characteristics. Based on the propensity score, I match each observation in 
the treated group with the control group and estimate the average effect of the treatment 
on the treated (ATET) to evaluate the effect of specialist CEOs on the occurrence of 
delisting. Table 4.11 presents the results for the ATET on the occurrence of delisting for 
IPO firms with specialist CEOs and those with generalist CEOs. The matching variables 
include Log(firm age), Log(sales), Top-tier underwriter, ROA, R&D, Advertising, Capital 
expenditure, Diversification, CEO-Founder, CEO-Chairman, High-tech industry, and 
Year dummies. The ATET is negative and strongly significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that IPO firms with specialist CEOs are less likely to be delisted in subsequent periods. 
This finding is consistent with the results presented in the main analysis. 
 
4.6.4. Other robustness checks 
In the main analysis, I define failed firms as those that are delisted due to negative 
reasons. For robustness, I check if my results are sensitive to the inclusion of acquired 
firms in the failure category by re-estimating the Cox model (Equation 4.3) in which 
failed firms include IPO firms that are delisted from the stock exchanges due to both 
negative reasons and acquisitions. I include acquired firms in the category of failed firms 
because earlier studies suggest that these firms appear to experience financial distress 
(Jain and Kini 2000; Welbourne and Andrews 1996). In addition, I also check the 
robustness of the results on the sample of IPO firms that do not have CEO turnovers 
within five years after the offering. The results are reported in Table 4.12 and consistent 
with the earlier findings that the management of specialist CEOs improves the survival 
profiles of IPO issuers.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
In this study, I examine whether past work experience of CEOs is associated with 
the probability of IPO failure and survivability in post-issue periods. Analysing detailed 
biographical information of CEOs, I generate a general ability index as the first factor of 
applying the principal component analysis to five proxies of managerial general ability 
including the number of positions which the CEO has held, the number of firms by which 
the CEO has been employed, the number of industry sectors in which the CEO has 
worked, whether the CEO has experience as a CEO in other firms, and whether the CEO 
used to work in a conglomerate firm. Based on the general ability index, I categorise IPO 
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firms’ CEOs into specialist CEOs and generalist CEOs. Consistent with the prediction of 
upper echelons theory that past managerial experience can influence corporate outcomes, 
I find that CEOs who have specialist managerial skills tend to contribute positively to the 
survival profiles of IPO issuers. I show that IPO firms with specialist CEOs have a lower 
probability of failure and survive for a longer time than firms with generalist CEOs. The 
influence of CEOs’ specialist experience on IPO survival remains strong after controlling 
for the effects of high-tech industries, crisis periods, CEO power, the inclusion of 
acquired firms in the failed firm category, and the exclusion of IPO firms which have 
CEO turnovers within five years after the offering. I also mitigate the concern that my 
results are biased by the endogeneity of CEO selection by applying the propensity score 
matching approach. 
Overall, the findings suggest that specialist experience of CEOs is an important 
dimension of CEO characteristics and can exert a positive influence on the survivability 
of IPO firms. From this perspective, my study not only contributes to the finance literature 
that explores the effect of managerial characteristics on corporate outcomes but also 
extends the upper echelon theory by establishing how organisational outcomes are linked 
with career backgrounds of CEOs. My focus on this paper is to investigate which type of 
managerial experience, i.e. generalist managerial skills or specialist managerial skills, 
improves the survivability of IPO firms. To better understand how specialist CEOs can 
affect IPO survival, it is plausible for future research to further examine channels through 
which specialist CEOs can influence their firms’ survival profiles. In my analysis, I 
suggest that financial leverage is one of the possible channels. The level of financial 
leverage is significantly higher among IPOs with generalist CEOs than firms with 
specialist CEOs, and financial leverage is associated with an increased probability of 
failure and shorter time to survive. Therefore, it is very likely that generalist CEOs with 
their greater risk attitudes and better ability to raise external funds will tend to exceedingly 
use financial leverage, which leads to lower future survivability. In addition, in my 
research, I specify specialist CEOs and generalist CEOs based mainly on their external 
job mobility, future researchers may also want to refine the measure of prior managerial 
experience, for example, to include as well internal experience, functional experience, or 
qualitative data based on in-depth interviews or surveys to produce more detailed analyses 
of prior experience of CEOs. Last but not least, although my emphasis has been on CEOs, 
there may be an opportunity to explore the implications of prior work experience for top 
management team members as a whole.  
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Table 4. 1 Variable definition 
Panel A: CEO characteristics 
Variable Definition 
CEO age Age of CEO in years (BoardEx). 
CEO gender Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is female, and zero 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO tenure Number of years working as CEO in the firm until the IPO (BoardEx).  
CEO-Chairman Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is also chairman of the 
board, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO-Founder Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is also founder of the firm, 
and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares owned by CEO in the issue year (SEC’s EDGAR). 
MBA Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO has an MBA degree, and 
zero otherwise (BoardEx).  
PhD Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO has a PhD degree, and zero 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
Ivy League alumnus Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is an alumnus of an Ivy 
League institution, and zero otherwise (BoardEx). 
Internal hire Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is hired internally, and zero 
otherwise (BoardEx). 
Cash compensation Salary and bonus (in thousands of dollars) of CEO in the issue year 
(SEC’s EDGAR). 
Equity compensation Equity incentives and value of options granted (in thousands of dollars) 
of CEO in the issue year (SEC’s EDGAR). 
Total compensation Total compensation of CEO which consists of salary, bonus, equity 
incentives, non-equity incentives, options, and other compensation in 
the issue year (SEC’s EDGAR). 
General ability index First factor of applying principal component analysis to five proxies of 
general managerial ability: Number of roles, Number of firms, Number 
of industries, CEO experience dummy, Conglomerate experience 
dummy. 
Specialist CEO Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is a specialist, and zero 
otherwise. CEO is classified as a specialist if CEO’s general ability 
index is below the median of the IPO sample. 
Number of roles Number of roles in which CEO has worked before becoming CEO in 
the IPO firm (BoardEx). 
Number of firms Number of firms for which CEO has worked before becoming CEO in 
the IPO firm (BoardEx). 
Number of industries Number of industries (based on four-digit SIC codes) in which CEO 
has worked before becoming CEO in the IPO firm (BoardEx). 
CEO experience dummy Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO worked as a CEO in another 
firm before becoming CEO in the IPO firm, and zero otherwise 
(BoardEx). 
Conglomerate experience dummy Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO worked in a multi-segment 
firm before becoming CEO in the IPO firm, and zero otherwise 
(BoardEx). 
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Powerful CEO Dummy variable that equals to one if CEO is powerful, and zero 
otherwise. CEO is classified as being powerful if CEO’s power index 
is above the median of the IPO sample. CEO power index is the first 
factor of applying principal components analysis on five proxies of 
CEO power: CEO-Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO ownership, CEO 
tenure, and Ivy League alumnus.  
Panel B: Firm and offering characteristics 
Variable Definition 
Firm age Firm age in years measured as the difference between the firm’s IPO 
year and its founding year. Company founding years are collected from 
the Field-Ritter dataset.18 
Sales Total sales in the issue year (Compustat SALE) 
Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets in the issue year (Compustat 
EBITDA/AT). 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets in the issue year (Compustat (DLC + 
DLTT)/AT). 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenses to book value of total 
assets in the issue year (Compustat XRD/AT). 
Advertising Ratio of advertising expenses to total assets in the issue year 
(Compustat XAD/AT). 
Capital expenditure Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets in the issue year (Compustat 
CAPX/AT). 
Diversification Number of business segments in which the IPO firm operates 
(Compustat). 
Proceeds Total proceeds of the IPO (SDC).  
Big4 auditor Dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is audited by a big four 
audit firm, and zero otherwise. Big four audit firms include Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(Compustat AU). 
Venture capitalist Dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is venture backed, 
and zero otherwise (SDC). 
Top-tier investment bank Dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is underwritten by 
most reputable underwriters, zero otherwise (SDC). Most reputable 
underwriters are those with a ranking score of 9.0 or above based on 
Jay Ritter’s underwriter rankings.19 
Market-to-book Market-to-book ratio in the issue year (Compustat (PRCC_F*CSHO)/ 
(AT-LT)). 
High-tech industry Dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is in an industry with 
a SIC code of 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 
3675, 3577, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 
3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 
3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812 4813 (telephone equipment), 
4899 (communications services), 7371 – 7375, 7378, or 7379 
(software), and zero otherwise (SDC). 
Initial returns Stock returns on the first day of trading (CRSP). 
Delist Dummy variable that equals to one if the IPO firm is delisted within 5 
years after the offering, and zero otherwise (CRSP). 
                                                          
18 The Field-Ritter dataset is available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm. 
19 IPO underwriter reputation rankings are available on Jay Ritter’s webpage: 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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Survived firms Firms that are still trading. Their CRSP delist code is 100 (CRSP). 
Acquired firms Firms that are acquired in mergers. Their CRSP delist code is from 200 
to 299 (CRSP). 
Failed firms Firms that are delisted due to negative reasons. Their CRSP delist code 
is greater than or equal to 300 (CRSP). 
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Table 4. 2 Distribution by issue year and industry of three IPO groups – Failed, Acquired, and 
Survived 
The table presents the distribution of three groups of IPOs categorised based on CRSP delist codes: Failed, 
Acquired, and Survived. Survived firms are those that are still trading (delist code of 100). Acquired firms 
are those that are delisted due to acquisitions (delist code from 200 to 299). Failed firms are those that are 
delisted for negative reasons (delist code greater than or equal to 300). N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs from 1999-2009 
 From IPO date to December 2014 From IPO date to five years after IPO 
 N % N % 
Failed  83 11.50 54 7.48 
Acquired 342 47.37 206 28.53 
Survived 297 41.13 462 63.99 
Total  722 100.00 722 100.00 
 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution by issue year of three groups of IPOs – Failed, Acquired, and Survived 
Year All IPOs Failed Acquired Survived 
N N % N % N % 
1999 107 16 14.95 41 38.32 50 46.73 
2000 125 7 5.60 30 24.00 88 70.40 
2001 30 2 6.67 9 30.00 19 63.33 
2002 30 2 6.67 10 33.33 18 60.00 
2003 39 4 10.26 14 35.90 21 53.85 
2004 95 3 3.16 30 31.58 62 65.26 
2005 71 3 4.23 16 22.54 52 73.24 
2006 83 7 8.43 19 22.89 57 68.67 
2007 98 7 7.14 27 27.55 64 65.31 
2008 14 2 14.29 2 14.29 10 71.43 
2009 30 1 3.33 8 26.67 21 70.00 
Total 722 54  206  462  
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO. 
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Panel C: Distribution by industry of three groups of IPOs – Failed, Acquired, and Survived 
Industry 
(two-digit SIC codes) 
All IPOs Failed Acquired Survived 
N N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  
(13) 
 
22 1 4.55 2 9.09 19 86.36 
Food products 
(20) 
5 1 20.00 1 20.00 3 60.00 
Chemical products 
(28) 
 
107 9 8.41 32 29.91 66 61.68 
Manufacturing 
(30 - 34) 
17 4 23.53 3 17.65 10 58.82 
Computer equipment & 
services (35, 73) 
 
229 18 7.86 85 37.12 126 55.02 
Electronic equipment 
(36) 
70 3 4.29 23 32.86 44 62.86 
Scientific instruments 
(38) 
60 5 8.33 19 31.67 36 60.00 
Transportation & public 
utilities (41, 42, 44 - 49) 
 
56 4 7.14 10 17.86 42 75.00 
Wholesale & retail trade 
(50 - 59) 
54 3 5.56 12 22.22 39 72.22 
Entertainment services 
(70, 78, 79) 
13 1 7.69 0 0.00 12 92.31 
Health services 
(80) 
19 1 5.26 5 26.32 13 68.42 
All others (01, 12, 15, 17, 
22-27, 29, 37, 39, 72, 75, 
82, 87, 96) 
70 4 5.71 14 20.00 52 74.29 
Total 722 54  206  462  
Note: Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO. 
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Table 4. 3 Survival distribution of IPO firms with specialist and those with generalist CEOs by year of issue and industry 
The table presents the comparison of the distribution and cumulative failure rates by issue year and industry between two groups of IPO firms: those with specialist CEOs, and 
those with generalist CEOs. The cumulative failure rates are examined for five years after the IPO. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: Survival distribution of IPO firms with specialist and generalist CEOs by year of issue 
Year 
CEO work 
experience 
IPO sample 
Cumulative number and percentage of firms that failed after the IPO 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
1999 Specialist  52 48.60 0 0.00 3 5.77 4 7.69 5 9.62 6 11.54 
 Generalist  55 51.40 0 0.00 3 5.45 8 14.55 9 16.36 10 18.18 
2000 
 
Specialist  46 36.80 0 0.00 1 2.17 2 4.35 2 4.35 2 4.35 
 Generalist 79 63.20 0 0.00 3 3.80 3 3.80 5 6.33 5 6.33 
2001 Specialist  8 26.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 22 73.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.55 1 4.55 2 9.09 
2002 Specialist  7 23.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 23 76.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.35 1 4.35 2 8.70 
2003 Specialist  22 56.41 0 0.00 2 9.09 2 9.09 2 9.09 2 9.09 
 Generalist 17 43.59 1 5.88 1 5.88 1 5.88 1 5.88 2 11.76 
2004 Specialist  58 61.05 0 0.00 2 3.45 2 3.45 2 3.45 2 3.45 
 Generalist 37 38.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.70 
2005 Specialist  37 52.11 0 0.00 1 2.70 1 2.70 1 2.70 2 5.41 
 Generalist 34 47.89 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.94 1 2.94 
2006 Specialist  53 63.86 0 0.00 1 1.89 2 3.77 4 7.55 4 7.55 
 Generalist 30 36.14 0 0.00 2 6.67 3 10.00 3 10.00 3 10.00 
2007 Specialist  56 57.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.79 1 1.79 
 Generalist 42 42.86 0 0.00 2 4.76 3 7.14 6 14.29 6 14.29 
2008 Specialist  8 57.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 Generalist 6 42.86 0 0.00 2 33.33 2 33.33 2 33.33 2 33.33 
2009 Specialist  13 43.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 7.69 1 7.69 
 Generalist 17 56.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1999-
2009 
Specialist 360 49.79 0 0.00 10 2.78 13 3.61 18 5.00 20 5.56 
Generalist 362 50.21 1 0.28 13 3.58 22 6.06 29 7.99 34 9.37 
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Panel B: Survival distribution of IPO firms with specialist and generalist CEOs by industry 
Industry  
(two-digit SIC codes) 
CEO work 
experience 
IPO sample 
Cumulative number and percentage of firms that failed after the IPO 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Oil and gas  Specialist  8 36.36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 12.50 1 12.50 
(13) Generalist 14 63.64 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Food products Specialist  1 20.00 0 0.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 
(20) Generalist 4 80.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Chemical products Specialist  61 57.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 1.64 1 1.64 
(28) Generalist 46 42.99 1 2.17 1 2.17 2 4.35 6 13.04 8 17.39 
Manufacturing Specialist  10 58.82 0 0.00 2 20.00 3 30.00 3 30.00 3 30.00 
(30-34) Generalist 7 41.18 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 
Computer equipment & 
services 
Specialist  115 50.22 0 0.00 5 4.35 6 5.22 7 6.09 9 7.83 
services (35, 73) Generalist 114 49.78 0 0.00 1 0.88 6 5.26 8 7.02 9 7.89 
Electronic equipment Specialist  37 52.86 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 2.70 1 2.70 
(36) Generalist 33 47.14 0 0.00 1 3.03 1 3.03 2 6.06 2 6.06 
Scientific instruments Specialist  27 45.00 0 0.00 1 3.70 1 3.70 2 7.41 2 7.41 
(38) Generalist 33 55.00 0 0.00 1 3.03 2 6.06 2 6.06 3 9.09 
Transportation & public 
utilities 
Specialist  23 41.07 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 4.35 1 4.35 1 4.35 
utilities (41, 42, 44-49) Generalist 33 58.93 0 0.00 2 6.06 3 9.09 3 9.09 3 9.09 
Wholesale & retail trade Specialist  29 53.70 0 0.00 1 3.45 1 3.45 1 3.45 1 3.45 
(50-59) Generalist 25 46.30 0 0.00 1 4.00 1 4.00 1 4.00 2 8.00 
Entertainment services Specialist  6 46.15 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(70, 78, 79) Generalist 7 53.85 0 0.00 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 1 14.29 
Health services Specialist  8 42.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(80) Generalist 11 57.89 0 0.00 1 9.09 1 9.09 1 9.09 1 9.09 
All others Specialist  35 49.30 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
(01, 12, 15, 17, 22-27, 29, 
37, 39, 72, 75, 82, 87, 96) 
Generalist 35 50.70 0 0.00 4 11.43 4 11.43 4 11.43 4 11.43 
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Table 4. 4 Descriptive statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample of US IPOs over the period from 1999 to 2009. CEO work experience, CEO characteristics, firm and offering characteristics are 
illustrated in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. Tests of difference in means between two samples of IPO firms with specialist and 
generalist CEOs are based on t-tests. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: CEO work experience 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
specialist CEOs 
 
IPOs with 
generalist CEOs 
 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 sd Mean Mean  
General ability index 722 -0.00 -1.13 -0.28 0.84 1.51 -1.15 1.15  
Number of roles 722 5.07 3.00 5.00 7.00 2.82 3.46 6.66  
Number of firms 722 5.13 3.00 4.00 6.00 3.31 3.10 7.13  
Number of industries 722 1.47 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.93 1.00 1.94  
CEO experience dummy 722 0.52 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.70  
Conglomerate dummy 722 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.13 0.61  
 
 
Panel B: CEO characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
specialist CEOs 
 
IPOs with 
generalist CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
CEO age 722 49.18 43.00 49.00 5 .00 8.07 47.96 50.57 0.000 
CEO gender 722 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.228 
CEO tenure 722 4.40 1.00 3.00 6.00 4.42 4.96 3.83 0.002 
Internal hire 722 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.29 0.24 0.040 
CEO-Chairman 722 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.39 0.34 0.070 
CEO-Founder 722 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.35 0.20 0.000 
CEO ownership 722 12.63 2.10 4.30 13.88 18.66 13.76 11.48 0.055 
Cash compensation 722 658.11 292.16 409.76 641.15 1494.21 603.80 713.37 0.168 
Equity compensation 722 690.08 0.00 149.83 605.38 1938.34 553.47 829.49 0.031 
Total compensation 722 1666.07 444.42 805.94 1561.21 3071.64 1468.40 1866.62 0.044 
MBA 722 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.013 
PhD 722 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.08 0.031 
Ivy League alumnus 722 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.14 0.21 0.006 
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Panel C: Firm  and offering characteristics 
 All IPOs 
IPOs with 
specialist CEOs 
 
IPOs with 
generalist CEOs 
 
Difference 
 
 N Mean p25 p50 p75 
7575 
 
75 
sd Mean Mean p-value 
Firm age 722 17.33 5.00 9.00 18.00 23.67 16.02 18.62 0.070 
Sales 722 401.63 25.19 82.80 288.15 1168.94 276.70 525.86 0.002 
Profitability 722 -0.03 -0.16 0.06 0.14 0.40 -0.01 -0.05 0.024 
Leverage 722 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.16 0.024 
R&D 722 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.18 0.10 0.09 0.349 
Advertising 722 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.457 
Capital expenditure 722 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.268 
Diversification 722 1.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.24 1.52 0.000 
Proceeds 722 144.68 50.00 80.50 140.00 203.36 118.92 170.30 0.000 
Initial returns 722 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.52 0.24 0.32 0.034 
Top-tier underwriter 722 0.51 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.064 
Venture capitalist 722 0.57 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.58 0.56 0.233 
Big4 auditor 722 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.28 0.91 0.93 0.133 
Market-to-book 722 4.12 1.13 2.27 4.20 7.33 4.09 4.14 0.463 
High-tech industry 722 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.473 
Delist 722 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.06 0.09 0.025 
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Table 4. 5 Correlation matrix 
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Specialist CEO 1.000                                 
Log(firm age) 0.024 1.000                               
Log(sales) -0.044 0.558 1.000                             
Top-tier 
underwriter -0.057 0.067 0.209 1.000                           
Big4 auditor -0.041 -0.013 0.034 0.179 1.000                         
Venture 
capitalist 0.027 -0.479 -0.491 0.000 0.174 1.000                       
Profitability 0.074 0.433 0.684 0.097 0.019 -0.392 1.000                     
Leverage -0.074 0.358 0.407 0.187 0.013 -0.369 0.237 1.000                   
Market-to-book -0.004 -0.240 -0.218 -0.012 0.002 0.174 -0.159 -0.210 1.000                 
R&D 0.015 -0.199 -0.456 -0.090 -0.012 0.309 -0.540 -0.148 0.085 1.000               
Advertising -0.004 -0.072 0.035 -0.001 0.031 0.020 -0.174 -0.045 -0.020 -0.037 1.000             
Capital 
expenditure -0.023 0.020 0.145 0.052 -0.016 -0.126 0.027 0.200 -0.068 -0.124 0.125 1.000           
Diversification -0.146 0.326 0.365 0.087 -0.027 -0.308 0.180 0.284 -0.115 -0.163 -0.061 0.079 1.000         
Log(proceeds) -0.141 0.321 0.630 0.327 0.107 -0.317 0.411 0.434 -0.129 -0.309 -0.035 0.112 0.305 1.000       
Initial returns -0.060 -0.264 -0.088 0.035 0.055 0.182 -0.081 -0.153 0.504 -0.042 0.007 -0.027 -0.091 -0.006 1.000     
CEO-Chairman 0.055 0.018 0.080 -0.022 -0.074 -0.032 0.108 0.059 -0.006 -0.103 -0.046 0.004 0.040 0.053 0.001 1.000   
CEO-Founder 0.173 -0.224 -0.170 -0.021 0.004 0.218 -0.094 -0.159 0.091 0.104 -0.029 -0.035 -0.131 -0.209 0.093 0.207 1.000 
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Figure 4. 1 Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 2 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
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Log-rank test for equality of survival functions 
  Chi-square = 8.02 
Chi-square test probability = 0.005 
 
 
List of survival functions 
 IPOs with generalist CEOs  IPOs with specialist CEOs 
Time after 
IPO 
Number of 
IPOs 
Survivor 
function 
 Number of 
IPOs 
Survivor 
function 
1 year 354 0.997  358 1.000 
2 year 306 0.961  328 0.971 
3 year 264 0.931  301 0.962 
4 year 237 0.906  278 0.945 
5 year 214 0.886  248 0.938 
6 year 179 0.876  220 0.927 
7 year 156 0.845  194 0.909 
8 year 125 0.839  143 0.897 
9 year 101 0.802  112 0.890 
10 year 78 0.793  86 0.881 
11 year 60 0.782  56 0.881 
12 year 51 0.767  43 0.881 
13 year 42 0.767  37 0.881 
14 year 32 0.767  31 0.881 
15 year 12 0.739  13 0.881 
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Table 4. 6 Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-
to failure for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. All regressions control for industry and 
year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. One, two and 
three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The test statistics 
are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.048*** 0.351                  
 (-3.89)                   
General ability index   0.366*** 1.443 
   (4.26)     
Log(firm age) -0.593 0.553 -0.494    0.610 
 (-1.27)  (-1.06)     
Log(sales) -0.688** 0.503 -0.690**  0.501 
 (-2.28)  (-2.32)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.487* 0.615 -0.509*   0.601 
 (-1.68)  (-1.75)     
Big4 auditor -0.417 0.659 -0.328    0.720 
 (-0.88)  (-0.70)     
Venture capitalist 0.007 1.007 -0.014    0.986 
 (0.02)  (-0.04)     
Profitability -2.119*** 0.120 -2.267*** 0.104 
 (-3.51)  (-3.84)     
Leverage 2.569*** 13.058 2.655*** 14.231 
 (3.93)  (4.17)     
Market-to-book -0.106*** 0.899 -0.107*** 0.899 
 (-2.81)  (-2.85)     
R&D -0.403 0.668 -0.464    0.629 
 (-0.61)  (-0.71)     
Advertising 2.497* 12.143 2.166*   8.723 
 (1.95)  (1.72)     
Capital expenditure -0.434 0.648 -0.144    0.866 
 (-0.30)  (-0.10)     
Diversification -0.192 0.826 -0.256    0.774 
 (-1.05)  (-1.38)     
Log(proceeds) -1.013* 0.363 -1.030**  0.357 
 (-1.92)  (-1.97)     
Initial returns 0.430* 1.537 0.496**  1.641 
 (1.91)  (2.29)     
CEO-Chairman -0.455 0.635 -0.492*   0.612 
 (-1.58)  (-1.70)     
CEO-Founder -0.225 0.798 -0.104    0.901 
 (-0.73)  (-0.34)    
     
Chi-square 203.78  204.88  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  
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 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Number of roles 0.197*** 1.217                        
 (3.96)                         
Number of firms   0.146*** 1.157       
   (4.31)        
Number of industries     0.273* 1.314     
     (1.80)      
CEO experience dummy       0.540** 1.717   
       (2.07)    
Conglomerate experience 
dummy 
        0.491* 1.634 
         (1.74)  
Log(firm age) -0.529 0.589 -0.490 0.613 -0.453 0.636 -0.518 0.596 -0.433    0.648 
 (-1.11)  (-1.06)  (-0.96)  (-1.07)  (-0.92)     
Log(sales) -0.731** 0.482 -0.718** 0.488 -0.663** 0.515 -0.612** 0.542 -0.689**  0.502 
 (-2.43)  (-2.36)  (-2.23)  (-2.02)  (-2.28)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.494* 0.610 -0.415 0.661 -0.494* 0.610 -0.397 0.673 -0.486*   0.615 
 (-1.71)  (-1.42)  (-1.70)  (-1.35)  (-1.68)     
Big4 auditor -0.293 0.746 -0.256 0.774 -0.398 0.672 -0.348 0.706 -0.434    0.648 
 (-0.62)  (-0.55)  (-0.85)  (-0.72)  (-0.91)     
Venture capitalist -0.095 0.909 -0.011 0.989 -0.012 0.988 0.048 1.049 0.007    1.007 
 (-0.29)  (-0.03)  (-0.04)  (0.14)  (0.02)     
Profitability -2.395*** 0.091 -2.231*** 0.107 -2.109*** 0.121 -2.199*** 0.111 -2.273*** 0.103 
 (-4.07)  (-3.74)  (-3.53)  (-3.65)  (-3.79)     
Leverage 2.347*** 10.456 2.566*** 13.018 2.534*** 12.609 2.479*** 11.923 2.556*** 12.880 
 (3.72)  (4.20)  (4.10)  (4.00)  (4.03)     
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Market-to-book -0.130*** 0.878 -0.107*** 0.899 -0.103*** 0.902 -0.100*** 0.905 -0.110*** 0.896 
 (-3.26)  (-2.84)  (-2.75)  (-2.62)  (-2.94)     
R&D -0.474 0.622 -0.306 0.737 -0.258 0.773 -0.393 0.675 -0.348    0.706 
 (-0.72)  (-0.46)  (-0.40)  (-0.59)  (-0.53)     
Advertising 1.793 6.007 2.187* 8.905 2.314* 10.114 2.400** 11.025 2.171*   8.765 
 (1.46)  (1.85)  (1.90)  (1.96)  (1.79)     
Capital expenditure -0.453 0.636 0.134 1.144 -0.401 0.669 -0.840 0.432 -0.454    0.635 
 (-0.31)  (0.09)  (-0.27)  (-0.55)  (-0.31)     
Diversification -0.195 0.823 -0.200 0.819 -0.131 0.877 -0.163 0.850 -0.206    0.814 
 (-1.09)  (-1.11)  (-0.75)  (-0.91)  (-1.12)     
Log(proceeds) -1.035** 0.355 -0.967* 0.380 -0.821 0.440 -0.779 0.459 -0.799    0.450 
 (-1.96)  (-1.88)  (-1.58)  (-1.48)  (-1.53)     
Initial returns 0.524** 1.689 0.462** 1.587 0.457** 1.579 0.432* 1.540 0.452**  1.572 
 (2.50)  (2.08)  (2.17)  (1.95)  (2.13)     
CEO-Chairman -0.434 0.648 -0.426 0.653 -0.350 0.705 -0.452 0.637 -0.387    0.679 
 (-1.50)  (-1.48)  (-1.24)  (-1.54)  (-1.35)     
CEO-Founder -0.037 0.963 -0.205 0.814 -0.245 0.783 -0.218 0.804 -0.207    0.813 
 (-0.12)  (-0.67)  (-0.81)  (-0.71)  (-0.68)     
           
Chi-square 203.29  203.54  190.89  192.23  190.83  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  722  722  722  722  
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Table 4. 7 Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-
to failure controlling for high-tech industries for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. 
Specification (1) includes a dummy variable High-tech industry and an interaction term between Specialist 
CEO and High-tech industry. Specification (2) is conducted on the sub-sample of IPO firms in high-tech 
industries. Specification (3) is conducted on the sub-sample of IPO firms not in the high-tech industries. All 
regressions include year dummies whose coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
 
 Overall IPO sample IPOs in high-tech 
industries 
IPOs not in high-tech 
industries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient Hazard 
ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.622**  0.537 -0.751*   0.472 -0.584*   0.558 
 
 (-1.98)     (-1.69)     (-1.76)     
High-tech industry 0.282    1.325     
 (0.88)         
Specialist CEO * High-tech 
industry 
-0.212    0.809     
(-0.43)         
Log(firm age) -0.601    0.548 -1.110    0.329 0.229    1.257 
 (-1.48)     (-1.38)     (0.41)     
Log(sales) -0.495**  0.610 -1.297*** 0.273 -0.669**  0.512 
 (-2.13)     (-2.94)     (-2.36)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.336    0.715 -0.204    0.815 -0.452    0.636 
 (-1.24)     (-0.47)     (-1.19)     
Big4 auditor -0.232    0.793 1.119    3.063 -0.563    0.569 
 (-0.54)     (0.91)     (-1.10)     
Venture capitalist -0.369    0.691 -0.655    0.519 -0.671    0.511 
 (-1.32)     (-1.37)     (-1.38)     
Profitability -2.404*** 0.090 -1.999**  0.135 -2.972*** 0.051 
 (-4.85)     (-2.35)     (-4.68)     
Leverage 2.356*** 10.549 1.784*   5.953 2.151*** 8.595 
 (4.66)     (1.68)     (3.05)     
Market-to-book -0.099*** 0.906 -0.064    0.938 -0.309*** 0.734 
 (-2.76)     (-1.38)     (-3.54)     
R&D -2.559**  0.077 -3.722    0.024 -0.333    0.717 
 (-2.25)     (-1.59)     (-0.51)     
Advertising 2.472    11.851 8.491**  4871.218 1.320    3.744 
 (1.56)     (2.18)     (1.01)     
Capital expenditure 0.354    1.425 -1.519    0.219 1.632    5.113 
 (0.28)     (-0.52)     (1.12)     
Diversification -0.161    0.852 -0.059    0.943 -0.226    0.798 
 (-0.99)     (-0.18)     (-1.16)     
Log(proceeds) -0.684*   0.505 -0.021    0.979 -0.901*   0.406 
 (-1.66)     (-0.02)     (-1.69)     
Initial returns 0.355*   1.426 0.364    1.439 0.745**  2.107 
 (1.82)     (1.17)     (2.19)     
CEO-Chairman -0.426    0.653 -0.303    0.739 -0.321    0.725 
 (-1.62)     (-0.72)     (-0.85)     
CEO-Founder -0.164    0.849 0.287    1.332 -0.135    0.873 
 (-0.59)     (0.61)     (-0.33)     
       
Chi-square 144.19  78.14  104.33  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  324  398  
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Table 4. 8 Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to-
failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-
to failure controlling for crisis periods for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. Crisis periods 
include the collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2000-2001 and the financial crisis 2007-2008. Specification 
(1) includes a dummy variable Crisis period and an interaction term between Specialist CEO and Crisis 
period. Specification (2) is conducted on the sub-sample of IPO firms in the crisis periods. Specification (3) 
is conducted on the sub-sample of IPO firms not in the crisis periods. All models include industry dummies 
whose coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
One, two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
 
 Overall IPO sample IPOs in crisis periods IPOs not in crisis periods 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.699**  0.497 -2.450*** 0.086 -0.985*** 0.373 
 
 (-2.18)     (-3.59)     (-2.76)     
Crisis period -0.057    0.945     
 (-0.17)         
Specialist CEO * Crisis 
period 
-0.768    0.464     
(-1.35)         
Log(firm age) -0.586    0.557 -1.795*   0.166 -0.024    0.976 
 (-1.33)     (-1.84)     (-0.04)     
Log(sales) -0.868*** 0.420 -1.457**  0.233 -0.779**  0.459 
 (-2.98)     (-2.08)     (-2.05)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.507*   0.602 -1.796*** 0.166 -0.094    0.910 
 (-1.77)     (-2.67)     (-0.23)     
Big4 auditor -0.564    0.569 2.749    15.620 -0.529    0.589 
 (-1.30)     (1.47)     (-0.93)     
Venture capitalist -0.132    0.877 -0.273    0.761 0.161    1.174 
 (-0.41)     (-0.31)     (0.39)     
Profitability -2.004*** 0.135 -4.891*** 0.008 -3.057*** 0.047 
 (-3.40)     (-2.93)     (-3.93)     
Leverage 2.654*** 14.206 3.791*   44.319 2.841*** 17.140 
 (4.37)     (1.90)     (3.48)     
Market-to-book -0.103*** 0.902 -0.433*** 0.649 -0.075*   0.928 
 (-2.67)     (-2.70)     (-1.85)     
R&D 0.162    1.176 3.251    25.818 -5.781*** 0.003 
 (0.25)     (1.50)     (-2.85)     
Advertising 2.655**  14.219 3.923*   50.568 3.303    27.205 
 (2.11)     (1.80)     (1.28)     
Capital expenditure -0.646    0.524 -10.702*** 0.000 1.076    2.934 
 (-0.46)     (-2.61)     (0.56)     
Diversification -0.187    0.829 1.212*** 3.360 -0.557*   0.573 
 (-1.07)     (2.63)     (-1.94)     
Log(proceeds) -0.520    0.594 -2.129**  0.119 -0.489    0.613 
 (-1.07)     (-2.04)     (-0.77)     
Initial returns 0.356    1.428 0.684    1.982 0.596*   1.814 
 (1.59)     (1.55)     (1.86)     
CEO-Chairman -0.496*   0.609 -1.873*** 0.154 -0.501    0.606 
 (-1.78)     (-2.60)     (-1.37)     
CEO-Founder -0.161    0.852 0.866    2.378 -0.092    0.912 
 (-0.54)     (1.31)     (-0.24)     
       
Chi-square 192.57  134.61  139.42  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  267  455  
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Table 4. 9 Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to-
failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-
to failure controlling for CEO power for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. CEO power 
index is the first factor of applying principal component analysis on the five proxies for CEO power: CEO-
Chairman, CEO-Founder, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and Ivy League alumnus. Powerful CEOs are those 
whose power index is greater than the sample median. Specification (1) includes a dummy variable Powerful 
CEO and an interaction term between Specialist CEO and Powerful CEO. Specification (2) is conducted on 
the sub-sample of IPO firms with powerful CEOs. Specification (3) is conducted on the sub-sample of IPO 
firms without powerful CEOs. All models include industry and year dummies whose coefficients are 
suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three 
asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Table 4.1. 
 
 Overall IPO sample IPOs with powerful 
CEOs 
IPOs without powerful 
CEOs 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Coefficient  Hazard 
ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.509*** 0.221 -1.056*   0.348 
 
-2.611*** 0.073 
 
 (-2.98)     (-1.89)     (-3.40)     
Powerful CEO -0.409    0.664     
 (-0.92)         
Specialist CEO * Powerful CEO 0.444    1.560     
(0.61)         
Log(firm age) -0.735    0.480 0.038    1.039 -2.331*   0.097 
 (-1.10)     (0.04)     (-1.81)     
Log(sales) -1.049**  0.350 -2.441*** 0.087 -1.716*   0.180 
 (-2.51)     (-3.20)     (-1.77)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.561    0.570 0.336    1.399 -0.057    0.944 
 (-1.51)     (0.50)     (-0.07)     
Big4 auditor -0.360    0.698 -1.725    0.178 1.278    3.590 
 (-0.58)     (-1.55)     (0.96)     
Venture capitalist -0.187    0.829 -0.859    0.423 -0.279    0.757 
 (-0.45)     (-1.45)     (-0.29)     
Profitability -2.677*** 0.069 1.120    3.066 -5.102*** 0.006 
 (-3.21)     (0.87)     (-2.91)     
Leverage 3.937*** 51.246 4.060**  57.961 0.280    1.324 
 (3.67)     (2.01)     (0.12)     
Market-to-book -0.133**  0.875 -0.094    0.910 -0.533*** 0.587 
 (-2.46)     (-1.59)     (-2.68)     
R&D -3.977**  0.019 1.909    6.745 -3.396    0.033 
 (-2.21)     (1.38)     (-1.48)     
Advertising 3.062    21.369 -1.126    0.324 3.161    23.593 
 (1.20)     (-0.21)     (0.56)     
Capital expenditure -3.033    0.048 1.438    4.214 -5.982    0.003 
 (-1.22)     (0.36)     (-1.04)     
Diversification -0.443    0.642 0.308    1.360 -0.741    0.476 
 (-1.64)     (0.63)     (-1.28)     
Log(proceeds) -0.328    0.720 0.652    1.920 -1.951    0.142 
 (-0.50)     (0.57)     (-1.23)     
Initial returns 0.373    1.452 0.815**  2.259 0.541    1.718 
 (1.30)     (2.12)     (0.57)     
       
Chi-square 158.05  89.31  135.26  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Number of observations 722  361  256  
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Table 4. 10 Estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to-
failure 
The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-to 
failure controlling for CEO characteristics for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. CEO 
characteristics included in the model are: CEO age, CEO tenure, Internal hire, CEO ownership, Total 
compensation, MBA, PhD, Ivy League alumnus. All models include industry and year dummies whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, 
two and three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -1.340*** 0.262 
 (-3.00)     
Log(firm age) -0.935    0.393 
 (-1.16)     
Log(sales) -1.079*   0.340 
 (-1.85)     
Top-tier underwriter -0.646    0.524 
 (-1.38)     
Big4 auditor -1.125    0.325 
 (-1.63)     
Venture capitalist -0.258    0.772 
 (-0.48)     
Profitability -3.025*** 0.049 
 (-2.75)     
Leverage 5.547*** 256.550 
 (4.36)     
Market-to-book -0.152**  0.859 
 (-2.21)     
R&D -0.742    0.476 
 (-0.90)     
Advertising 2.337    10.349 
 (0.76)     
Capital expenditure -7.356*   0.001 
 (-1.76)     
Diversification -0.211    0.809 
 (-0.67)     
Log(proceeds) -0.102    0.903 
 (-0.14)     
Initial returns 0.574    1.776 
 (1.43)     
CEO-Chairman -0.322    0.724 
 (-0.65)     
CEO-Founder -0.257    0.773 
 (-0.56)     
CEO age 0.059*   1.061 
 (1.82)     
CEO tenure -0.014    0.987 
 (-0.24)     
Internal hire -0.004    0.996 
 (-0.01)     
CEO ownership 0.004    1.004 
 (0.24)     
Log(total compensation) 0.369    1.447 
 (0.56)     
MBA 0.411    1.509 
 (0.91)     
PhD 0.848    2.336 
 (1.41)     
Ivy League alumnus 0.670    1.955 
 (1.38)     
   
Chi-square 153.51  
Chi-square test probability 0.000  
Number of observations 438  
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Table 4. 11 Endogeneity control – Propensity score matching 
The table illustrates the analysis of the effect of specialist CEOs on the occurrence of delisting in the five 
year period subsequent to the offering for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009, controlling 
for the endogeneity of CEO selection using propensity score matching. The variables used for matching 
include: Log(firm age), Log(sales), Top-tier underwriter, ROA, R&D, Advertising, Capital expenditure, 
Diversification, CEO-Founder, CEO-Chairman, High-tech industry, Year dummies. All variables are 
defined in Table 4.1. The test statistic is shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimate. One, two and 
three asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 Delist  
ATET 
(Specialist CEOs vs. Generalist CEOs) 
-0.078*** 
(-2.80) 
  
Number of observations 722 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 12 Other robustness checks 
The table illustrates the estimation of the Cox proportional hazard model of probability of failure and time-
to failure for the sample of US IPOs over the period 1999-2009. Specification (1) is the estimation in which 
failed firms include those delisted from the stock exchanges due to both negative reasons and acquisitions. 
Specification (2) is the estimation for the sample of IPO firms excluding those that have CEO turnovers 
within 5 years after the offering. All models include industry and year dummies whose coefficients are 
suppressed. The test statistics are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. One, two and three 
asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are defined 
in Table 4.1. 
 
 Failed firms include those 
delisted from the stock 
exchanges for both negative 
reasons and acquisitions 
 
 IPO sample excludes firms that 
have CEO turnover within 5 years 
after the offering 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coefficient  Hazard ratio  Coefficient  Hazard ratio 
Specialist CEO -0.500*** 0.606  -0.938*** 0.391 
 (-4.57)      (-2.98)     
Log(firm age) -0.353*   0.702  -1.005*   0.366 
 (-1.89)      (-1.91)     
Log(sales) -0.047    0.954  -0.510    0.601 
 (-0.36)      (-1.42)     
Top-tier underwriter 0.091    1.095  -0.609*   0.544 
 (0.81)      (-1.84)     
Big4 auditor -0.305    0.737  -0.472    0.624 
 (-1.36)      (-0.72)     
Venture capitalist 0.079    1.082  0.284    1.329 
 (0.57)      (0.75)     
Profitability -1.169*** 0.311  -2.269*** 0.103 
 (-3.74)      (-3.17)     
Leverage 1.024*** 2.784  2.356*** 10.547 
 (3.30)      (2.90)     
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Market-to-book -0.027*** 0.973  -0.097**  0.907 
 (-2.90)      (-2.22)     
R&D -0.549    0.577  -3.741**  0.024 
 (-1.10)      (-2.00)     
Advertising 1.273    3.570  2.996**  20.003 
 (1.53)      (2.24)     
Capital expenditure -1.666**  0.189  0.066    1.068 
 (-2.06)      (0.04)     
Diversification -0.405*** 0.667  -0.173    0.841 
 (-4.62)      (-0.83)     
Log(proceeds) -0.257    0.774  -0.732    0.481 
 (-1.22)      (-1.20)     
Initial returns 0.192**  1.212  0.290    1.336 
 (2.10)      (1.13)     
CEO-Chairman -0.551*** 0.576  -0.768**  0.464 
 (-4.67)      (-2.28)     
CEO-Founder 0.084    1.087  -0.029    0.971 
 (0.70)      (-0.09)     
      
Chi-square 254.96   169.29  
Chi-square test probability 0.000   0.000  
Number of observations 722   592  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I examine the effects of credit ratings and a CEO’s work experience 
on EM and post-issue performance of US IPOs. First of all, I study the impact of credit 
ratings on EM around IPOs. I find that firms going public with a credit rating are less 
likely to engage in both accrual-based and real EM in the offering year. I also do an 
additional test concerning the credit rating level but do not find a significant association 
between the rating level and EM in the issue year. This suggests that it is the presence of 
a CRA that matters, not the rating per se. In addition, analysing the interaction effect 
between CRAs and other financial intermediaries involving in the IPO process such as 
venture capitalists, investment banks, and auditing firms, I further document that CRAs 
further constrains the EM of IPO firms that are venture backed, underwritten by reputable 
investment banks, and audited by large accounting firms. Overall, the findings support 
my argument that CRAs play a significant role in restraining managers of IPO firms from 
EM activities. I also investigate the managerial intent in undertaking EM and find that 
while managers of unrated firms tend to opportunistically manage earnings upward to 
influence short-term stock prices, managers of rated firms use their accounting and 
operating discretion to better inform investors about the firm’s prospects. This is 
consistent with my conjecture that the lower information uncertainty among rated IPOs 
due to the provision of a credit rating facilitates the positive responses from investors to 
the firm’s signalling; therefore, managers of rated IPO firms have more incentives to use 
financial reporting as a channel to convey private information to the less informed 
investors to signal the firm’s value. Since rated firms tend to use accounting discretion 
for informative purposes, the EM in the offering year does not explain the post-issue long-
run stock performance. However, for unrated firms, the income-increasing EM 
undertaken in the issue year can predict the IPO firm’s underperformance in subsequent 
periods.  
Secondly, I provide novel empirical evidence on the association between financial 
expert CEOs and EM around IPOs. I document that financial expert CEOs are not only 
less likely to manipulate earnings in the offering year but also tend to provide investors 
with more informative reported earnings. Additionally, financial expert CEOs with more 
decision making power over the board tend to have a stronger influence on lowering the 
level of EM in the issue year. I also check the results with alternative measures of CEOs’ 
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financial experience such as CFO experience, CPA certification, and financial experience 
variety. For all of the measures, I still find consistent results which suggest the 
significance of financial expert CEOs in providing higher quality in terms of lower EM 
and more informative financial reporting. 
Thirdly, I examine the influence of specialist CEOs on the survival profiles of IPO 
firms and find that specialist managerial experience of CEOs is an important aspect 
determining the future survivability of IPO firms. Particularly, I find that specialist CEOs 
are associated with a lower probability of failure and higher survival rates in subsequent 
periods following the offering. The failure risk of IPO firms with specialist CEOs is 
approximately a third of the failure risk of firms with generalist CEOs. The results remain 
consistent after controlling for the effects of high-tech industries, crisis periods and CEO 
power, as well as endogenous CEO selection.    
As with other research, my study has its own limitations, which open the 
opportunities for future research. First of all, my analysis is focused on the US IPO 
market. I believe that my findings can provide useful insights for both the US and 
international IPO markets such as the European market because the recent trends indicate 
some convergence between the US and European IPO markets (Jain and Kini 2008; Ritter 
2003). However, further research on international IPO markets may be useful in 
strengthening the understanding of the influence of credit ratings and CEOs’ work 
experience on EM and post-issue performance in a different institutional and regulatory 
context. Another issue is regarding the managerial discretion over financial reporting. In 
this study, I apply an EM methodology using accrual expectation models that have been 
widely used in prior literature. However, I acknowledge the rising concerns over the 
explanatory power of this methodology. Therefore, I suggest future research to conduct a 
detailed investigation of actual cases of firms that have been charged with earnings 
manipulation in order to more deeply understand the pervasiveness of financial reporting 
misbehaviours as well as the context in which they occur, and to provide the validation 
of the accrual expectation models. Last but not least, with regard to my analysis of the 
influence of specialist CEOs on IPO survival, it will be useful for future research to 
explore channels through which specialist CEOs can enhance the survivability of IPO 
firms. Moreover, analysis using qualitative data from in-depth surveys or interviews will 
provide additional comprehensive analysis on how prior work experience of CEOs 
contributes to the post-performance of IPO issuing firms.  
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